Saturday, November 19, 2005

* Religion, Politics and Terrorism


Revised Draft, November 18, 2005


Religion, Politics and Terrorism

Ali-Asghar Kazemi*
November, 2005




“It is not in the temporal interest of a religious communion that all its members should be
reasonable minded. The violent spirits, who adhere to it solely out of factiousness,
perform for it, humanly speaking a thousand valuable services. So it is useful that hotheaded of this
sort should be found in its ranks; this is necessary evil.”


Pierre Bayle [1]


Introduction

Recent terrorist attacks in Jordan’s relatively calm capital on November 9, 2005, and the unfortunate killing of a number of innocent peoples[2], raise once again the vital question of religious fanaticism in the region. It appears that this unfortunate phenomenon is the most essential peril of the overall world order at the beginning of 21st century. It seems that the threat of terrorism is really getting out of hand and is causing immense damage to almost everybody throughout the globe.

Almost four years after September 11th, and despite the fact that most powerful nations on earth, including the United States of America and other European states, have mobilized their full military, political, intelligence and financial capacity to cope with this curse, the situation seems to be much worse than ever before. Many books papers, articles, guidelines and directives have been written in order to devise strategies and course of actions to tackle with this problem, yet there appears to be no solution for it and no end to it. Are we really condemned to accept this horrifying carnage and surrender to it? Is this really a necessary evil of our modern civilization? Does it seek its roots in religious intolerance of zealous Moslem devout?

This short paper shall attempt to briefly address those questions in order to shed some light on this most unusual calamity which is endangering the present social order and international peace.


What is Terrorism? Problem of definition

Since the League of Nations, several attempts to arrive at an internationally accepted definition of terrorism have proved to be fruitless.[3] Despite numerous efforts of international institutions, academics, and specialists in the field, there still seems to be no consensus on the legal, political and practical meaning of terrorism. This lack of agreement has created major obstruction to devising effective measures and strategy to cope with this horrific phenomenon which in the present century is threatening the whole fabric of human societies. One reason for this impediment is the contradicting views and perceptions on the terminology. Cynics who want to simplify the matter argue that: one state's ‘terrorist’ is another state's ‘freedom fighter’. Therefore, it appears that we are caught in a terminological stalemate in defining terrorism right from the start. However, there has been some endeavor by the United Nations to set some more or less acceptable standards upon which terrorism could be defined. [4]

Despites those attempts, the UN Member States still have no consensus and agreed-upon definition for terrorism. Some have suggested equating acts of terrorism as “peacetime equivalents of war crimes.”[5] It is not however quite clear as to whether having a comprehensive single convention on terrorism at the international level, instead of numerous piecemeal treaties and protocol, may necessarily solve any problem. Since, those non-states actors who recourse to such inhuman actions for dubious and evil causes, would never feel obligated to any such legal instrument which has the effect of limiting their deeds. Nonetheless, one could make a case that the lack of an agreement on a definition of terrorism leaves the matter to the will of any single state to take any arbitrary countermeasures which seem appropriate and suitable to its interests. Furthermore, critics have often commented that if terrorism is defined strictly in terms of attacks on civilian populations and non-military targets, numerous assaults on military installations, residences, convoys and soldiers' quarters, which have been prime targets of terrorists in recent years, would be excluded from the lists.


When Terrorism gained Momentum?

Terror and terrorism have existed throughout the history of human civilization. Despite its long history, terrorism and low-level violence associated with religious movements are more recent phenomena. In the past, despotic rulers used terror as a means to subjugate their own people. The post-revolutionary France has passed through the trauma of Robespierre’s terror. The memory of systematic state terror in Stalin’s Russia, Hitler’s Germany and other dictators is still alive.

Curiously, one of the earliest groups to use terror by religious heresy and in the name of God was the “Persian Assassins,” whose trans-national activities plagued the Islamic world from the end of eleventh century to the beginning of the thirteenth.[6] The Assassins who belonged to a secret order of Moslem fanatics terrorized and killed without mercy the Christian crusaders.

The rapid spread of religious fever and revolutionary appeal in the troubled Middle-East after the Iranian revolution, created extreme fear for oil-rich traditional Moslem societies such as Saudi-Arabia and other small states of the Persian Gulf. The fall of the Shah of Iran enhanced the confidence of other dormant and latent religious movements in the region. Soon after Iran’s revolution, destabilizing forces throughout the Middle East gained momentum under the guise of religion. Saudi-Arabia was one of the first targets, where fundamentalist groups launched attacks against and occupied the Grand Mosque in Mecca at a time when King Khalid was expected to be worshipping there.[7]

Since the first version of this paper was written almost two decades before September 11th, 2001, [8] the world has experienced unbelievable rise in terrorist activities. In those days, terrorism was merely categorized as “low-level violence”, carried by certain extremist groups and mainly directed toward limited objectives. Their causes were more or less known and their means were rather limited to hostage takings, high jacking and other petty actions for the purpose of gaining some publicity and recognition.

In the past terrorism had merely a pejorative connotation in world public opinion, and for the authors it was merely another kind of legitimate struggle involving use of force and violence, for presumably legitimate causes and objectives. Terrorists were described as “non-state actors” employing unconventional as well as orthodox techniques of violence in order to attain certain political objectives.[9]

But today this dimension of terrorism has changed drastically. We are now witnessing the tremendous spread of a new face of terror, associated with violent behavior of religious extremists, whose cruel actions and drive to cause extensive bloodshed, go beyond sane imagination. This phenomenon is described as one of the sad paradox of our time; the myth of “romantic revolution” whose promoters are the ideologues, whose dupes are the young and idealistic and whose victims are the week and the little men, the children, the old and defenseless.[10]

With the advent of sophisticated communications and relations among nations, terrorism, whether directed toward states or individuals, has gained new dimensions and consequently attracted the attention of world public opinion. It has also provided appetizing food for mass media around the world and hence incentive for terrorists to gain reputation through wide publicity.[11] Unlike the past when conventional media, such as radio and television broadcast and newspapers could limit the propaganda impact of terrorism, today the internet has become a rather uncontrollable, easy and handy tool for murderer to expose their horrifying acts to the public around the world. We have seen with revulsion the shocking video clips showing the act of beheading of innocent people in Iraq.


Terrorism: Means and Ends

During the past decade or so, not only the momentum of terror activities but also the means and ends of terrorism have drastically changed. Today we fear about terrorist attacks by unconventional means such as: nuclear, biological and chemical agents. Unfortunately, terrorist organizations and groups, such as Al-Qaeda, have accumulated huge amounts of financial assets through clandestine or even legitimate activities or have been provided money and other means by states at odd with the prevailing norms and status of international community.

Terrorist organizations use diverse methods for their actions and violence. From hand-made bomb explosions in crowded places of business, banks, military installations, communication centers, to hijacking of airplanes, political abductions, and assassination of important private or public figures. Terrorists employ every conceivable means of violence to promote their cause; provided they really have one.

In recent years, especially after the American military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, terrorists have gone to the extreme by conducting suicidal attacks against their targets. Of course, we shall not forget the suicide attacks against embassies and troop’s headquarters of Western powers around the world before that period; among which militia actions in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Argentina… are the most notorious. Despite extreme precautionary security measures, these operations and the likes are still being carried out by the terrorists, for the purpose of gaining attention of the media, intimidating an opponent or toppling a shaky and weak government. The present Iraq is an ill-fated example of such daily occurrence.

Political assassinations, sabotage and mass murder activities by religious factions in the Middle-East have been among the most atrocious actions in the recent years. Even Iran, which is accused to support certain terrorist groups in the Middle East, has experienced the harshest and the bloodiest terrorist operations conducted by opponent and antagonistic religious groups during and after the 1979 revolution.[12]

Curiously, it was in the midst of this religious turmoil in the Middle East that the opportunist Soviets began to promote their own cause in the region. The invasion of Afghanistan[13], along with pro-soviet terrorist activities, made the ground ready for further religious movements directed toward political ends.

After the collapse of the Soviet communism, which traditionally supported terrorist activities throughout the world, religious conviction became the motivating force for those who wanted to change the rule of the game in international relations with the objective to alter the prevailing conditions by bringing down the infidel and corrupt rulers and ousting their foreign supporters.

A brief chronology of significant terrorist activities in an interval of about 40 years (1961-2003), prepared by the U.S. State Department shows hundreds of such operations which claimed the lives of thousands of innocent peoples around the world.[14] These operations range from high jacking, hostage taking, attacks on military headquarters, embassy, hotels, restaurants, churches, mosques, assassinations of political and religious figures, kidnappings, suicide bombings and the likes. Perhaps September 11th attacks on U.S. cities were the most significant and unprecedented operations, which indeed thoroughly changed the security perception of the Americans as well as all other nations around the Globe. [15]

State Sponsored Terrorism

The lack of a clear definition for terrorism makes it quite problematic to distinguish between domestic violence and repression against political dissidents by the government in power or its proxy. To label such actions as terrorism may depend on whose eyes one considers the matter. Usually, when it applies to nationals of a particular state, the incumbent power uses justification for its actions against dissidents by accusing them to complot for toppling the legitimate government. These operations however are not considered as state sponsored terrorism as such. But when states plan to perform through its agents some clandestine terror actions inside or outside its territory in pursuit of some political objectives, then it can be labeled as act of terrorism. Some critics have argued against distinction between state and non-state acts of terror on the ground that it may justify state supported violence. Nonetheless, in several occasions states have been accused to commit genocide and crime against humanity for systematic and willful mass murder. [16]

State sponsored terrorism either to counter domestic dissensions or to intimidate and humiliate foreign countries, is a dangerous development of the so-called low-level violence in international relations. There is no doubt that the support of terrorist activities, in whatever manner, by a state or group of states will further increase these latter’s capacity for violence, by encouraging recourses to such operations for the settlement of ethnic, political or religious differences.[17]Just recently, Syria was accused to plot a terrorist act against former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, which led to the UN investigations on the event and a UN Security Council Resolution on the matter, which paved the way for a drastic geopolitical change in the Middle East.[18]

Apart from the terrorist attacks on the lives of political and religious leaders of the world during the past years,[19] as mentioned earlier, the international system has also experienced the development of highly sophisticated and unprecedented terrorist activities against the interests of Western powers throughout the globe. All of these operations, whether conducted by “liberation fighters” or “terrorists”, depending whose side we consider the matter, are actions aimed at creating psychological impact on the opponents.[20] These latter may be domestic government, foreign occupying or intermediary unwanted forces, or simply competing factions of the same political or religious movements.


Terrorism and Freedom Fighters

As mentioned above, distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters has always posed difficult questions for devising internationally agreed upon measures to cope effectively with terrorism. In the past, religious inspired terrorism has helped certain colonial territories to fight against powerful countries for their liberation. In such case the freedom fighters or liberation movements sought justification for their operations via the attainment of a legitimate cause. For example, the Algerian struggle for independence turned to terrorism, once the rebel armies were virtually beaten in the field by the French forces. It was only after recourse to such activities that French military might in Algeria came to its knees.[21]

The Moslem Shiite Militia in South Lebanon did the same with Israel in their occupied land through harshest terrorist activities.[22] Afghan Moslem Mujahedeens fought with a Superpower (USSR) through guerrilla warfare and terrorist operations in occupied Afghanistan. [23]They caused much trouble to Moscow, as did North Vietnamese to the United States.[24] Current daily bloodshed in Iraq and to some extent in Afghanistan by insurgent groups, seek their logic in such pretexts.

Urban guerrilla warfare, low-level violence or mob actions directed by religious groups are dimensions of ideological conflicts and revolutionary theories which now manifest in form of domestic and international terrorism. Dissidents of tyrant leaders and dictatorial regimes find their voice heard and their cause achieved through what we call terrorism for sake of simplicity, but they consider it legitimate jihad or just struggle against their enemies.[25]

In all cases, culprits and victims believe that they are acting in the best interest of their causes and in accordance to their respective moral values. On the one hand, the cause of the state, social order and the preservation of the status quo; on the other hand, the causes of salvation, justice, human rights, liberation, and the changing of the status quo.[26]


The Future of Terrorism

We are living in a dangerous world no prophet ever predicted. The spread and magnitude of terror activities have made all nations very vulnerable. What happened recently in Amman- Jordan can occur any time and any where without discrimination. Terrorists have already demonstrated that they can achieve disproportionately large effects in world order with a relatively small number and limited capacity for violence.[27] They have caused widespread alarm, compelling governments with a clear preponderance of conventional military power to negotiate with them, to grant them concessions or simply to back down with humiliation.[28]

Unfortunately, religion, in this particular case Islam, has become a scapegoat for the cowards and cruel backward fanatics in order to discharge their evil intentions and capacity. Religiously inspired terrors are understandably more ferocious and brutal than mere political violence or mob actions. When for example, martyrdom is considered as a grace and blessing of God, an obsessive Moslem believer can easily risk his life in a suicidal attack in order to do damage to his ideological opponents[29]. The resurgence of the Islamic fundamentalist movements in the Middle-East whose participants preach total devotion and submission to the will of God, and negation of earthly materialism, is indeed a crucial development of our time which is capable of destabilizing the international system and world order.

Thus far all endeavors to effectively deal with this kind of terrorism seem to have failed. It is not quite clear how the world should approach this evil of the 21st century. Use of force and naked power has proved to be inefficacious. It would be rather hard to believe that terrorism may be uprooted for good in the years to come. Perhaps we should think of some unconventional means to contain this unusual phenomenon called terrorism.


* * *
Notes

* Professor of international relations, Political Analyst.

[1] Quoted from Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, by Arnold Toynbee, An Historian’s Approach to Religion, (London: Oxford University Press, 1957, p.172.
[2] Among the victims of the suicide bomb attack was our Palestinian friend and colleague Abed Alloun, who so eagerly hoped for peace and quiet in the Middle East.
[3] The first attempt to arrive at an internationally acceptable definition was made under the League of Nations, but the convention drafted in 1937 never came into existence. The League of Nations Convention (1937) provides the following definition for terrorism: "All criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public".
[4] In 1999 a UN Resolution was passed in which a rather clear language was used to define and condemn terrorism:
1. " Strongly condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed;
2. “Reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them". (GA Res. 51/210 Measures to eliminate international terrorism).
[5] In order to cut through the Gordian definitional knot, terrorism expert A. Schmid suggested in 1992 in a report for the then UN Crime Branch that it might be a good idea to take the existing consensus on what constitutes a "war crime" as a point of departure. If the core of war crimes - deliberate attacks on civilians, hostage taking and the killing of prisoners - is extended to peacetime, we could simply define acts of terrorism as "peacetime equivalents of war crimes". See: UNODC - Terrorism Definitions.htm, Monday, 14 November 2005
[6]. The name comes from the Medieval Latin assassinus (Hachischins in French) identifying Ismailian Moslems of West Asia.
[7]. In this incident, Saudi security forces, after initial difficulties, were able to suppress the violence. While Saudi Officials denied “foreign government involvement” in these operations led by “religious extremists;” later intelligent sources found unequivocal evidence of the Soviet, Libyan and South Yemeni (PDRY) hands in the trouble. See e.g. Gregory Copley, “The Troubled Middle-East: More Fluid, More Important than Ever,” Defense and Foreign Affairs 6 (1980), p. 10.
[8] The main structure of this paper is taken from : Ali-Asghar Kazemi, Religion and Politics: In Search of Compatibility and Compromise, Monograph, Tehran, 1985
[9]. cf. “Focus on Terrorism,” Orbis 19, No. 4 (winter, 1976), passim.
[10]. Quoted by Maurice Tugwell, “The Utility of Terror,” Jane’s Defense Review 2(1980), p.151.
[11]. Specialists have suggested that one way to curb terrorism is to make it less attractive to adventures who seek to gain publicity, simply by not giving them this opportunity in mass media. See e.g. “Ten Ways to Fight Terrorism,” Newsweek, The International Newsmagazine, July 1, 1985, pp.20-23.
[12]. A number of successive bloody terrors and explosions in post-revolution Iran claimed the lives of hundred of very important political and religious figures, including members of the parliament, cabinet ministers, Islamic Republican Party’s chief ideologue, and above all the president and the prime Minister. For an account of these events see: “Iran, A Government Beheaded,” Time, The Weekly Newsmagazine, no. 37, September 14, 1981, pp.10-12. In connection with these terrorist activities whose real culprits are not yet quite known but are claimed to be the Mojahedine Khalq Organization (MKO), observers believe that the Islamic regime of Iran has successfully passed the test of survivability and thenceforth started systematic persecution of political dissidents.
[13]. The Soviet Red Army moved in to Afghanistan in December 1979.
[14] Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology, Historical Background Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs- U.S. Department of State

[15] Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Homeland, September 11, 2001: Two hijacked airliners crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center. Soon thereafter, the Pentagon was struck by a third hijacked plane. A fourth hijacked plane, suspected to be bound for a high-profile target in Washington, crashed into a field in southern Pennsylvania. The attacks killed 3,025 U.S. citizens and other nationals. President Bush and Cabinet officials indicated that Usama Bin Laden was the prime suspect and that they considered the United States in a state of war with international terrorism. In the aftermath of the attacks, the United States formed the Global Coalition Against Terrorism.

[16] We don’t want to engage into act of terror committed by armed forces during active hostilities and international wars, which are essentially covered by laws of war as well as 1949 Geneva Conventions and its related 1977 protocols covering domestic conflicts.
[17].The alleged cooperation, support or machination of terrorist activities by the East and West secret services or countries such as Libya, Iran, Cuba, etc. are examples of such contentions.

[18] The Security Council has established an “international independent investigation Commission” based in Lebanon to investigate the killing of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. To ensure an effective probe into Hariri’s murder, the Council calls on Lebanese authorities to grant the Commission full access to information relevant to the inquiry. If Beirut fails to cooperate with the UN investigation into the “terrorist act,” it could face UN sanctions which seek to root out terrorism See: Security Council Resolution 1595 (April 7, 2005).
Following the submission of the first stage report of the investigation to the Security Council, a second resolution was adopted. In this resolution, the Security Council calls on Syria to cooperate with the efforts to investigate the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. To obtain the consent of veto-wielding China and Russia, the US, Britain, and France agreed to replace the threat of sanctions against Damascus by a warning of "further action" if Syria fails to collaborate. See: Security Council Resolution 1636 (October 31, 2005)
[19]. The Killing of: the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1983 by religious groups belonging to Moslem Brotherhood, the Lebanese President Bashir jamayel by religious rivals, the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by Sikh religious fanatics in 1984, and the unsuccessful attempt at the life of world religious leader Pope John Paul II are among the many terrorist actions conducted directly or indirectly under the influence of religion.
[20]. The hostage taking of the American diplomats in Tehran by Moslem Students (of the Imam’s Line), which later was endorsed by the revolutionary regime, has been label by western analysts as “terrorism by analogy” aimed at humiliating the United States. This tactics succeeded to blackmail the incumbent president (Jimmy Carter) into impotence and ultimately changed the course of domestic US politics and international relations, by removing the frustrated president from the White House.

[21]. See e.g. Alf Andrew Heggoy, Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in Algeria (Bloomington, 1972), passim.
[22]. See: “Lebanon’s Holy Warrior; The lowly Shiite Muslims seek power and revenge,” Newsweek, International Newsmagazine, July 1, 1985, pp.18-19.
[23] It is interesting to note that Afghan freedom fighters were helped by Moslem zealous of other Middle Eastern countries and they were equipped and supported by the United States. Surprisingly, Ussameh Bin Laden, the notorious Al-Qaeda terrorist head and some of his entourage are citizen of Saudi Arabia.

[24]. In both cases the two Superpowers have used all kinds of military means, short of nuclear weapons, in order to bring the freedom fighters to a situation to accept the status quo and to give up hope. The United States has failed to achieve this objective, and the Soviets were not be able to succeed in their attempt.
[25]. There are various Shiite groups now claiming to be engaged in Jihad, Islamic Holy War, e. g.: Hezbollah, and Al Dawa Islamiya.
[26]. Notice that I have benefited from the above mentioned short essay “Defenders of the Faith,” in exposing the idea in a different manner in the development of the subject under consideration.

[27]. CF. e.g. Brian M. Jenkins, “High Technology Terrorism and Surrogate War: The Impact of New Technology on Low-Level violence,” in Geoffrey Kemp et al. The Other Arms Race, (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Book, D.C, Heath & Co. 1975), p. 91.
[28]. The withdrawal of US and French forces from embattled Lebanon, following Moslem suicidal attacks on their military installations comes to mind in this connection.
[29] It has to be noted that some countries are openly inviting devoted Moslem youngsters to sign up for the “Army of Volunteer Martyrs’’ in order to use them for suicidal attacks against their potential enemies. They are being trained and prepared for martyrdom. In their view, this is some sort of deterrence vis-à-vis powerful states who want to dictate their will to other nations. This tactic indeed may intimidate those for whom life is a precious thing and are ready to pay any price in order to save the soul of a an innocent human being.

Saturday, November 12, 2005

* The Persian Paradox and the West

First Draft November 10, 2005


The Persian Paradox and the West

Ali-Asghar Kazemi*
November 2005

____________________________________________________________________

« Ah! Ah! Monsieur est Persan? C’est une chose bien extraordinaire! Comment peut-on être Persan? »

Montesquieu, Lettres Persanes (1721)

When French famous thinker Charles Baron de Montesquieu published in1721 his renowned satirical work Lettres Persanes, where he superbly exposed his philosophical thoughts, Persia and Persian people were little known to the West, including France as a European nations. In his book, Montesquieu spoke about the “prestige of celebrity” and “inconveniences of incognito.”

The story is about two traditional Persians who left Persia for political reasons and went to Paris-France for visit. In a series of letters, one of them recounts his observations of the French society and people for his compatriots. The first day in Paris, dressed with traditional Old Persian costumes, he attracted so much attention of curious Parisians that he decided to change his conventional outfit to Western attire. Thence, nobody paid attention to his presence anywhere and this disturbed him even more. However, when he revealed his identity, peoples were bewildered and curiously asked question: Ah! Ah! Mister is Persian? This is an extraordinary thing! How one can be Persian?

Persians are indeed amazing people with peculiar character; perhaps not to the extent similar to what James Morier mentions in his Hajji Baba of Isphahan.[1] But, as Graham Fuller described in The Center of the Universe,[2] Iranians are alike to their impressive carpets with immense intricacy in designs and colors. They are difficult to approach and comprehend. They don’t expose their thoughts easily and they are master of concealing their intentions.[3] Kenneth Pollack[4] goes even further in his depiction of Iranian national character. In a book named The Persian Puzzle, he indulges in criticizing Iranian emotionalism, xenophobia, exaggerated "self-importance", "considerable ignorance” about [their political environment].

While as a Persian, I don’t quite concur with such a contemptuous portrayal, but in the back of my mind something intrigues me and tickles my head. What is wrong with our attitude or behavior that justifies such unfair judgments?

Of course, it is rather difficult for a native Iranian to pass judgment on the overall character of his own nation, with so disperse variety of traditions, values, customs, mores, and ethnic background. But it is not hard to understand why others have such a weird impression about us and how they perceive Persian attitude in their interactions and dealings with us. Now, a query is appropriate here: that is whether Iranians have always possessed such a complex attitude? The answer is not simple, but it is believed that the feeling of insecurity and fear of oppressive regimes in various stages of Iran’s past and present history, made them to a great extent circumspect and conservative.

In fact, the vicissitudes of the Persian history and the sense of uncertainty and insecurity has always shadowed and influenced Persian life and culture. Persian literature and precious poetry are the product of such condition in this land of legend. Hafez, the famed Persian lyric poet of 14th century is the illustration of this feeling par excellence. Describing the double standard behavior of the pretentious preacher, he has said in his fabulous book of poetry:

Pious men who in public and on the dais show virtuous attitude,
Do much vicious deeds when they retreat to their solitude.
[5]

Hafez is the fervent critic of hypocrisy in a period when Persia was under subjugation of pious, oppressive, fanatical and intolerant rulers. He had to compose his inspiring lyrics in ambiguous and versatile manner so that people would find in them the expression of their own misery and gloom. Seven centuries after Hafez, people of all walks still read, enjoy and console themselves with his marvelous mystical poems.

This short piece of writing was not intended to be a literary essay; but, when one engages to portray the Persian traits, the pen is cogently dragged into this kind of reflections. As national character is the product of a number of determinants, a one sided review of such phenomenon could be misleading. Today, the typical “Persian” is caught in a crisis of identity. The juxtaposition of Islamic culture to that of national customs has trapped Iranians in a confusing quandary. While he has lost contact with the past, he seems unable to assimilate the present and has no hope in the future.

The problem of identity crisis in Iran is one of the burdens that any political system should be prepared to face with, now and in the future. The dilemma seems to arise from the official religious teachings, dogma and rituals within the Shiite doctrine backed by the state, and the purely national mores and traditions, severely affected by universal values of modern society. In political realm, the dichotomy is still more flagrant and the appeal for a secular approach to the government and the daily affairs of people is gaining momentum. Thus, there seems to emerge some sort of confrontation between the strict rules emanating from the almighty God and the more tolerant code of human interaction, stemming from the free will of man on earth.

The present “Persian” feels betrayed by politics and everything that goes with or emanates from it. He is also deceived by polemics and no longer pays attention to rhetoric and abhors words and deeds devoid of ethics and sincerity. Justice and compassion seem to have lost their true meanings, and are farfetched wishes. Right and might have become indispensable corollary to each other. Law and order is merely the instrument of selfish and greedy social and political relations.

Indeed, such a confusing condition hardly motivates people for constructive ideas and may not lead to action and sense of progress. Every once and while some new figures appear in the political horizon, pretending to lead the nation for combating against injustice, corruption, insecurity, poverty and other social glitches. The recent presidential elections in Iran are an example of such occurrence. While in his campaign the new president gave so many nice promises, once in office, he brought with him a team of “Revolutionary Guards” (Passdars), and appointed all colleagues, friends and relatives to important positions. The new ruling junta is supposed to tackle with many vital issues on the agenda of Iran’s domestic and foreign policy, including the nuclear crisis. Unfortunately, this latter case is on the verge of being referred to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions, due to horrific blunders of the elected president.

Almost three centuries after Montesquieu, a Persian, dressing in the garments of a political leader of the “new Persia” (Iran) bewildered the world, by his odd statements, once at the United Nations General Assembly and on other occasions, by his eccentric edict about the annihilation of a state member of the UN. This time the “Persian” himself happens to be the “President” of a nation with 2500 years of history behind[6]. The event attracted a great deal of attention around the world and brought much snagging celebrity overnight for the naïve Persian. He and his entourage are much puzzled as to what went wrong with him and his performance during the short period of his tenure as president. Yet, the 21st century Persian does not seem to be willing to change the outfits. He is trapped between celebrity and incognito; between polemics and politics. He is accusing the West and other malevolent conspirators for his failure and is impatiently waiting for the hidden Shiite Imam to save the nation from the plot of foes and infidels.

Now the whole world, astonished by such an odd political figure, would probably ask: Gentleman is President? This is an extraordinary event! How one can be a [Persian] President?

* * *
* Professor of international relations and political analyst.

[1] Hajji Baba of Ispahan, hero of The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan by James Justinian Morier (3 vols. London, 1824), the most popular Oriental novel in the English language and a highly influential stereotype of the so-called "Persian national character" in modern times. Morier (1782-1849), a former diplomat who had resided in Persia for nearly six years (1808-1809 and 1810-1814) at a critical juncture during diplomatic entanglements with European powers, fashioned his novel on his personal observations and direct knowledge about Persia, but with a decidedly hostile and satirical overtone. An Orientalist project par excellence, Hajji Baba lampoons Persians as rascals, cowards, puerile villains, and downright fools, depicting their culture as scandalously dishonest and decadent, and their society as violent. Morier depicted the East, not simply through the arrogant eyes of a European traveler, like his own accounts of his visits to Persia (published in 1812 and 1818), but in the form of a biography of a "native," a composite Persian character whose imagined identity was wrapped in deliberate ambiguities. See: www.iranica.com

[2] Former CIA analyst and author, See: Graham Fuller, Center of the Universe: The Geopolitics of Iran (Westview Press, 1991)

[3] This is my own recollection from the book.

[4] Kenneth M. Pollack, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst, now at the Brookings Institution. According to some observers, he tends to make a mockery of objective analysis bereft of such abstract generalization smacking of what the late Edward Said labeled "Orientalism". Cf. review by : Atimes.com

[5] This is my own translation

[6] Interestingly, according to the Islamic regime constitution, one important prerequisite of candidates for presidential elections is supposed to be “rajol-e-siasi” (political statesman). Mr. Ahmadinejad was neither a statesman nor even a common sense political amator. He was “passdar” or member of the Revolutionary Guard, akin to many devout Iranians who participated in the Iraq-Iran war without much military training, at the beginning of the revolution. Though he was appointed Tehran Mayor for a short period of time with no particular achievement, he proved not to have the capacity and competence to understand the subtleties of statesmanship or rudimentary norms of diplomacy. He has no political tact, experience or insight. He has done more harm to the country in his short tenure than any other office-holder in the past. In less than four months in office, the country is on the brink of conflict, diffidence, decadence, and insolvency.

Monday, October 31, 2005

* Iran's Nuclear Case: One Step to the UN Security Council

First draft October 30, 2005

Iran’s Nuclear Case:
One Step to the UN Security Council


Ali-Asghar Kazemi
October 2005
___________________________________________________________

Keywords: Iran’s nuclear case, IAEA resolution on Iran, Iran’s new president’s statement on Israel, UN Security Council, Nuclear proliferation.


“He who learns not from past experiences, is condemned to repeat past mistakes”

Less than four months since new conservative government is in power in Iran and during this rather short period of time it has made more gaffes than any other administrations in the lifespan of the Islamic regime in Iran. Some of these blunders are truly susceptible to drag the whole nation into a serious crisis situation and jeopardize national interests and even the very existence of the religious regime.

After the much publicized presidential elections in Iran and the dubious circumstances which led to the coming into power of a hard-line inexperienced person as president, the amazing outcome of the ballot boxes was somehow welcome by naïve optimists, including this author[1]. It was hoped that upon the failure of the reformist government to cope with corruption, inflation, favoritism and other social evils, this humble and devoted man will embark in a serious battle to shore up justice, compassion, meritocracy and the rule of law inside the country and promote respect for international law and breakthrough the barriers that impeded the previous government for building confidence and establishing good relations with outside.

The latest provocative blunder of the new president, regarding the total annihilation of the state of Israel from the surface of the earth, which rose widespread reactions of the international community, leads one to believe that indeed the new president has become a liability for the nation. The question now is whether this seemingly purposeful gaffe is prone to further isolation of Iran and expedites the referral of its much debated nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council for eventual sanctions?

It is believed that never before in recent history of the UN any responsible statesman, elected into high political office of a country, has said such a provoking statement in total contradiction with the United Nations Charter, against another member state of the UN and international community. The unfortunate thing is that other statesmen of the high political apparatus in Iran did naught to attenuate the hostile tone of the blunder and thus their silence proved some kind of overall acquiescence to the matter.

Indeed, one thing that Iranian decision makers should have avoided at this very critical juncture, was giving a hostile signal to the international community at a time when the nuclear dossier is being assessed for referral to the Security Council. Unfortunately, the president’s statement at a seminar named “A world without Zionism” in Tehran, a day before the state’s organized rally against Israel, on the last Friday of Ramadan; pave the way for the unexpected occurrence. That is the shaping of an undesired consensus that the Islamic regime is in fact up to something in its nuclear venture and is becoming a real threat to the Middle East and international stability.

How can we assess Mr. Ahmadinejad’s statement as a supposedly responsible office-holder, whose official position obligates him to act and talk according to the prevailing norms of international relations? There could be several answers to this question:

-He did not really mean what he said for a group of deeply dedicated and zealous people in a rather politico-ideological gathering for the purpose of encouraging them to participate in Qods-Day rally,
-He did not realize that as a president, his public statements for domestic consumption would be propagated throughout the world in a matter of second,
-His inability to deal with important domestic problems and his several setbacks in handling foreign issues (including the nuclear case) pushed him to opt for a rather radical foreign policy, in order to divert public attention to outside,
-Putting this statement in the context of other positions so far taken by Mr. Ahmadinejad and the regime itself, he may in fact believes in what he said and he just exposed the stance of the Islamic government which at the beginning of the revolution took hostage American diplomats for 444 days,
-Finally one may argue, he has no political education, experience or insight and with a narrow vision of Islamic teachings, regardless of how he was elected to the office, he has not enough political maturity and his threats should not be taken seriously by the world community.

Each of the above arguments or a composition of several of them could prove true. This means that no matter what is in the back of the president’s mind, his statement did not please the international community as a whole and it would be extremely difficult for the Islamic regime to repair the extraordinary damage inflicted to the nation.

Now, after the widespread condemnations of almost all countries around the world, the UN Secretary General, the Security Council, and even Iran’s very few allies, such as Venezuela, who voted against the last IAEA resolution of September 24, 2005, the Islamic regime is much baffled about the bungle that led to this messy situation. We shall wait and see how the matter will develop until the next session of the IAEA Governing Council on November 24, 2005. Meanwhile, Iran has a very difficult task to manage the crisis with a view to avoid the worst. Otherwise, with this rather quick escalation, it is not hard to imagine that Iran’s nuclear case is almost one step away from the Security Council.

* * *
[1] For example see: A. A. Kazemi, “Iran’s Presidential Elections: The Miracle of the Ballot Boxes” in the Middle East Academic Forum see also my article “ New Conservative Power Grip

Friday, October 28, 2005

* Iran: The Price of Going Nuclear

First draft October, 2005


Iran: The Price of Going Nuclear

Ali-Asghar Kazemi
October 2005
__________________________________________________________________


Keywords: Nuclear proliferation, International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran’s nuclear project, United Nations Security Council.


Introduction

Whether for peaceful purposes or not, Iran’s nuclear aspiration has become one of the most urgent dilemma of our present international relations. Perhaps if we did not have the events of September 11, 2001, this venture could go un-noticed along with many other similar undertakings, which usually occur, in technological, scientific and strategic developments around the world. In fact, as we know well, Iran’s nuclear ambitions go back to the Shah’s regime before the revolution. In those days, technologically advanced Western countries were competing for the lucrative nuclear deal with this oil-rich country.

With the advent of the revolutionary regime in Iran since 1979 the situation changed and a new-fangled political environment emerged in total contradiction with the West. The “nuclear Iran” is now considered as an unwelcome and ominous menace to the established order in the region and the world. After several years of talks and negotiations within the IAEA and the EU, the problem now is on the verge of being referred to the UN Security Council for eventual sanctions. What are the chances of the case being submitted to this organ and what are the prices that Iran may pay in pursuing the project?


Mounting Pressure on Iran
Iran’s defiance to the world opinion by resuming some of its nuclear activities in the past recent weeks, and the increasing ambiguity in official public statements with respect to its nuclear project, irritated many, especially the EU and the United States. As an immediate result, the IAEA Governing Council and the Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize Committee took two separate actions putting more and more pressure on Iran.
On the one hand, the IAEA adopted a Resolution on September 24, 2005 on Iran’s nuclear activities[1] which was rather harsh and surprising for Iranians who were counting on the negative votes of NAM[2] states as well as Russia, China and India. The two first abstain from voting and India voted for the resolution. The only negative vote was that of Venezuela, which presumably because of its quarrel with the United States and perhaps not necessarily out of its amicable relations with Iran, did not support the resolution.

The resolution states that "the history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities" had resulted in the "absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”[3] Many countries including the United States and the EU seem to be suspicious that Iran has ambitions to develop nuclear weapons, while Iran has always claimed that its program is strictly peaceful and for generating energy.

This resolution shows the international community’s concern about Iran’s nuclear undertaking and its alleged non-cooperation regarding the non-proliferation rules. At the same time, the text keeps open the possibility of negotiations with EU3 in order to put forward proposals which could re-establish trust. Thus, the resolution “calls on Iran to observe fully its commitments and to return to the negotiating process that has made good progress in the last two years.”
On the other hand, when the Norwegian Committee awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize on 7 October 2005 to the IAEA and Director General ElBaradei, this gesture was interpreted as a serious stand of the international community to endorse this world body to contain any drive for nuclear ambitions and proliferation.[4]

Optimists saw the award as a new mandate for the IAEA to continue to solve nuclear issues around the world, including that of Iran, by way of peaceful means and diplomacy, meaning that the referral of the case to the UN Security Council for eventual sections is not on the agenda. Pessimists however, view that as a warning to those who still may be perplex as to the widespread consensus in the international community to inhibit any action in breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[5]

The West and the United States have welcomed the selection of the IAEA and its Director General as the recipients of the prize and started to capitalize on the case to further push Iranians to proceed with the pending negotiations with EU and suspend all its nuclear activities within the framework of the 2003 Paris agreement with EU3.

Iran’s Softening Position
While Iran rejected the resolution as purely political and blamed countries which had voted in its favor, signaled the presumed abstaining friends, such as China, Russia and the bulk of NAM states that it shall review its economic relations with them. Later the United Kingdom became the main target of the Islamic regime and conservative media condemnations. High officials in the government threatened to retaliate against any state which would support any document with the effect of referring Iran’s nuclear case to the UN Security Council. Initially, they have alluded to a number of options open to Iran, such as the followings:

· Economic retaliations, including the stoppage of Iranian oil to unfriendly nations,
· Withdrawal from the Nuclear proliferation Treaty and its Additional Protocol, signed but not yet adopted by the Parliament,
· Resuming all nuclear activities, voluntarily suspended in earlier agreement with the EU3,
· Barring IAEA agents from any further arbitrary inspections of nuclear sites,

There is no convincing evidence that a common sense cost-benefit assessment of the above retaliatory measures have been performed nor even properly thought out within the framework of a strategic plan at any level of decision-making apparatus. Thus, soon after when the negative impacts of each of the above tentative action was elucidated by media, the whole campaign suddenly faded out and a more compromising stance emerged in official statements.
Whereas at the beginning Iran showed intransigence on the matter and rejected any action that could hinder it from using its rights to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, gradually it softened its position. Iran’s initial rigidity caused the reformists and even conservative elements of the government and the parliament to criticize the wisdom of willingly inviting troubles for the nation at a time when the country needs calm and stability for the achievement of the much publicized promises of the new government to the people.[6]

Not surprisingly, as the pressure from inside and outside Iran began to increase, in an unprecedented move in order to settle the case, the supreme leader decided to delegate portion of his supervisory prerogative on the overall state, including the three branches, to the “State Expediency Council” under the powerful pragmatic figure and the new President’s rival, Mr. Rafsanjani. Although the action was downplayed in official circles, but the consequence of this new mandate was immediately felt in policies related to the nuclear issue. Soon after this transmutation, Iran started to use a compromising stance on the matter and with some diplomatic shyness announced that it was ready to resume talks with EU3 for the purpose of breaking the deadlock. Nonetheless, it continued to stress on its earlier position that no precondition would be accepted in any future talks. (Meaning that Iran will not suspend anew the Uranium Conversion Facilities UCF in Isfahan).

Officials in Tehran are now hopeful that the case will not be referred to the UN Security Council by the IAEA next November 2005. One reason for that is that Tehran has improved cooperation since that Agency passed its Resolution of September 24th.
As a matter of fact, Just recently it was revealed by Western media that Iran has submitted a very important and critical report/document concerning its past nuclear activities to the IAEA and has conceded that an Iranian nuclear scientist(presumably a high ranking officer) be interviewed by the agency. Though the story was not supported by Iranian officials, there seems to be some truth in it. Since the IAEA Director General recently appeared optimistic that Iran’s nuclear dossier will be settled.[7]

On the other hand, there seems to be some hope for the Iranians with the new composition of the Board of Governors at the IAEA. As we know, with the entering of Belarus, Cuba and Syria as new members of this world body, the referral of the case to the Security Council may be a bit more difficult. This is especially true with the position that Russians have been taking recently[8] vis-à-vis the United States in this respect. The United States does not seem to mind that the diplomatic course initiated by EU be continued as long as an overall consensus is not reached on the matter. But, at the same time U.S. officials close to the White House did not reject the military option, as a possible alternative on the President’s table.


Prudence and Perception of Vulnerability
The perception of the potential dangers of referring the case to the UN Security Council pushed Iran to move away from the rhetoric of the inexperienced new conservative government and opt for a more cautious, compromising and cooperative stance.[9] The reasons for this decision may be explained in the following considerations:

· The political system is not ready to engage in adventurous and risky situations in which the overall existence of the Islamic regime might be threatened,
· The new conservative government lacks the necessary experience and capacity to deal with the much uncertain and hazardous issue of nuclear matter,
· Those in charge of the nuclear project have not been able to convince the public at large and educated people on the rationale of the nuclear project, even for peaceful purposes,
· The nation as a whole is not prepared to engage in another hostility and military engagement, or to endure severe economic sanctions, eventually imposed by the UN Security Council, particularly because of a dubious matter which is not really considered as a vital national issue,[10]
· The Islamic regime is quite conscious of the resolve of the West, especially the United States, that they will not allow it to continue the nuclear project in a self-sustained and independent manner.
· This may mean that even if they fail to obtain some sort of UN Security Council resolution on the matter, because of Russian or Chinese vetoes , the Americans or their allies in the region, will not hesitate to use military option as a preventive self-defense, by direct strategic targeting on Iran’s nuclear sites,
· In such case, there seem to be little chances that the international community as a whole and even the presumed friends of Iran may object or take any action against or condemn such eventual attack.
Indeed, prudence is the mother of wisdom and good governance and politics is about changing foes into friends and assuring one’s interests and survival.

Concluding Remarks
I have argued elsewhere in several occasions that the Islamic regime in Iran, despite its ideological and revolutionary nature, has a very low propensity to conflict and confrontation. It is now in a state that any uncalculated risk in its various domestic and international undertakings, including the nuclear project, might cost it a price unbearable by any common sense standard. Iranian leaders are quite aware of the potential threats to their very survival. They have the experience of what happened in Afghanistan and Iraq. They may not afford to challenge the supposedly unfair rule of the game in the present world order, unless they convince the people of Iran to sacrifice once again themselves for an unknown utopia. This means that despite the sporadic bullying actions by the regime, the overall system in Iran will do every thing in its power to avoid escalation of the nuclear crisis [11]and other pending issues.

Whether we like it or not, the world power structure is extremely unequal and the rule of the game unjust and unfair. Though mankind was able to change the total insecurity of “the state of nature” into “state of civility” through “social contract” and by law and order at the national level and civic institutions, at the international level this ideal is still far- reaching. This means that power is still the undisputed instrument of world politics and as one has correctly said: “right is might.” In other words, if you don’t have the power you can’t claim your right.

* * *

[1] The International Atomic Energy Agency’s governing board approved the resolution despite threats by Iran to begin enriching uranium. The resolution was drafted by Britain, France and Germany and backed by the United States, who had wanted Iran to be immediately referred to the Security Council, but it was watered down by the Europeans. With 22 votes for, one against and 12 abstentions, the outcome highlighted the split between Western nations and others such as Russia, China and South Africa, which disagree with the EU three and Washington on how to deal with Iran. The resolution requires Tehran to be reported to the Security Council at an unspecified date, meaning Iran would probably not be referred to the Security Council until the IAEA board meets in November,

[2] Non-Aligned Movement
[3] Under the IAEA statute, the board is required to notify the Security Council if a state-party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is found in noncompliance with its agency safeguards agreement. Such agreements allow the IAEA to monitor NPT states-parties’ declared civilian nuclear activities to ensure that they are not diverted to military purposes.
[4] In an address to the Board, Dr. ElBaradei said he was grateful that the Norwegian Nobel Committee had recognized the challenges ahead for the Agency. These included the fight against nuclear terrorism and significant expansion of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, he said: "I compare ourselves to an orchestra. I am simply the conductor of a qualified, well-tuned and dedicated orchestra... We need to make every possible effort for the highest level of security. We owe it to humanity. The award also shows the will of humanity to address challenges and to seize the opportunity for a better life for future generations," Dr. ElBaradei said.

[5] Conservative Iranian officials and media have expounded their usual “conspiracy theory” and claimed that for the second time the Nobel Peace Prize Committee has shown its enmity toward the Islamic regime by awarding the Prize to a person in direct clash or opposition with Iran. Two years ago the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the controversial Iranian human right activist Shirin Ebadi
[6] One such critique came from the head of Expediency Council, Mr. Rafsanjani, who sharply criticized the wisdom and logic of the new administration to use unwise and undiplomatic rhetoric for the defense of Iran’s nuclear project.
[7] In a meeting with Iran’s Ambassador to Vienna and Iran’s permanent envoy to the IAEA, Mr. ElBradei said that “ resolving the crisis is moving on the right track and the concerned parties would do their best to this effect” Iran Daily , October 22, 2005 . p.1
[8] Recently it was announced that U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in a trip to Russia was not able to convince her counterpart that the case of Iran should be referred to the UN Security Council.
[9] In an earlier paper I had argued that the overall propensity of the high official’s decision makers to conflict and confrontation is very low, especially when it comes to the matter of survival of the Islamic regime. See e.g. : Iran’s New President and the Nuclear Issue, August 2005,
www.aakazemi.blogspot.com

[10] It is necessary to note that despite some sporadic state-organized rallies in support of the nuclear project, there no scientific findings as to the overall public opinion with respect to that matter in Iran.
[11] See: Ali-Asghar Kazemi, “Iran-U.S. Nuclear Wrangle: The Crisis of Credibility” and “Iran’s New President and the Nuclear Issue” in Middle East Academic Forum See also: Ali-Asghar Kazemi, “Heading for a Clash! Iran-U.S. New Conservatives’ Lineup over the Nuclear Issue” http://www.akazemi.homestead.com/Documents.html

Friday, September 02, 2005

* Iran's New President and the Nuclear Issue

First Draft, August 29, 2005


Iran’s new President and the Nuclear Issue

Ali Asghar Kazemi*
August 2005


Keywords: Iran’s nuclear Issue, Iran’s foreign policy, new conservative government, IAEA, Nuclear proliferation, NPT, EU talks, United States Middle East Policy.



Introduction

Just until the time the new President formally took the oath of office as the seventh president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the world was anxious to know how this new conservative figure will tackle the impending nuclear issue. Mr. Ahmadinejad had not taken concrete position on the subject during his short campaign and had just repeated the official stance of the previous progressive administration. Interestingly, the outgoing smiling president, Mr. Khatami, had toughened his stand on the nuclear issue during the last weeks and days of his tenure.

In reality, this could mean that the nuclear matter in Iran stays beyond and above the bureaucratic affaires of the governments and resides at the national strategic level within the prerogative of the supreme leader. In other words, the official government is only the apparatus of putting into action the strategy laid down by the Supreme National Security on behalf of the leader for the attainment of specific objectives.

This paper intends to address the critical question as to how the new president, known for his hard line conservative attitude and his full devotion to the supreme leader, will approach the nuclear issue and whether the situation is susceptible to escalate to full scale crisis leading to an eventual hostilities, due to misperception and mismanagement of the parties involved?

New Political Landscape Under the Conservative Rule

Despite widespread speculations about a fundamental shift of Iran’s domestic and foreign policy during the conservative power grip in the legislative and executive branches, it seems that the honeymoon of the new president with the parliament did not last long. Every body expected that the Majlis would endorse Mr. Ahmadinejad proposed cabinet list without much difficulty. But surprisingly this did not happen and four of the minister candidates, including the much important oil portfolio, failed to be approved. This may mean that even the conservative hardliners in the parliament are not so much united as a homogeneous block.

As a matter of fact, as I argued elsewhere, the conservative members belong to a spectrum of background whose views differ on various matters. Thus, they are not so much uniform in terms of economic, political, cultural and foreign policy. Sometimes they have special interests, which inhibit them from taking side with or endorsing a figure who might stay on their way to achieve their objectives. Therefore, the cleavage in the parliament is not necessarily between various recognized fronts, like conservatives and progressives, but among the so-called fundamentalist hardliners who seem to differ ferociously with each other’s on important issues. Yet, the nuclear issue is a peculiar one on which there appears to be no overt controversies. Since each faction has its own logic for endorsing the official position of the Islamic regime.

With respect to the new government position vis-à-vis the United States and the prospects of finding some middle ground solution on nuclear issue, I have already discussed the matter in a separate paper.[1] I argued that the problematic, which has so far created such an atmosphere of mistrust and intolerance, is deep-rooted in relations between the two states and may not be settled merely by resolving the nuclear matter. However, if the Europeans fail to reach a satisfactory result from their ongoing dialogue with Iran, which has been endorsed so far by the Americans, then very probably a consensus may be formed among all interested parties to send the case to the UN Security Council for eventual sanctions. This process has its own difficulties from legal, procedural and practical standpoints.[2]


Iran’s New Conservatives and their Propensity to Conflict

In an earlier paper I wrote during the previous progressive government in Iran, it was predicted that for a number of reasons the new conservatives in Iran are not ready to engage in a crisis situation, which may put the survival of the Islamic regime at risk[3]. This means that when the overall existence of the system is at stake they might change their position and become arch pragmatic. The only difference between the two governments was their degree of devotion to the leader and their attitude towards world public opinions.

Khatami government was known for his confidence-building strategy in the Middle East region and the world at large. Thus, it was inherently barred from swimming against the current. The “dialogue of civilization” was a product of such way of thinking. While the conservative did not mind to capitalize on the momentum created by such slogan at the UN and elsewhere in the world, they detested the idea as absurd and incongruous with the present state of world affairs.

Like elsewhere in the world, Iranian progressive elements believed in idealism, which considers law and ethics as the prime motto and instrument in the running of states’ business. The conservatives however, have a tendency to “real-politics,” power and national interests and believe that in this chaotic world you should stay on you own feet and nobody will “scratch you back” in hard time.[4] On this particular aspect, we can argue the previous progressive government was more ideological than the present one. Therefore, we can say that the perceptions of the new government on security matters, while being more realistic and pragmatic, match that of the main leaders of the Islamic regime at the beginning of the revolution, who did not hesitate to challenge the United States of America calling it as the “ Great Satan” and took American diplomats hostage for 444 days.

Therefore, with respect to the “new conservatives” in post-Khomeini and post-war period Iran, as we attempted to describe them earlier[5], we are in fact faced with a spectrum of social and political attributes, which does not allow a definitive conclusion, as regards their views and behavior. However, it is not hard to suggest from our experience that the mainstream of the new Iranian conservatives bend over a more liberal, progressive and yet pragmatic stance. Nonetheless, they may continue to expound on their hard-line rhetoric, out of expediency, for public consumption. By the same token, we may feel assured that the strong sense of survival inhibits them from going untamed and looking for trouble in the region. Recent endeavor of the new government to avoid escalation in the current crisis, by setting up new framework for the purpose of breaking the deadlock in nuclear negotiations, is a good indication of such attitude.


Brinkmanship Policy: Compromise amid Challenge

On the day the new president took office, the UCF (Uranium Conversion Facilities) at the Isfahan Site resumed activities and presumably the IAEA seals were removed. This was despite numerous warnings from various sources including the IAEA. The atomic agency urged Iran not to resume nuclear fuel cycle until an international inspection apparatus is set up for the purpose of supervision of any eventual activities.

The European Union and the United States threatened to send the case to the UN Security Council for eventual sanctions. The EU3 foreign ministers warned Iran in a letter against resumption of enrichment activities and requested an emergency meeting of the IAEA’s 35 members of the Board of Governors. Despite some divergence among Governing Council at the beginning, especially the Non-Aligned Members who objected the tone of a draft prepared by the EU3, finally a rather harsh resolution was adopted unanimously against Iran. [6]

The resolution on Iran was adopted without a vote by full consensus. All 35 members of the board agreed the language of the resolution text. The resolution said, "outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear program have yet to be resolved, and that the agency is not yet in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran."[7]

Iran reacted with indignation to the resolution and claiming that there are serious legal problems with it declared that it is unacceptable and therefore it does not feel obligated to implement it. One member of Iranian delegation to the IAEA (Sirus Nasseri) said: "It is evident that the motive is to apply pressure and Iran will not bend. Iran will be a nuclear fuel producer and supplier within a decade."

Furthermore, Iranian officials considered the text as improper because it would bar it from enriching uranium and other related activities that it is allowed to pursue under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Iran argues that all it wants to do is to enjoy the right under the NPT; the right which has been denied to it for more than two decades.

One interesting development with respect to Iran’s new president and the nuclear matter was his unexpected telephone call to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on August 9, 2005, during which he acknowledged Iran’s respect for international law and its commitment to support UN endeavor to establish peace and justice in the world. Stressing that Iran as a member of UN expects this organization to help achieve its legitimate rights as a sovereign state. He further said, “ It is obvious that Iran will refrain from unilateral measures, but cannot ignore its legitimate rights” [8]

This whole gesture could have a significant impact on Iran’s future behavior and attitude with respect to the United Nations and international law. This is to say that, contrary to widespread belief, the new conservative hard line president presumably has been advised not to swim against the current and avoid taking any position that could jeopardize Iran’s security and national interests.

As regards the EU3 proposal[9], rejected by Iran and the continuation of negotiations, Mr. Ahmadinejad stressed that Iran is willing to continue negotiations within the framework of IAEA regulations.[10] Later he divulged to the media in a press conference that Iran was preparing a new proposal for the IAEA and the EU in an attempt to break the deadlock for the purpose of resuming nuclear negotiations. This compromising attitude appears in contradiction with Iran’s bold and forceful resumption of nuclear enrichment activities in Isfahan site. The interpretation of this apparent incongruity may be that Iran wanted to put pressure on Europe with a view to have an upper hand in the negotiations with the objective to get more advantages during the next round of talks. However, EU announced that it has cancelled its scheduled talks with Iran due on August 31st. The reason for this action was evidently related to the resumption of Iran’s nuclear processing in Isfahan, seemingly in breach of Iran’s commitment to Paris Accord of 2003.

Realizing that the EU decision to halt negotiations might worsen the situation already critical, Iran launched a new initiative, which apparently would pave the way for breaking through the deadlock. The proposal alluded to by the president seems to be part of this initiative whose content is not yet known. At the same time, Iran declared that it is prepared to resume dialogue without precondition, meaning that it has no intention to cease activities in Isfahan, demanded by EU, before any further negotiations.



Iran’s new initiative on Nuclear Issue

Despite the fact that Iran does not seem much worried about the possible referral of the nuclear case to the UN Security Council, the new government is doing all it can in order to avoid such a situation. The new appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (Mr. Larijani who replaced Mr. Rohani as chief nuclear negotiator) has been very actives recently and at one occasion he was successful in influencing the IAEA to cancel its extraordinary meeting on Iran, due on September 3. He also alluded to the new plan initiated by Iran, which would broaden the number of parties to the negotiations outside the current trio of UK, France and Germany, thus far representing the European Union. Apparently, the plan would also encompass matters relating to the resumption of other parts of Iran’s nuclear activities, suspended under Paris accord with EU3 concluded last September.[11]

The new government seems to have reached to the conclusion that Europe alone has not the necessary capacity and political will to respond to its legitimate demands, especially with respect to the question of security guarantees, which, in the final account, should be endorsed by the United States. Therefore, the perceptions that continued engagement and talks with Europe is merely a waste of time, has gained momentum. Thus, the idea of setting up a new framework for future negotiations came into the new government agenda of work.

The main objective of the new initiative seems to be the enlargement of the scope and parties to the negotiations to include the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members of the IAEA, (Brazil and Malaysia), plus Russia (Iran’s main nuclear partner), China and perhaps India and South Africa. Furthermore, Iran is interested to get the United Nations directly involved in future negotiations. By broadening the multilateral talks, Iran may be seeking to:

- Undermine the importance of its previous negotiations and agreement with the EU3 and to involve other members of the IAEA Governing Council, supporting Iran’s position on the issue;

- To change the course of negotiations from political to a legal-technical path;

- To pave the way in getting the United States involved in the talks with the final objective of attenuating the mistrust between the two states, susceptible to lead to full scale crisis situation;

- To use the leverage of the United Nations as far as possible for inhibiting an eventual coalition against Iran, within the Security Council;

- To gain more time in order to properly set up the new strategy of the conservative government, while preparing ground for domestic public opinion for digesting any eventual concessions, in case threats to Iran’s security reaches its threshold.

Conclusions

An optimistic assessment of the present situation, and considering the new conservative cautious attitude, which I tried to describe here and elsewhere, leads to the conclusions that chances for the new government in Iran to avoid a confrontation on nuclear issue are high, provided that Iran is not totally barred from pursuing its declared peaceful use of nuclear technology in a faithful and transparent manner. This means that the IAEA and all the interested parties should endeavor to engage in a fair non-zero-sum game with a positive outcome in settling this impending crisis.

The IAEA is an appropriate and legitimate forum to debate the case in order to set up the necessary mechanism with the technical assistance of other interested nuclear powers, in order to guarantee the proper use of atomic energy and the adequate implementation of the NPT safeguard protocols and other legal and technical instruments. Of course, Iran expects that its security and survival of the Islamic regime be guaranteed in all circumstances. This is the pivotal point on which any future settlement of Iran’s nuclear issue should rest.


* * *


* Professor of international law and Politics. Dr. Kazemi is the Dean of the Graduate School of Law and Political Science, Islamic Azad University (Science and Research Campus). For more detail please consult http://www.akazemi.homestead.com/ and: Middle East Academic Forum; International Journal of Law and Politics e-mail: Kazemiaa@hotmail.com


Notes

[1] Iranian leaders believe that there is no rationale in giving concessions on this matter, since it will increase the appetite of the United States, whose ultimate objective is the total disintegration of the Islamic regime. They claim that even with the complete and perpetual cessation of enrichment process, the American will soon put forward further demands on other thorny issues such as terrorism, human rights, and democratization… This perception is likely to push Iranian decision makers to opt for more rigid and intransigent stance vis-à-vis the United States. This in turn, could escalate the crisis situation whose management would be more difficult and unpredictable. See: “Iran-U.S. Nuclear Wrangle: The Crisis of Credibility” Middle East Academic Forum http://www.aakazemi.blogspot.com/

[2] Iranians seem not so much worried about their case being submitted to the Security Council, because they seem to have some other kinds of assurance, either from a legal or procedural point of view. They may be even seeking some help from outside, counting upon the support of Russia and China, as two important permanent members of this UN body, to block any eventual resolution. On practical grounds, Iranian leaders pretend that they do not worry much about an eventual embargo or economic sanctions, though this surely will cause lots of trouble and inconvenience to the overall nation. But, those who eventually wish that the people would revolt against the Islamic regime in case of an economic blockade should remember that ever since the revolution, this country has been subject to all kinds of sanctions both during the war and after, and no such thing has ever happened. On the contrary, Iranians have shown that they have a tendency to consolidate during the hard times. Cf. Ibid


[3] See: “Heading for a Clash! Iran-US New Conservatives’ Line-up Over the Nuclear Issue,” Prepared for: The Regional Security Conference UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations, 9-12 September 2004

[4] Cf. Fariboz Mokhtari, “ No One Will Scratch My Back: Iranian Security Perceptions in Historical Context,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 59, No. 2, Spring 2005, pp209-229
[5] See my paper ibid
[6] The IAEA has unanimously adopted the resolution expressing "serious concern" over Iran's resumption of uranium conversion and has demanded that Iran suspend all nuclear activities. Diplomats from the European Union have said that if Iran does not comply they will refer the matter to the Security Council.Under the resolution, the IAEA Board of Governors:
1. Expresses serious concern at the 1 August 2005 notification to the IAEA that Iran had decided to resume the uranium conversion activities at the Uranium Conversion Facility in Esfahan, at the Director General's report that on 8 August Iran started to feed uranium ore concentrate into the first part of the process line at this facility and at the Director General's report that on 10 August Iran removed the seals on the process lines and the UF4 at this facility; ...3. Urges Iran to re-establish full suspension of all enrichment related activities including the production of feed material, including through tests or production at the Uranium Conversion Facility, on the same voluntary, non-legally binding basis as requested in previous Board resolutions, and to permit the Director General to re-instate the seals that have been removed at that facility;

[7] See the text of the resolution: Ibid
[8] Cf.: Iran Daily, Wednesday August 10, 2005, p.1

[9] The proposal relates to a package of incentives offered by EU for continued suspension of Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities. There are several important points in this package covering areas of politics, security, economic and technological matters. On security guarantee, the European proposed a mutual engagement in conformity with the UN Charter and the 1995 UN Security Council resolution promising protection of states with no nuclear arsenal by those that have such capability.

[10] In this telephone conversation Mr. Ahmadinejad expressed interest to meeting the UN Secretary General during the next annual meeting of the UN General Assembly in New York. Mr. Annan for his part called on Iran to refrain from intensifying its nuclear activities, worrying that Iran-Europe talks may come to a deadlock. Ibid.
[11] See: Iran News, Saturday, August 27, 2005. P.15