Obstacles
on the Way of Iran New President
Ali
Asghar Kazemi
June 30, 2013
_________________________
Iran
president-elect Rohani is gradually becoming more and more explicit on various
positions he took during the presidential campaign. In his last speech on June
29 he alluded to almost all critical issues facing the nation and gave a clear-cut
picture on his approach to tackling with them. Albeit he was silent on one
important point, that is the “revolutionary nature” of the Islamic regime and
implications of that characteristic.
When
a revolutionary regime suddenly pledges to become moderate, rationale, tolerant
and open, this means that it is no longer a revolution but a civil society with
law-abiding
citizens.
In other words, it is not possible to be both at the same time which would be
paradoxical. A simple explanation for this paradox is that the Islamic
revolutionary regime is merely showing a tactical shift that is transitional
and temporary.
Four
years ago amidst 2009 tumultuous presidential elections in Iran, I wrote an
article in which I tried to spell-out fundamental obstacles on the way of the
new president, who was optimistically assumed to be a reformist. This however did
not happen but the substance of that article is still relevant in the present
circumstances. The main argument of the
comment at that time was that as long as the Islamic leaders in Iran persist on
the “revolutionary nature” of the regime, this country may not be able to
peacefully integrate in the international community and legitimately benefit from
its advantages while submitting to its obligations.
The
present commentary shall paraphrase some principle points of the previous article
for those students and readers who had not a chance to read that in 2009.
Among
commentators and political analysts inside Iran and on international scene, many
express the opinion that Mr. Hassan Rohani will have hard time ahead in
assuming responsibility as an efficient president to tackle with horrendous
problems on his way. But, none of them, to my knowledge, follow the fundamental
line of argument exposed here. To most of them, factors such as economic
sanctions, political pressure, galloping inflation, recession, unemployment, mismanagement,
intransigence, corruption and the likes are responsible for failure of past
presidents leading to further isolation of Iran. While there is no doubt about
the impact of these important stumbling factors, the argument here is that all
those issues are inevitable byproducts of a more primordial cause which is the
“revolutionary nature” of the Islamic regimes. Here are some explanations about
this unconstructive trait of the ruling system in Iran.
More than three decades after the
ascendance into power of a clergy rule in Iran, the Islamic leaders still insist
on the revolutionary character of their institutions. While each revolution has
generally a limited lifespan beginning with extreme radicalism to authoritarian
rule; Thermidorian period and finally demand for moderation and reconstruction.
The Islamic revolution however claims to be “perpetual” until the reappearance
of the hidden Shiite Imam. This latter aspect has indeed a tremendous impact on
the world view of the rulers and the approach they follow to achieve their
goals on the national and international scene.
Despite widespread publicity about the
miraculous achievement of the outgoing hard-line president, it seems rather
obvious that Iran’s overall international standing has terribly diminished
during the arch-conservative rule. With respect to domestic affaires the
situation is much worse. An economy in shamble, a galloping inflation, and a
general discontent of the accomplishment of Mr. Ahmadinejad who’s various
promises simply did not materialize.
Now, almost eight years after the
conservative grip to power, with a nation at the brink of social and economic
crises, the reformists are embarking for a new comeback under the patronage of
Hassan Rohani who is neither a reformist nor a hard-line conservative but
supposedly somewhere in between. His election was backed by former president
Khatami and the powerful Rafsanjani. He was clever enough to choose platform
that people expected to hear. Slogans such as moderation, rationality,
transparency and constructive interaction with the world for the sake of saving
the country from total collapse, war and insolvency, indeed pleased majority of
people voting for him.
What are the chances of the
president-elect and his reformist comrades to succeed in their promises? Will he be able to restore the lost public confidence
and to respond to the widespread expectations of the people suffered from
economic hardship and political restraints? What are the prospects for normalizing
relations with the world in general and the United States in particular?
As was stated in the commentary in
2009, in order to evaluate the performance of a high position office-holder
such as the president in Iran, one must consider the facts against the
religious-revolutionary natures of the Islamic regime and its worldwide
objectives reflected in its constitutional provisions and ideological
aspirations. In present Iran, no one individual can trespass the red lines
predetermined either by Shari’a, as interpreted by the appropriate body
instituted for that purpose, or by the “supreme leader of the revolution”. Even
the leader who has the final say in matters of “high politics” such as the
nuclear issue or other “strategic decisions” is bound to follow those revolutionary
demands. Of course, he has the prerogative to assess the situation and decide
according to his evaluation of a particular issue. This is to say that the
chief executive and other legislative and judiciary bodies are subordinate to
the “supreme leader.” This means that nothing substantive can take place in the
country by “general will” of the people without the consent of the leader.
With that assumption in mind, one of
the major impediments of the Islamic regime overall conduct in running the
business of the state seems to be the continuing persistence on its
revolutionary slogans. In fact, this feature has created a strong barrier
before Iran’s national objectives and aspirations in setting clear criteria for
determining for example friends and foes in national and international scene. Perhaps
many unfortunate events and vicissitudes during the lifespan of the Islamic
regime so far are geared to this very important dimension of the revolutionary
Iran.
Nevertheless, when states choose to
engage in interactions with their peers, they must have a lucid definition of
their ends and means, a realistic assessment of their partners and above all a
faithful commitment to certain primordial standards (rules of the game) in
international relations. Indeed revolutions have their own peculiarities and
manners and do not necessarily follow conventional norms and expected behavior.
They usually have a tendency to challenge the status quo and even alter
those rules. Thus, many states prefer not to be in love with revolutionary
regimes which by nature have a propensity to be repelling rather than
receptive.
The problem of not being able to
distinguish between its ideological concerns and vital national interests has impeded
the revolutionary Iran in identifying friends and foes and this has almost paralyzed
Iran’s diplomacy especially during recent nuclear crisis. While international
pressure was gradually increasing in order to push it to stop all nuclear
activities, Iran was helplessly looking for friends here and there in order to
get some support for its intransigent position. To this end, a number of
lucrative deals were offered to some potential partners,[1] but, at the critical moment when Iran
needed their help, they turned to its opponents in the UN Security Council.
Iranian leaders should not be surprised
by this unfortunate experience. Indeed, this is the golden rule of the game in
international relations; states only have permanent interests and no permanent
friends or enemies. Yet, an intelligent and rational foreign policy should put
the right emphasis at any particular moment on the means and leverages it has
on its potential friends in order to neutralize or bypass the negative impacts
of its presumed foes’ actions and decisions. When a state puts all of its eggs
in one basket, it may soon end up with unpredictable situations in which it
should sacrifice all at once. No diplomacy that would stake everything on mere
rhetoric and intimidation or concessions deserves to be called intelligent.
While the radical and conservative
hardliners in Iran persist on a return to revolutionary slogans of the regime
and do everything to show this feature, the international community seems quite
alarmed with the development. Thus, most states are reluctant to engage in deep
interaction with a nation defying the prevailing norms. This is not to suggest
that those norms and rules of the game are necessarily ethical, just or fair.
Recent American offer by President Barrack
Obama to open direct talks with Iran may simply be regarded as a calculated
move in order to disarm the conservative groups from their revolutionary
slogans and push Iran to the corner to comply with accepted norms in
international relations. While Obama is pursuing his strategy through soft
power and diplomacy[2], the neo-conservative war-mongers pursue the same objectives by threatening Iran
by hard power. However, for the Islamic leaders, compromising on principles
means giving bitter unnecessary concessions which would devoid the Islamic
regime from its fundamental revolutionary and ideological drives and
values.
While the new-elected president has good
chances to open dialogue with the
West, it is faire to suggest that he
alike other personalities in that capacity is not powerful
enough to make substantive changes in the structure or religious-revolutionary
nature of the Islamic regime. They may be all pursuing the same goals with
different styles. They can merely act within a limited boundary determined to
them either by law or by the authority of the leader. The difference is purely
that of approach reflecting individual character, social background and
philosophical outlook.
In the typology of political leaders,
as classified by Harold Lasswell, Ahmadinejad represented the “agitator” type
with extreme intransigence who sacrificed immediate gains for abstract
principles and always sought to instigate the emotional response of the public.
While Khatami was a “negotiator” with more concerned on acceptable solution to
a conflict than a just or perfect resolution. Now, the new president- elect Rohani pretends
to be open-minded, moderate and rational. This means that he does not mind to enter
into dialogue and compromise with his opponents for the sake of improving national
interests and eliminating the clouds of animosity over the sky of the nation.
Nonetheless, solutions to important issues such as: relations with the United
States, the nuclear project, the Middle East problems and the likes are only
dependent variables geared to the “revolutionary nature” of the Islamic regime
in Iran. /
____________
[1]The deal on liquefied gas with China,
which amounts to an overall value of $100 billion, is one such undertaking
which would tie Iran’s political fate to China’s growing needs for energy over
the next 25 years. Russians on the other hand, are very happy about the current
nuclear plant in Bushehr and the prospective other nuclear plant deals with
Iran and seemed not to be ready to forego this lucrative business just for the
sake of giving a hand to American plan to contain Iran’s ambition to use
nuclear technology, which in their view, is not harmful. But, as we have seen,
both of them voted against Iran at the IAEA. India was also supposed to support
Iran for promoting its interests in the prospective gas line project, but this
did not happen either.
[2]See: Ali Asghar Kazemi, “US Democrats
are Pushing Iran to the Corner”: Strategic
Discourse February 3, 2009.
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