Lessons from Iran’s Nuclear Deal with 5+1 Powers
Ali Asghar Kazemi
July 15, 2015
______________________
After
almost 12 years of vicissitude, finally on July 14, 2015 a Comprehensive Nuclear
Agreement was reached by Iran and the 5+1 powers in Vienna.[1]
Negotiations that had started about the same time as Iran new president Hassan Rohani
took office[2]
lasted almost two years and several rounds of arduous talks. The agreement was
supposed to be a win-win non-zero-sum with positive outcome for all parties. At
the end, the comprehensive nuclear agreement was
described as a landmark for Iran and 5+1 powers and as a
model for settling a dangerous situation that could lead to conflict and war
through the instrument of diplomacy.
Revolutionary regimes usually care little for
peaceful dialogue and diplomacy for achieving their objectives and national
goals. They often choose unusual means such as hostile slogans and coercive
measures for the furtherance of their ideals. Iran is no exception of this
unfortunate approach. But, how comes that this time Iranian diplomats were able
to keep their partners at the negotiating tables to the last minutes of quid-pro-quo
talks? What are the lessons to be learned from this unique case?
For a student of international relations diplomacy
is the major tool of foreign policy by which a state can achieve objectives,
realize values and defend national interests. Governments have the function to
communicate through their diplomatic agents with those whose actions and
behavior they wish to influence, deter, alter or reinforce.[3]
This process requires a clear definition of a state’s objectives,
rationalizations for them, threats, promises, and the setting up plans and
strategies to tackle with problems and contentious issues.
Thus, in its
widest meaning the task of diplomacy is fourfold:
1) It must determine state’s objectives
in the light actual and potential power available for the pursuit of these
objectives;
2 ) It must assess the objectives of
other nations and the power actually and potentially available to them for the
pursuit of their objectives;
3) It must determine to what extent these
different objectives are compatible with each other;
4) It must employ
the means suited to the pursuit of its objectives.[4]
One of the major impediments of Iran’s foreign
policy, almost four decades after the establishment of the Islamic Republic,
has been the continuing persistence on its revolutionary nature. In fact, this characteristic
has created a strong barrier before Iran’s national objectives and aspirations
in setting clear criteria for determining friends and foes. Perhaps many
unfortunate events and vicissitudes during the lifespan of the Islamic regime
so far are geared to this very important dimension of the revolutionary Iran.[5]
Among the many factors that paved the ground for
reaching the comprehensive agreement between Iran and the 5+1 powers the
followings could be more decisive:
1)
Security Council Resolutions adopted with almost unanimity under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter Article 41 regarding various economic, financial and
banking sanctions against Iran;
2)
Effective enforcement of the Article 25 of the UN Charter that that requires
all members
of the United Nations to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with the UN Charter. It is well to remember that the
United States was the prime overseer for the application of this article.
3)
Iran’s earnest desire to get rid of horrible sanctions that had impeded
this country to have access to oil revenues that caused terrible damages to the
economy and the well-being of the people;
4)
Iran’s fear that its revolutionary and defying stance vis-à-vis the world community might put into
serious jeopardy the whole existence of
the Islamic regime;
5)
Effective and sincere commitment of educated, talented and zealous
Iranian diplomats who engaged in the negotiations, despite all pressure and
negative impacts from opposition groups inside and outside Iran;
6)
Sincere commitment of the American president Barrack Obama to settle the
nuclear issue during his time at the White House in spite of Republican
pressure from Congress and Israeli lobbyists.
7)
Positive atmosphere of the world public opinion and international media
and market in favor of settling Iran’s nuclear issue for the benefit of the parties involved and the international
community as a whole.
One may add other factors to the ones listed
above. There is no doubt that the substance of the comprehensive agreement has
no inherent values unless all parties to the deal feel legally and morally
committed to its enforcement with “Good Faith.”[6]
As I said elsewhere[7], Iran should
be conscious of the fact that only portions of sanctions imposed upon it relate
to its nuclear undertaking and in order to lift all sanctions it should come
clean on questions related to human rights and other pending issues. For that
matter, Iran should not hesitate to enter into direct dialogue with important
world power on matters related to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and
international community as a whole./
[1] Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) runs to 109 pages, including five annexes.
[2]Presidential elections were held in Iran
on 14 June 2013. Hassan Rouhani won with a landslide victory, elected in the
first round of voting with 50.88% of the vote The
[3] 1 Cf. K.J. Holsti,
International Politics, A Framework for Analysis, Prentice –Hall of
India Private Limited, New Delhi, 1981, p.183
[4] See: Hans J.
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for Power and Peace,
Alfred A. Knopf. New York, Fifth edition, p.517-518
[5] See my paper,
The Dilemma
of Iran’s Foreign Policy : Identifying Friends and Foes, in Middle East Academic
Forum
https://www.academia.edu/13238276/_Good_Faith_is_Key_to_Iran_s_Nuclear_Deal_with_5_1_Powers
[7] See Ibid
* Ali Asghar Kazemi is professor of Law and -International Relations in Tehran-Iran. Students, researchers, academic institutions, media or any party interested in using all or parts of this article are welcomed to do so with the condition of giving full attribution to the author and the Middle East Academic Forum. ©All Copy Rights Reserved.
