* Iran's Nuclear Venture: Legal Obligation and Political Temptation

Iran’s Nuclear Venture:
Legal Obligation and Political Temptation

Ali-Asghar Kazemi
February 2004
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1- Introduction

When Iran signed the Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Non Proliferation last year, with the official mitigation of three important EU foreign ministers (UK, France and Germany), nobody had a clear picture of the future development of the matter. At the time of the conclusion of the agreement with EU members, both sides appeared happy from the outcome and both claimed victory. Each side appraised its stance and in its mind, stuck firm to its position.
Thus, Iran claimed that it would never forego its inalienable right to acquire nuclear technology for “peaceful purpose.” In the final Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU Foreign Ministers of 21 October 2003 in Tehran, to promote mutual confidence with a view to removing barriers for cooperation in the nuclear field, Iran agreed that “it has decided voluntarily to suspend all Uranium enrichment and processing activities as defined by the IAEA.”[1]

Interestingly, the two key words that need a little explanation here are:
First, the voluntary character of the agreement, that hints at rejection of any pressure or forceful demand from the other party to accede to an unfair commitment,
Second, The temporary nature of the enrichment and processing activities, which is reflected in the tem “suspension.” This in a way epitomizes the intention of Iranian authorities that they may at any time in future and under any pretext resume the activities
thus suspended.[2]

Iranian chief negotiator, Hassan Rohani, used a smart tactics, by throwing some confusion in the Statement, either for the purpose deceiving the party to contract, or with the intention of gaining time; with the firm conviction that the final ratification of the agreement would be put at the mercy of the conservative majority in the future parliament. Eventually in his mind, he neither accepted nor rejected the obligations emanating from the Statement.
This may seem indeed a good diplomatic maneuver, which by and large, is used in uncertain circumstances, where one is not quite sure of the future outcome of a political game. However, when it comes to the matter of legal obligation, the problem is much more subtle and delicate and may cause a host of trouble to the State which has not demonstrated its good faith during and after the conclusion of a commitment.

Upon a more recent inspection by the IAEA agents, it was revealed in last February, that a number of enrichment equipment was not declared previously by Iran. This alarming case led the IAEA and the international community that indeed Iran was up to something with its nuclear activities and ought to be contained before it goes to far.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the legal obligation created by the Statement and later the signature of the Additional Protocol to the NPT. Furthermore, bearing in mind that the official accession of Iran to the Treaty, requires the final ratification and promulgation of the Iranian legislature for its official entry into force, what would be the overall consequence of Iran’s eventual breach and disregard of its international commitments with respect to the NPT and its various safeguard instruments?


2-Legal Commitment amidst Political Game

In order to have a clear picture of Iran’s nuclear affaire, it is useful and even necessary to review rather quickly the background and short history of the case.
When Iran consented to sign the Additional Protocol, on the political, rather than legal, level, it declared itself open to do it, while also seeking prior assurances with regard to the transfer of nuclear technology to support its future civil nuclear program - a quid pro quo structured deeply into the NPT and IAEA regimes. [3]

In the period under cosideration(mid-June 2003), the issue was submitted in to the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors. Prior to that, the Board had received a report from the Director General on his February visit and a subsequent technical assessment of the Iranian program. In the introductory statement of the report(June 16), it was made clear that while Iran did not stand convicted by the report, its government clearly had a case to answer:
"The report points out that Iran has failed to report certain nuclear material and activities, and that corrective actions are being taken in cooperation with the Iranian authorities. The report also explains that work is still ongoing with regard to the correctness and completeness of Iran's declaration to ensure that all nuclear material in Iran has been declared and is under safeguards. In this respect, we are continuing our efforts - through technical discussions, inspection and environmental sample analysis - to understand all aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, including: the research and development work relevant to its uranium conversion and enrichment programme; and its programme for the use of heavy water.”

In his report on Iran to member states in advance of the June 16-19 meeting of the Board of Governors, the Director General said inter alia :
· Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material, and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed. These failures, and the actions taken thus far to correct them, can be summarised as follows:
(a) Failure to declare the import of natural uranium in 1991, and its subsequent transfer for further processing.
· On April 15, 2003, Iran submitted ICRs [Inventory Change Reports] on the import of UO2, UO4 and UF6. Iran has still to submit ICRs on the transfer of material for further processing and use.
(b) Failure to declare the activities involving the subsequent processing and use of imported natural uranium, including the production and loss of nuclear material, where appropriate, and the production and transfer of waste resulting therefrom.
· Iran has acknowledged the production of uranium metal, uranyl nitrate, ammonium uranyl carbonate, UO2 pellets and uranium wastes. Iran must still submit ICRs on these inventory changes.
(c) Failure to declare the facilities where such material (including the waste) was received, stored and processed.
· On May 5, 2003, Iran provided preliminary design information for the facility JHL [Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories]. Iran has informed the Agency of the locations where the undeclared processing of the imported natural uranium was conducted (TRR [Tehran Research Reactor] and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre), and provided access to those locations. It has provided the Agency access to the waste storage facility at Esfahan, and has indicated that access would be provided to Anarak, as well as the waste disposal site at Qom.
(d) Failure to provide in a timely manner updated information for the MIX [Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon radioisotope Production] Facility and for TRR.
· Iran has agreed to submit updated design information for the two facilities.
(e) Failure to provide in a timely manner information on the waste storage at Esfahan and at Anarak.
· Iran has informed the Agency of the locations where the waste has been stored or discarded. It has provided the Agency [with] access to the waste storage facility at Esfahan, and has indicated that access will be provided to Anarak
· On April 15, 2003, Iran submitted ICRs [Inventory Change Reports] on the import of UO2, UO4 and UF6. Iran has still to submit ICRs on the transfer of material for further processing and use.
(f) Failure to declare the activities involving the subsequent processing and use of imported natural uranium, including the production and loss of nuclear material, where appropriate, and the production and transfer of waste resulting therefrom.
· Iran has acknowledged the production of uranium metal, uranyl nitrate, ammonium uranyl carbonate, UO2 pellets and uranium wastes. Iran must still submit ICRs on these inventory changes.
(g) Failure to declare the facilities where such material (including the waste) was received, stored and processed.[4]
With this rather lenghtly inventory of Iran’s failure to abide by its commitment, it was thought that a very serious decision will come out of the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors. But curiously, this did not happen so and the issue was finally settled in the meeting of the Board of Governors with a mild outcome. Iran was only required to cooperate with the IAEA and to present a full list of its nuclear activities in a transparant manner and to consider signing the Additional Protocol by October 31st.[5]This was considered as a rebuff to US attempt to obtain a “ guilty” verdict against Iran, for paving the way to bring the case to the UN Security Council sanctions.[6] Other countries with nuclear capability, such as Russia, were not quite in the same line as the United States and finally managed to pass a rather mild resolution requesting Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and take a number of positive actions, including the signature of the Additional Protocol.[7] But, some experts doubted from the beginning that even the mere signature of the Protocol would not aleviate the prevailing preoccupation about Iran’s nuclear activities.[8] The paradox was that while Iran wanted to abide by the IAEA safeguards on the legal ground, it did not want to succumb to the wishes of foreign powers, which pursue their own interests. This indeed made the whole problem rather confused and delicate. Since the the acceptance of the Protocol would open the door to unannounced inspections of suspect facilities- something that Iran could not afford on political ground.

Against this background, neither the IAEA nor the countries troubled with Iran’s nuclear activities, were assured about the future development of the matter. The United States, as one of the leading powers much preoccupied with Iranian confusing posture, in various occasions expressed concern about IAEA optimism with the its nuclear venture.[9] The US delegate at the IAEA questioning the motivation of the Iranian government, asked:
"if Iran's intentions are peaceful, why did it engage in a long-term pattern of safeguards violations and evasions regarding a number of its nuclear fuel cycle research and development activities? Can anyone believe that all the different instances of 'failure to comply' over many years, involving different quantities of nuclear materials at different locations, could reflect anything but a conscious effort by Iran to avoid monitoring of its fuel cycle research and development activities by the IAEA?"[10]

This alarming situation heated up once again when it was revealed that the claimed indigenous Iranian nuclear technology was in fact the product of a nuclear leack through a very sophisticated international black market, originated in Pakistan’s highly sensitive scientific milieu. The story needs a bit more clarification that follows in the next section.

3- Iran and the International Nuclear Black Market:
The Libyan Syndrom

In one of its reports to the IAEA, Iran had revealed that some of the components used in the nuclear activities were obtained through unidentified agents in the world black market. It was further disclosed that nuclear technology was clandestinely transferred from Pakistan in collusion with operatives from Europe, the United Arab Emirates and Asia.[11] It was only after this clue that the name of the prominent Pakistani scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, better known as the “father” on Pakistan nuclear bomb, appeared in media. But the vital question was as to whether Pakistani government as a whole, and the army in pariclular was involved in the proliferation affair, which would be a serious breach of legal obligation.

The matter was finally settled through the official declaration of Abdul Qadeer Khan’s apology that he acted alone while accepting the full reponsibility of the unauthorized proliferation activities. He admitted that his action was in violation of Pakistani laws and had placed his country credibility in “serious jeopardy” and his own liftime achievement in doubt.[12]
While the Pakistani scandal was developing aroud the world, came the Lybian confession to the IAEA that it was prepared to disclose its clandestine nuclear activities,[13] apparently acquired through the same sources as Iran and North Korea in the international black market. This was indeed a serious blow to all unlawful nuclear activities around the world, including Iran.
It was further revealed that the Libyan officials were the ones who produced names of individual middlemen and companies involved in the nuclear black market last December.[14] In Fact, Libya as one of the nuclear black market customers, was the one who first whistled on the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan and more than a dozen of his intermediaries. But apparently, the network of all providers and procurers of the nuclear technology in the world black market is not quite lucid. So far only North Korea and Iran have been allegedly linked to the network.

Interestingly, among the most startling discoveries of the IAEA agents were components and drawings of centrifuge that facilitate the uranium processing and plutonium that are used in the core of nuclear warheads, clandestinely handled in the black market. The Libyan disclosure seems to be a very serious challenge, not only to Iran’s nuclear venture but also to the IAEA, whose most recent report to its members divulge yet another breach of Iran’s commitment with respect to the NPT and the Additional Protocol.[15]

As we said above, Iran has agreed to halt assembling uranium centrifuge as part of the pledge to suspend “ remaining uranium enrichment activities” in November last year. But it didn’t reach an agreement with the Agency on a definition of what that meant exactly.[16] The IAEA report said that Iran continued to assemble cetrifuges despite its commitment to ceasse such activities after November 2003.

Furthermore, UN nuclear inspectors in Iran, more recently have found blueprints for a much advanced uranium enrichment centrifuge, the G2 ( or P2), which was not declared in its previous report to the IAEA.[17] This apparently is being added to Iran’s previous failures of providing full disclosure on its nuclear activities to the IAEA. Iran in its part claimed that it has many other projects in hand that need not to be disclosed at this juncture, but it will do so when appropriate.[18]

4-Reading into Iran’s Intention for Developing Nuclear
Technology

Digging into the intention of political leaders is a difficult task. Generals and admirals in the field are more predictable. In politics we are always involved with some sort of games and players. Terms such as: zero-sum and non-zero-sum games, rationality, interests, balance of power, pride and prestige…are ordinary words used in poltical realem. Politicians usualy get involved with them with the intention to promote their national interests.On this point, it is safe to suggest on doctrinal level, that Iran’s national objectives and strategies are shaped by its regional political aspirations, threat perceptions, and the need to preserve its Islamic government.[19] But, the problem is that most of the time the term “national interests” is not quite lucid and those who decide about them are not quite apt for such vital task. Thus, in seeking to explain the behavior of a State, such as Iran, in the international or regional scene, we have to read into the minds of men and individuals at the higher echellon of decision making apparatus. This indeed is not an easy job and requires some imagination and speculation.

If we assume that men are rather deliberte and self-conscious about what they do, thus, they should know their own motives and give reasons for their behavior. But this does’t seem to be often true. Because, sometimes people do not want to confess their real motives, or at least not all of them, and so they may knowingly lie or distort or conceal the facts. Sometimes even, they may base their motives and behavior on false assumptions about themselves, their true aims and objectives, their threats, their capabilites and opportunities, or their political and strategic enviroment. This may prove to be very dangerous, not only for them but also for others who interact with them.
One may argue safely that in present day Iran, we are facing with this latter kind of decision-making, that is, we are concened with factors affecting choice other than the entirely conscious and rational criteria that usually come into play in the determination of “national interests.” Political expediencies sometimes overshadow factors related with optimum and rational choices. Perhaps,the reason behind the very risky and high political costs of Iran’s nuclear venture, may find its rationale in such argument which goes beyond the regular calculation of risk or cost-benefit analysis.

Western statesmen and politicians involved with the Middle Eastern and particularily Iran’s affairs often ask: “who is in charge of Iran’s nuclear business? Who are the decision-makers in this matter?” Answer to these queries is both simple and difficult! It is simple in the sense that the Iranian Constitution very clearly puts the whole national power under the supreme command and absolute prerogatives of the religious leader. At the same time, the president of the Islamic Republic, who is elected into office, is the head on National Security Council, in charge of the security, internal order and territorial integrity of the country. But, he has no command or control over the overall defense policy and armed forces. True that budget allocation to the defense system is within the regular fuction of legislative tand executive branches, but this is more of a formal rather than substantive function. This means that the government as a whole may know nothing specific about a particular defense project, such as the nuclear scheme.

With respect to the true intention and objective of Iran’s nuclear activities, the official answer is that this country it merely using its basic and inalienable right of all member States of the NPT to develop atomic energy for peaceful purpose. To this end, Iran claims that it is ready to ensure the international community that it have no intention to produce nuclear weapons.[20] Furthermore, the upper echelon decision-making ladder in Iran has rightfully and in several occasions recognized that Iran does not consider nuclear weapon as a viable and rational useful strategy for defense purposes. The official reading of such statement is that nuclear option may render the country more vulnerable to risks outside threats[21]. But, most critiques and specialists in the field believe that these claims are mere rhetoric that is neither supported by factual evidence, nor accepted by the IAEA and the international community as a whole. They refer to recent (February 2004) revelations about international nuclear black market and specific findings of the IAEA during its last inspection in Iran.

How then shall we explain the present situation and the earnest attempt by Iran to pursue its long-standing nuclear policy? In fact as we know, the project goes back to the 1980s, that is the period in which Iran was engaged in an all out war with its neighboring hostile State, Iraq. The optimistic view would go along with the argument advanced by Iran about its peaceful intention of developing nuclear technology. The pessimists however, have more ground to argue against the peaceful aims of such undertaking. They would eventually base their argument on the following facts and factors:

· Iran as an important and rich country in oil and gas, having extensive reserves of fossil fuel inland and offshore, does not need to embark on a more costly and risky nuclear project in order to produce energy,

· Enrichment facilities and related components that are being used or developed by Iranians, do not seem to be for support of civilian nuclear energy plants in Bushehr (considering the fact that the Russians are supposed to supply the necessary fuel for Bushehr plants and the Iranian party is obligated to return the depleted uranium that could be used in nuclear bomb),

· Iran may be enthusiastic in obtaining nuclear capability with the objective of deterring any potential aggressor that might threaten the very existence of the Islamic regime,

· Iran may contend that the West is using a double-standard policy with respect to the nuclear proliferation (Pakistan, India and Israel are the ones who have been left out of the black list),

· Iran might be tempted to acquire nuclear technology for the mere sake of national pride and prestige with a view to boost its regional position vis a vis its potential opponents and contenders,
· Being a nuclear power for a revolutionary Islamic State may be an indication of the regime efficiency and viability despite the mounting pressure from the world political environment,

· While the optimists would say that even if Iranian leaders have any adventurous intention in the back of their mind, the Libyan syndrome will make them think twice in pursuing their nuclear project before it goes too far, the pessimists would argue that Iran does not seem to be deterred or intimidated by the disclosure scandal,

· Iran appears to be pursuing the North Korean tactics by lingering the legal process of ratifying the safeguard measures related to the NPT additional Protocol. In other words, Iran is trying to buy time for enrichment of enough uranium to build a number of nukes before it officially declares to withdraw from the NPT obligations. This will put the IAEA and the world as a whole before a fait accompli,

· Iranian leaders seem to prefer accepting the risk of being target of an eventual preemptive strike than to give up the power altogether. Since, they believe they can capitalize on such event to consolidate the people while tightening the rope around the opposition neck,

· - Optimists and pessimists would both admit that strategic thinking; rationality; national interests and optimum choice do not have the same meanings among the Iranian leaders and the Western political thought. This indeed makes a lot of difference when the two sides face each other in a peaceful dialogue or in a hostile confrontation.

5- Conclusions

Whatever conclusions that could be derived from this short analysis, based on some assumptions regarding the present international environment and the emerging world order after the events of September 11, 2001, a number of propositions could be deducted:
· Iran, as an ideological, revolutionary Islamic State, does not accept the prevailing norms in the present international system and, wherever possible, try to escape from unfair obligations and commitment imposed upon it,
· Believing that international rules and regulations are product of powerful Western nations, Iran as a revolutionary State, could not endorse them and will try to change or challenge them whenever possible,
· As a consequence of the above propositions, Iran will continue to swing between abiding by legal obligations and evading pressure by political expediencies in the foreseeable future,
· While Iran does not desire to be coined as a violator of international rules, nonetheless, it can not go along with some legal restrictions imposed upon it by the NPT and the relevant safeguard measures, including the Additional Protocol,
· Iran believes that the United States and Israel are launching an unfair propaganda campaign in international media on Iran’s nuclear threat, while pursuing a double standard policy, they themselves are the real source of threat for the Middle East security and stability,
· Whatever the true intention of Iran’s nuclear activitie, the project seems to be rather an issue of national pride and prestige than a source of threat to peace and security of the region. Since in the final account, it would be impossible for Iran to become a viable nuclear power in the present international environment. (There seems to be a consensus in the international community on this critical issue),
· With the recent development in the international nuclear black market and the volontary disclosure of Libyan nuclear project, it appears very hard for countries such as Iran to resist the international pressure and to avoid the risk of its case to be sent by the IAEA to the UN Security Coucil.
· International community as a whole, and a number of world powers, including the United States, are not at all ready to witness the emergence of another nuclear State- no matter how big or small- on the surface of earth. It would be therefore unconceivable that Iran could pass this dangerous road unchecked.
· The most probable course of action that Iran may rationally opt with respect to its nuclear activities, would be the strict coplience with the relevent international rules and regulations, and to cooperate fully with the IAEA in a transparent manner, in order to avoid any misunderstanding and misperception. This indeed will help to aleviate the preoccupation of the international community and also will alow Iran to benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

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Notes

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· Professor Kazemi holds Ph.D. in International Law and Relations from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts U.S.A.; He is the author of many books and articles. He is legal advisor on matters of International Law of the Sea. Currently, he is Dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Science, Islamic Azad University (Science and Research Campus). For more detail please consult Academic Site of Dr. Kazemi: http://www.akazemi.homestead.com/

[1] - Emphasis is mine.
[2]- In fact, the same day after the Statement was officially issued, Mr. Hassan Rohani, head of Iranian negotiators, asserted that Iran might resume its activities at any time, which seems suited to its national interests. He even emphasized that: within a week, a month or a year we may choose to exercise our rights to terminate the suspension.
[3]- From a mix of political and non-proliferation motives, a number of IAEA/NPT member states, including the United States and United Kingdom, currently ban all nuclear-related exports to Iran. Cf.: \Disarmament Diplomacy News Review - IAEA Increases Pressure On Iran Over Nuclear Inspections.htm. Issue No. 72, August - September 2003

[4] Disarmament Diplomacy News Review Issue No. 72, August - September 2003
“IAEA Increases Pressure On Iran Over Nuclear Inspections”

[5] The IAEA Board of Governors - whose 35 members included Iran in that period - meet in Vienna. Despite the momentous range of issues facing the Agency, notably with regard to North Korea, discussions were dominated by the Iran crisis and the Board's response to the June 6 report from the Director General. The meeting took place to the backdrop of regular, large-scale, and occasionally violently repressed student pro-reform demonstrations in Iran. See:DisarmamentDiplomacy Issue No. 72, August - September 2003

[6] The U.S. had supplied Russia and other countries on the IAEA board with some of its intelligence, although a senior U.S. official said it remained unclear what findings the IAEA board will make when it meets following month. It was thought that imposing sanctions on Tehran through the United Nations Security Council for its nuclear activities would be difficult. Unlike Iraq and even North Korea, Iran has relations with many European countries and Russia, and their governments appear reluctant to jeopardize these ties by joining a campaign to isolate Tehran. [Source: David S. Cloud, "U.S., Iran Stall on Road to Rapprochement --- Bush Administration Divided on How to Resolve Renewed Tensions Over Iraq, Nuclear Plans", Wall Street Journal, May 12, 2003, p. A4]

[7] To US diplomats, an eventual action against Iran in the Security Council would lead to its international isolation and destabilisation, and possible future military overthrow, of the next member of the 'axis of evil' due for 'regime change'. Iran in its part, claimed that Washington's intense focus on its nuclear program was in part an effort to divert attention from the discrediting of its claims concerning the Iraqi WMD threat. See Ibid. It is interesting to note the position of Russia, as a partner of Iran’s nuclear activities. Russia understandably sought to bridge the gap between these two interpretations: by its reading, the IAEA had begun the process, with which Iran was cooperating, of clarifying the situation - a process which could be brought to the happiest conclusion by speedy Iranian acceptance of the Additional Protocol. Disarmament Diplomacy, Ibid

[8] - It was argued that "Even the so-called "Additional Protocol" won't keep Iran from going nuclear if it so desires. Alarming news that enrichment facilities developed in recent months are under Iran military control, illuminating as a lie the Iranian claim that the program is geared to commercial power production. Despite these apparent facts, the USA is signaling that Iran need not fear US, and that we are willing to stay out of Iran's politics and even help subdue the international operations of Iran's leading opposition group (who, by the way, are the folks who've blown the whistle on Iran's n-program to begin with). See: A:\Iran news at nuclear_com.htm [Source: Howard LaFranchi (staff writer, The Christian Science Monitor), "On Iran, US opts for peer pressure; As new allegations of Tehran's nuclear program surface, Washington tries multilateral approach", Christian Science Monitor, July 10, 2003, p. 1]

[9] The United States is deeply concerned about information the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has verified concerning Iran's nuclear program, says Ambassador Kenneth Brill. Responding on June 18 to the IAEA director general's report on Iran, Brill noted that clandestine Iranian nuclear activities made public in news reports last summer were confirmed as a result of the IAEA's inspection visit to Iran in February. He also said that "Without the outside revelations, Iran's extensive nuclear program would still be proceeding on a largely clandestine basis" and the report "confirms that Iran's nuclear program is cause for grave concern." Brill, who is the U.S. Representative to United Nations organizations in Vienna, noted that Iran told the IAEA that it had a policy of "full cooperation" and "complete transparency" concerning its nuclear program. "Iran's 'complete transparency' proved not to extend, however, to the import of nuclear material, or to the subsequent processing of that material, or to the facilities where the material was stored and processed," Brill said. "In fact, Iran's 'complete transparency' has proven in crucial respects to be an empty promise, intended to distract attention from its reluctant confirmation of the existence of a whole series of clandestine activities and facilities," he continued. See: US Department of State, International Information Program A:\U_S_ Urges IAEA to Expedite, Expand Iranian Nuclear Investigation.htm

[10] - See Ibid.

[11] -See Iran Daily, January 29, 2004, p.1. It was disclosed in the Iranian reports to the IAEA that individuals from Pakistan, Germany, Holland South Africa and the UAE had been involved in the case.

[12] - Cf. Iran Daily, February 9, 2004. p.7. The Pakistani scientist confessed that other people involved in the black market deal acted on his instructions, while emphasizing that no government officials were involved in the clandestine activities.

[13] After Libya decided to get rid of its program on weapons of mass destruction last January, the United States took possession of its equipments, including centrifuge parts used in uranium enrichment and “ most sensitive documentation associated with the Libyan nuclear weapon program.” A centrifuge is a rapidly rotating cylinder that can be used to speed up uranium enrichment for use in nuclear bomb. Cf. Iran Daily January 29, 2004. p.9.

[14] - See e.g. “ UN Watchdog Gets Nuke Data from Libya,” Tehran Times International Daily, February 25, 2004, p.6.

[15] - In his statement of 8 March 2004 to the IAEA Board of Governors, Director General of the Agency said inter alia “, I am seriously concerned that Iran’s October declaration did not include any reference to its possession of P-2 centrifuge designs and related R&D, which in my view was a setback to Iran’s stated policy of transparency. This is particularly the case since the October declaration was characterized as providing ‘the full scope of Iranian nuclear activities’, including a ‘complete centrifuge R&D chronology’.

[16] -See Tehran Times, February 25. 2004. P.1

[17] - Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf has said that their investigations revealed that Abdul Qadeer Khan has only sold the drawings of centrifuges and other nuclear related information to Iran and not the designs for making nuclear weapons. The Pakistani scientist has signed an agreement not to establish any contacts with “nuclear criminals” and were to break his pledge, his parole would be revoked. See Iran Daily, February 19, 2004, p.1

[18] - Declaration by Hassan Rohani, Iranian chief negotiator last February 2004, to the media on its return from a trip to Vienna, where the IAEA Headquarters is located.

[19] - See: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/doctrine.htm - Last updated, December 13,2002. According to the analysis presented in the Global Security, “Tehran strives to be a leader in the Islamic world and seeks to be the dominant power in the Persian Gulf. The latter goal brings it into conflict with the United States. Tehran would like to diminish Washington’s political and military influence in the region. Within the framework of its national goals, Iran continues to give high priority to expanding its NBC weapons and missile programs.”

[20] - Cf. my paper presented last December to the Regional Security Conference in Athens- Greece, on“The Shifting U.S. Threat Perception after September 11 and Fear of Iran’s Nuclear Threat.”

[21] This fact has been even recognized by two important personalities directly responsible for Iran’s national defense and security. The leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei once said to his followers that the Islamic Republic strength does not lie in the obtaining or domestic manufacturing of an atomic bomb, but it is the power of the faith that can deter our enemy. Washington Post, November 17,1992. More recently, Iran’s Defense minister, Vice Admiral Ali Shamkhani recognized in a February 2002 statement: “ The existence of nuclear weapons will turn us into a threat to others that could be exploited in a dangerous way to harm our relations with the countries of the region” See The Guardian, Feb.6, 2002. See also, George Perkovich, Dealing With Iran’s Nuclear Challenge, April 28, 2003. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

* Shifting U.S. Threat Perception after September 11 and the Fear of Iran's Nuclear Ambition

Shifting U.S. Threat Perception After September 11 and the Fear of Iran’s Nuclear Threat

Ali-Asghar Kazemi
December 2003

Introduction

That the events of September 11, 2001, changed our perception of the world order and international power structure is now uncontestable. To characterize these changes, however, one has to examine the specific context in which the new perception has occurred and the relevant discursive effect it had upon the trend of international relations and the world order.

The United States, which became the sole “superpower” after the demise of its long-time ideological adversary the Soviet Union, found itself without serious challengers. The new strategic environment even brought the existence of important security alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), into doubt, because the major task of most such huge and costly military institutions was to defend the West against the Soviet threat. The overall feeling of NATO members after the Cold War was that sooner or later this defensive pact, founded to counter a specific threat in a bipolar world system, would have to be dismantled, just like its rival, the Warsaw Pact, which covered the Eastern bloc defense. The September 11 attacks not only changed this feeling, but also shifted the whole fabric of U.S. strategists’ security and threat perceptions.

This paper attempts to analyze the rationale behind this transformation and its impact on both the Middle East region and wider international relations. In the course of my discussion, I shall also examine some specific questions related to the much-debated issue of Iran’s nuclear program and recent developments with respect to the NPT and the IAEA Additional Protocol for the Application of Safeguards.

The main argument is as follows:
1. The recent shift in threat perception has induced a sense of urgency for U.S. policymakers to counter any probable source of threat (including non-conventional and nuclear), throughout the world, for which they do not seem to be prepared;
2. There is no consensus on the nature, origin, viability and the urgency of this threat among various actors and nuclear states in the world;
3. The plague of September 11 has pushed the United States to lower its threshold of threat perception and has created a new “ institutional paranoia,” somewhat like that which persisted during the Cold War;
4. The new strategic environment is likely to isolate the United States in international relations, leading to further cleavage among its former European allies and spreading the seeds of animosity and defiance, especially in the crisis-ridden Middle East;
5. Without passing any judgment on the real intention of Iran’s endeavor to acquire nuclear technology, it does not appear to be a viable threat to any country in the region and much less to the United States;
6. U.S. strategy to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be directed toward preventive diplomacy rather than preemptive defense;
7. In the specific case of Iran, any attempt to use force to deter this country from acquiring nuclear technology and capability may lead to the revival of “Persian nationalism,” the emergence of anti-American sentiments, and the strengthening of hard-liners’ positions;
8. Mounting challenges to the U.S. global strategy against terrorism make it difficult for the incumbent U.S. president to sway domestic public opinion or the world at large. This problem, added to the ongoing daily threats in occupied Iraq and U.S. casualties, might affect President Bush’s chances in the November election.

The impact of September 11 on U.S. threat perception

As world communication and information technology shrink the distances between people around the world at the dawn of twenty-first century, history is being accelerated. The challenges are shaped mainly by the simultaneous convergence of a number of trends and phenomena. Globalization and its corollaries have led to “localization,” and identity crises among less affluent peoples have created a new return to traditional religious values and awareness around the world. Each of these trends is having a impact on socio-political and strategic discourse; when they occur jointly or simultaneously, they are creating new situations and parameters at national and international levels and transforming the whole concept, structure, and perception of the world order.

The interrelation of the two processes, globalization on the one hand, and the emergence of distrust and suspicion about the United States in the traditional third world on the other, has had a negative impact overall. The desire to preserve their identity and the discontinuity between means and ends have led some less tolerant groups to opt for unconventional tactics. This is one way of explaining the unfortunate events of September 11 and subsequent terrorist actions around the world, planned and conducted by a tiny number of fundamentalist radicals. Nonetheless, this has changed the perception of international order and national security in the minds of U.S. strategists and policymakers.

Even before September 11, with the end of the Cold War and the apparent victory of Western liberal democracy over Marxist ideology, international relations thinkers projected two contradictory views about U.S. strategy in the world:
1. The United States has no incentive to get involved in various world crises and international entanglements. Since there is no longer a great enemy contending against the West, there is no reason for the United States to act as a world “gendarme” and sacrifice its own resources. According to this view, a reduction of U.S. commitments to old alliances in Europe and elsewhere in the world would take place.
2. The opposite view is that the United States would be able to influence the emerging world order at the beginning of the new century by acting as a “policeman” to manage various national, ethnic, tribal, and cultural quarrels around the world. Among these conflicts are the long-standing disputes in the Middle East, the most urgent of which remains the Arab–Israeli hostilities.
September 11 paved the way for this second alternative, hence the victory of the neo-conservative hawks over the doves.

There are a number of ways to explain the rationale behind the United States’ decision to intervene militarily around the world. Among the various causes that lead a country to go to war or to use force to counter a potential or actual threat, historians and specialists in the field consider the following factors most important:[1]
1. Reaction to perceived threats;
2. Enthusiasm for ideals;
3. Frustration over unsatisfactory conditions, attributed to foreigners;
4. Belief in the utility of the threat of war or war itself as an instrument of policy, prestige, or power;
5. Conviction that military self-help is necessary to vindicate justice, law, and rights, if peaceful negotiation proves ineffective.
Each of the above factors can be explained and applied to current situations in the new strategic environment. Furthermore, this can be viewed from the vantage point of both the United States and the terrorist groups. In fact, this mutuality is the main factor lowering the threshold of U.S. threat perception.

Threat perception
Perhaps the most critical factor in the evaluation of past situations leading to serious crises and wars is how high-ranking policymakers see a specific case and what the individual or collective threshold to counter and manage a crisis situation is.

During the “bipolar” era, the United States and the Soviet Union were in permanent states of alert. The arms race resulting from the perceived threats tended to raise the fear of each side almost to the point of paranoia. In the United States, threat perception has always varied among the various departments traditionally and legally responsible for crisis management and making foreign policy (such as the White House, the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the State Department). Of course, the U.S. Congress has its own prerogatives and tools of control in all aspects of U.S. policy decisions. As we saw during the last U.S. intervention in Iraq, some serious arguments against it were raised in various departments on the one hand, and Congress on the other. The media have their own impact on the overall shape of public opinion as well as leaders’ and decision makers’ threat perceptions.
Enthusiasm for ideals
This important second factor has been translated to some kind of obsession formed by ideological conviction. This is especially true for the United States, which has taken on a self-proclaimed responsibility to convert the world to its values and norms, regardless of social and cultural differences. For instance, U.S. authorities speak of the democratization of Iraq and the wider Middle East, without realizing that Western-style democracy may be counterproductive in some deeply traditional countries. They simply may not be ready to accept the norms and values cherished by the West, either because of religion or other inhibiting factors.

Some high-ranking and well-educated officials in the West seem stupefied by the fact that some peoples do not like democracy, freedom, or justice, especially when advocated by outsiders. Actually, they hate for others to tell them what is good or bad for them. Traditional societies as a whole, and countries of the Middle East in particular, prefer to put their feet on the steps of their fathers and ancestors, rather than to imitate strange Western values. Indeed, it takes time to induce changes in these societies; otherwise they are susceptible to disintegration and collapse.
Frustration over unsatisfactory conditions, attributed to foreigners
This factor relates to the continued disorder and poverty around the world, for which the globalization trend, supported by the big powers, is seen as the main culprit. The same scapegoat was used during the Cold War by communists, who put the blame for their difficulties on “imperialist states.”[2] This supposition fits the widespread discontent around the world and especially the Middle East region, which suffers great poverty and injustice despite its huge hydrocarbon reserves and riches.

Belief in the utility of threat of war
This factor is a double-edged sword, used equally by terrorists and by mature states that believe that recourse to coercion and war is sometimes useful for promoting their policies and objectives.

The dynamics of coercion in U.S. foreign policy is a well-known phenomenon.[3] It is no secret now that the new conservative wing in the Washington decision-making apparatus believes that recourse to war and military operations is sometimes necessary for solving problems of terrorism and dictatorial regimes in the Middle East. They rationalize such strategy as reasonable or necessary to oust incumbent totalitarian regimes and put democratic governments in their place. Fundamentalists tend to use the same logic by advocating terror as a legitimate tactic against those who do not understand their cause. This mutual perception tends to reinforce the situation of intolerance and hostility. The next factor is somewhat complementary to this one.

Belief in the necessity of self-help
Recourse to self-help is a classical tactic that seems to please both the weaker side and the stronger. Today, as in the time directly after World War II, states have found it difficult to maintain internal peace and order unless they have an outside enemy that they can blame for political and economic failure. This usually helps them to avoid disintegration of their societies in times of crises. Even the strategy of “preventive defense” advocated by some U.S. war planners as a pretext for military intervention may fit in this category.

On the other hand, the more recent suicide attacks in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East also find their rationale in the necessity of self-help, rooted in the belief that for your survival you must rely on your own means and not expect assistance from other states or organizations.

With this in mind, the U.S. leadership is increasingly under pressure, both from inside and outside, to justify its military interventions around the world. This includes the traditional European allies of the United States, who have turned away from U.S. world policy. It is true that U.S. diplomats can still get the full endorsement of the UN Security Council on the issue of Iraq’s reconstruction or consensus in the IAEA board of Governors to pass a resolution against Iran’s nuclear venture.[4] This should not be construed, however, as the total submission of other states, which are contending many aspects of U.S. policies.

As we witnessed in October 2003, the EU’s leading members did not hesitate to take initiative in the matter of Iran’s nuclear issue by sending the foreign ministries of the big three (France, the United Kingdom, and Germany) to Tehran to make sure that the case would not fall into the hands of U.S. strategists.[5] This may be considered “preventive diplomacy” as opposed to “ preventive self-defense,” and was used by the EU to avoid the case of Iraq being repeated in Iran. If the European initiative had not taken place, it is not hard to imagine that in order to push Iran to go along with the IAEA demands, the hard liners in Tehran would be tempted to refuse any commitment, which would pave the way to bring the case to the UN Security Council. This matter will be further clarified below.

Iran’s nuclear venture and the perceived threat to peace
Is Iran’s desire to acquire nuclear technology potentially harmful to world order and peace? It depends on whose lens we use to view the issue. The IAEA Board of Governor’s decision to pass a resolution on 12 September 2003 for the implementation of the NPT Safeguards has been interpreted differently inside Iran from at the international level.[6] Preoccupation with the danger of Iran’s nuclear capability is now an alarming issue throughout the world. Iran’s decision to start negotiations for the conclusion of the Additional Protocol, and the IAEA request that Iran should promptly and unconditionally sign and implement it while stopping all nuclear enrichment programs, may bring a modicum of relief to all those who feel threatened by Iran’s undertaking. Since we are now in the midst of this process, it is very hard to pass judgment on the outcome of the ongoing negotiations.

Iran claims that it is merely using the basic and inalienable right of all NPT member states to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes and is ready to assure the international community that it has no intention to produce nuclear weapons. Some critics would also argue that the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968 is not an endeavor designed to protect mankind from the danger of devastation and annihilation, but rather to preserve the monopoly status of a handful of powers in possession of such technology.

Iran claims that its undertaking is legitimate and just. We know well that justice, equity, and fairness have never been highest aim of dealings between states, yet they have served as useful caveats in political discourse for the promotion of national interests. In fact, as we said earlier, one of the causes of war and hostility is the frustration of the less fortunate over unsatisfactory conditions allegedly created by the powerful nations. To them, slogans such as rendering justice to the powerless, saving humanity from the plague of hunger and disease, securing the world from the threat of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, atomic bombs and so on are wonderful words that only tickle ears and minds. Indeed, international norms and principles are always coated with some kind of noble and human overtone that merely serves as ground to promote one’s own policy or interests.

Some contend that the main objectives of owning nuclear weapons have always been their deterrent capabilities and use as leverage in political dealings. The argument against this is that nuclear capability in the hands of undemocratic and irresponsible regimes is too dangerous and should be contained at any cost. There seems to be a consensus on this latter point between the United States and many European powers. Realistically looking at the matter, even if we assume that Iran is trying to acquire a handful of nuclear weapons, it would have little operational or deterrent value. On the contrary, such an endeavor would increase Iran’s vulnerability vis-à-vis its potential adversaries.[7]

U.S. strategy to contain Iran’s nuclear project
The perception of the Bush administration and the neo-conservatives around him is that the new configuration of the world after September 11 does not leave any room to compromise on the risk of nuclear proliferation.[8] Things are fine as they are, as long as conventional treaties and obligations can be used to stop the trend; beyond that, the United States will use its muscle without hesitation. In the new configuration, it is suggested that not only the most powerful nation in the world, but also the world in general, are threatened by “rogue states” which are achieving WMD—nuclear, biological, and chemical—capabilities. The primary goal of the new preemptive strategy is to completely neutralize such threats.[9]

Iranians are quite conscious of the U.S. threat. They have witnessed U.S. military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and do not wish to see such events happening in Iran. U.S. strategy for keeping Iran from acquiring nuclear technology should be founded on premises other than use of force. That is to say, a strategy of preemptive strike or preventive defense, whether directed at selective targets (for example, attacks on specific nuclear plants or facilities) or at the overall regime, may only help Iran’s internal consolidation and perhaps the revival of the long-dormant “Persian nationalism,” even among people who have no sympathy for the incumbent regime.

The idea of the “axis of evil” that came into political jargon, including Iran alongside Iraq and North Korea, was something that did not deter Iran’s leadership, but helped instead to inflame anti-American sentiment. If Iran is kept from achieving its proclaimed peaceful nuclear project, such strategies may strengthen the hard liners in Tehran and weaken the position of those who favor gradual rapprochement with the United States.

U.S. policies toward Iran and the broader Middle East should demonstrate that its efforts to contain nuclear proliferation aim to create a secure and stable environment for Iran and all other states in the region. It should also clarify that the duration of its occupation of Iraq and military presence in Afghanistan depend on the assistance of neighboring states, including Iran, in achieving stability and peace in the region.[10] Perhaps a similar initiative to that of the EU foreign ministers, though not conducted officially, could pave the way for a constructive dialogue between the two countries. The initial aim of such dialogue should be mutual confidence building. Furthermore, such an initiative should not exclude one political faction (conservatives) in favor of the other (reformists); otherwise it would be doomed to failure. They must work together. The Iranian national security and defense apparatus are in the hands of hard liners, but the reformists are the ones who have legal authority to conclude agreements and approve them in the parliament; yet again the final promulgation of such agreements is at the mercy of conservative hard liners.

The same situation may emerge if sanctions are imposed upon Iran for any future non-compliance to the NPT, either through some sort of UN Security Council Resolution or otherwise by EU or the United States. A much better strategy would be to demonstrate the benefits of mutual cooperation in various domains, such as economic, technological, and security matters in the region. This may include the easing of U.S. sanctions against Iran, and even gradually lifting them, in order to pave the way for resolving all outstanding issues between the two countries and finally restoring their normal relations.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
The main strategic dilemma facing U.S. leaders is how to benefit from the opportunities which emerged after September 11, in order to shape a new world order attuned to U.S. interests and those of the world at large.[11] The impulse to eradicate terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, despotism, poverty, and disease, and thereby make the world a safer place to live is indeed commendable. But this impulse could run aground against the belief that it can be fulfilled by military means. Since failure on this ground would significantly undermine U.S. policies and overall strategy, it may lead to a never desired world disorder. The means that statesmen and generals in Washington are using to promote U.S. security against terror and intolerance do more on the whole to promote insecurity. Therefore, national security and national interests need to be rigorously redefined and reexamined in current world affairs. One state should not make others insecure for the sake of preserving its security. Military power alone does not enhance national security and national interests. It may even lead to insecurity and provoke fear. It has become clearer and clearer that no single nation, no matter how powerful, can be safely entrusted with the responsibility of bringing about peaceful change or interpreting and remaking international security. Thus, unilateral assumption of shaping world order by a single state is likely to jeopardize international peace and security.

The apparent shift of U.S. threat perception and the belief that war is a legitimate instrument of politics may lead to a dangerous world no prophet ever predicted. U.S. policy in the Middle East after the collapse of Iraq has been a source of anxiety and irritation throughout the region. Iran, for example, sees the Americans as behind the IAEA Resolution against it.[12] Thus far Iran has conceded on the question of NPT and the Safeguard Additional Protocol, but it does not mean that this source of international preoccupation is eliminated for good.[13] This may be the beginning of a long, time-consuming, and serious conflict that, if not managed properly, may lead to another entanglement in the region. To avoid this, the following points about the question of threat perception in general are worth considering:[14]
· The greater the reliance on a military solution to Middle East problems, the greater the resistance to U.S. presence in the region;
· The greater the opposition to U.S. unilateralism, the greater the possibility of U.S. isolation in world affairs;
· The higher the perception of threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East, the greater the probability of recourse to force to counter the situation;
· As the level of crisis increases in the Middle East, public discontent increases in the United States;
· As the targeting of values of high priority in the opponent’s normative hierarchy increases, the sense of threat to values will also increase;
· As many values and targets are threatened simultaneously, the sense of threat to U.S. targets and values tends to increase;
· The greater the perception of terrorist attacks, the greater the tendency of recourse to military action;
· As stress of terrorists acquiring WMD increases, decision makers will perceive the range of alternatives open to them become narrower;
· As misperception of the level of violence in the actions of opponents increases, the probability of escalation of the conflict tends to increase.
With respect to Iran’s nuclear activities and the outcome of the ongoing dialogue and negotiations with IAEA, and the relevant U.S. strategy to contain the perceived threat from this country, the following observations and recommendations are forwarded for the purpose of stimulating debate:
· Iran’s fluid political dynamic has raised high threat perception in the minds of U.S. decision makers; this is further aggravated by recent disclosure of Iran’s secret nuclear activities and breach of legal obligation during past decade;[15]
· Iran’s acquisition of nuclear capability has added further negative elements to the already hostile relations between the two countries and has put Iran’s credibility into serious doubt;
· Iran is in a vulnerable defensive situation after the September 12 IAEA Resolution and will probably give more concessions to the international community on various matters, namely the signature of the Additional Protocol to the NPT,[16] but this may not alleviate the U.S. threat perception;
· Even if Iran succeeds in obtaining or manufacturing a handful of nuclear weapons, it lacks the overall capability to build a viable deterrent force vis-à-vis the United States or other nuclear states;
· Whatever the real intention of Iran’s recent attempts at manufacturing delivery systems and long-range ballistic missiles, this action seems to be a gesture of national prestige in the region, rather than a serious threat to any country since it lacks other important elements of national power for a sustained military operation;
· Any selective targeting or military operations against Iran’s nuclear plants or vital oil terminals and facilities may only consolidate national integration and risks the revival of Persian nationalism, even among those who are not in line with the incumbent regime. This also may put the hard liners in a stronger position;
· Any future sanction or embargo imposed upon Iran for breach of obligation or non-compliance with the NPT provisions, either within the framework of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter or otherwise enacted by the United States or EU, may not prove effective to achieve the expected result, and may even worsen the situation;
· The United States would be better off in pursuing a strategy of preventive diplomacy with respect to the Middle East (especially the current issue of Iran’s nuclear project), rather than preemptive strike, which may stir up antagonism and hostility in the region.


Notes

Professor Ali-Asghar Kazemi holds a Ph.D. in International Law and Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Mass. He is the author of many books and articles, and a legal advisor on matters concerning the international law of the sea. Currently, he is dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Science, Islamic Azad University (Science and Research Campus).


1. See, for instance, Quincy Wright, A Study of War: An Analysis of the Causes, Nature, and Control of War. Abridged ed. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970).
2. Cf. Quincy Wright, “ Commentary on War Since 1942,” in Sanders and Durbin, Contemporary International Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971), 210–15.
3. For a very recent and insightful study on this matter see Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (London: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
4. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves as the world’s foremost intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Established as an autonomous organization under the United Nations in 1957, the IAEA carries out programs to maximize the useful contribution of nuclear technology to society while verifying its peaceful use.
5. With respect to the signature of the Safeguard Protocol, Iranian officials were initially divided, until the visit of foreign ministers of the three great powers of the EU (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) to Tehran, which took place before the 31 October 2003 deadline.

The Final Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU Foreign Ministers of 21 October 2003 in Tehran is as follows:
Upon the invitation of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany paid a visit to Tehran on October 21, 2003.
The Iranian authorities and the ministers, following extensive consultations, agreed on measures aimed at the settlement of all outstanding IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] issues with regards to the Iranian nuclear program and at enhancing confidence for peaceful cooperation in the nuclear field.
The Iranian authorities reaffirmed that nuclear weapons have no place in Iran’s defense doctrine and that its nuclear program and activities have been exclusively in the peaceful domain. They reiterated Iran’s commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and informed the ministers that:
a. The Iranian Government has decided to engage in full cooperation with the IAEA to address and resolve through full transparency all requirements and outstanding issues of the agency and clarify and correct any possible failures and deficiencies within the IAEA.
b. To promote confidence with a view to removing existing barriers for cooperation in the nuclear field:
i. having received the necessary clarifications, the Iranian Government has decided to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol and commence ratification procedures. As a confirmation of its good intentions the Iranian Government will continue to cooperate with the agency in accordance with the protocol in advance of its ratification.
ii. while Iran has a right within the nuclear non-proliferation regime to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes it has decided voluntarily to suspend all uranium enrichment and processing activities as defined by the IAEA.
The foreign ministers of Britain welcomed the decisions of the Iranian Government and informed the Iranian authorities that:
a. Their governments recognize the right of Iran to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
b. In their view the Additional Protocol is in no way intended to undermine the sovereignty, national dignity, or national security of its state parties.
c. In their view full implementation of Iran’s decisions, confirmed by the IAEA’s director general, should enable the immediate situation to be resolved by the IAEA board.
d. The three governments believe that this will open the way to a dialogue on a basis for longer-term cooperation that will provide all parties with satisfactory assurances relating to Iran’s nuclear power generation program. Once international concerns, including those of the three governments, are fully resolved Iran could expect easier access to modern technology and supplies in a range of areas.
e. They will cooperate with Iran to promote security and stability in the region including the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations.
6. The IAEA’s statement was a compromise that fell short of U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Brill’s assertion that findings on Iran’s nuclear program “will point to only one conclusion: that Iran is aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons program.”

The IAEA stated that Iran had not lived up to its reporting obligations under the terms of its Safeguard Agreement. Iran’s IAEA Safeguard Agreement requires the country to provide the agency with information “concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material.” Technically, Iran is still in compliance with its Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations, but as the IAEA stated, “it is the number of failures of Iran to report the material facilities and activities in question” that is “a matter of concern.” Going back over a ten-year period, Iran has followed a pattern of obfuscation that raises well-founded international suspicions about Iran’s nuclear program.
7. This fact has been even recognized by two important personalities directly responsible for Iran’s national defense and security. The leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, once said to his followers that the Islamic Republic’s strength does not lie in obtaining or the domestic manufacture of an atomic bomb, but it is “the power of the faith that can deter our enemy” (Washington Post, 17 November 1992). More recently, Iran’s Defense minister, Vice Admiral Ali Shamkhani, recognized in a February 2002 statement: “ The existence of nuclear weapons will turn us into a threat to others that could be exploited in a dangerous way to harm our relations with the countries of the region.” See the Guardian, 6 Feb. 2002. See also George Perkovich, “Dealing With Iran’s Nuclear Challenge,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 28 April 2003.
8. The seriousness of the information being revealed about Iran came at quite an inopportune time for Washington, on the verge of a presidential election year and already burdened with Iraq, Afghanistan, the war on terrorism, North Korea, and potentially recurrent Middle Eastern crises. The U.S. administration’s policy on the Iranian nuclear program is less than clear, and there does not seem to be a senior administration member who is either particularly active on the issue or has articulated a detailed U.S. policy. The Bush administration has not formulated an overall policy toward Iran, nor has Washington succeeded in producing a policy review on Iran. See: Brenda Shaffer, “Iran at the Nuclear Threshold,” Arms Control Today (Nov. 2003).
9. The view comes mainly from the realist scholars such as Kenneth N. Waltz. See his recent interview “Deterrence and Rogues,” Conversations with History ( UC Berkeley Institute of International Studies), 6.
10. Perkovich 2003, 11.
11. The recent overall U.S. policy toward Iran has been largely driven by its Iraq policy, its Afghanistan policy, and its attempts to have Iran turn over al-Qaeda suspects currently in Tehran’s custody. With U.S. success in Iraq partly contingent on countering Iranian efforts to undermine U.S. policy there, Washington does not seem to have decided if the best way is to deter or to tempt Tehran from further destabilization operations in Iraq. At times, its concerns about Iran’s nuclear policy seem to play second fiddle. See Shaffer, op. cit.
12. At its meeting on 12 September 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution calling on Iran to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol promptly and unconditionally, and as a confidence building measure to act henceforth in accordance with the Additional Protocol. The Board also called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, pending provision by the director general of the assurances required by member states and pending satisfactory application of the provisions of the Additional Protocol.
13. The International Atomic Energy Agency has found that “there is no evidence that the previous undeclared nuclear material and activities ... were related to a nuclear weapons program.” Not yet, anyway. Director General Mohamed ElBaradei’s report adds that Iran’s past “pattern of concealment” means “it will take some time before the agency is able to conclude that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.”
14. In adapting the propositions that follow I have benefited from Charles F. Herman, ed., International Crises: Insight from Behavioral Research (New York, The Free Press, 1972).
15. See “Statement by U.S. Ambassador Kenneth C. Brill on IAEA Director General’s Report on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, September 2003.” Available at http://www.usun-vienna.usia.co.at/Agenda%20Item%204.htm--BOGspeech.htm.
16. Iran’s representative to the IAEA, Ambassador Ali Akbar Salehi, on 10 November 10 2003 delivered a letter to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei conveying his Government’s acceptance of the Additional Protocol. Mr. Salehi also informed the ElBaradei that Iran had decided, as of that day, to suspend all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities in Iran—specifically, to suspend all activities on the site of Natanz, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment-related items. The IAEA intends to verify, in the context of the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol, the implementation by Iran of these decisions.

* Mounting Challenges to U.S. Military Presence in Iraq and the Rising Costs of Occupation

Mounting Challenges to U.S. Military Presence in Iraq and the Rising Costs of Occupation

Ali-Asghar Kazemi[1]
December 2003
___________________________________________________



1- Introduction
The fact that the number of American casualties in Iraq, after the official termination of war, outnumbers those during the active military operations, should be considered as an alarming sign to U.S. strategy and policy makers in Washington. Those who speak about the Vietnamization of Iraq, describe the American military intervention there a futile war which did not but spread terrorism more than before in the world. They argue that neither “ Weapon of Mass Destruction” WMD, nor the alleged link to terrorism was finally proved. To use the words of the American Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, John Bolton, testifying before the House International Relations Subcommittee, “ No conclusive evidence as yet found in Iraq”.
This whole picture is indeed discouraging both the public opinion inside the U.S. as well as the world at large, especially the former U.S. allies, who initially opposed to American military intervention in Iraq. Furthermore, the situation is inducing more and more the people of Iraq to resist to American presence, and instigates the old warriors to come to the scene and challenge the demoralized U.S. military occupying Iraq. The atmosphere is somehow the same for the British and to some extent to other coalition token forces.
The main questions this paper shall attempt to address and analyze briefly are the followings:
1- What are the main sources of challenge to American occupation inside Iraq?
2- What are the wider implications of the ongoing situation?
3- Who gets what and how?
4- What are the American options?





2- Sources of Insecurity in Iraq

American quick military victory in Iraq at the beginning of the year 2003 had an immediate impact on U.S. potential contenders and rivals. Many of those who had objected such intervention and described it as illegal and immoral and some who had coined it as an imperialist war against a Moslem Nation, were impressed by the quick round up. Almost all of them endorsed the collapse of the cruel Baathist regime, and many softened their attitude towards the American intervention, hoping to get some benefits in the reconstruction phase in Iraq. But, the optimistic feeling did not last long. As soon as the coalition forces eased the situation a bit, in order to embark on material, social and political reconstruction, then we witnessed the gradual emergence of petty and at first isolated resistance.

At the initial phase of resistance, only some pockets of unarmed Iraqi, liberated from the long subjugation, began to exercise their democratic rights and took to the streets of major cities of Iraq to protest against the lack of security, water, electricity, and shortage of food etc. At first, the Americans did not mind and not only tolerated but even appreciated such peaceful protests and took them as natural for the liberated masses from a tyrannical regime. The movement was interpreted as a good sign of democracy and freedom of expression. Even foreign reporters were invited to witness by themselves the miracles of democracy. Hundreds of papers suddenly appeared in the street corners, and people read them with enthusiasm and here and there shook hands with the liberators.

The easing atmosphere, however gave a free hand to those who feared the emergence of a democratic Iraq in the Middle-Eastern political arena, and gradually invisible hands started to obstruct the trend, both from inside and outside Iraq. At the beginning, U.S. forces faced only minor armed attacks. Then, suddenly resistance appeared in forms of well-planned sabotages, car bombings, suicide attacks, and gradually reaching to full-scale military operations.[2] In order to determine the sources of these recent operations, one has only to rely on his imagination and speculate on the matter, based on the facts and data provided by official sources and the independent reporters covering the events in Iraq.

It is safe to say that those challenging the U.S. occupation of Iraq come from various backgrounds, and do not pursue the same objectives and interests. One way of classifying them is as follows:

1- A faction or group of average unemployed and desperate people who feel humiliated by foreign occupation and have no hope for the future and think that the Americans are not able to restore law and order in Iraq. This group is not necessarily pro-Saddam and does not wish to see the old Baath regime to be revitalized, but has a great desire to regain national identity. These peoples are most susceptible to manipulation for political protests. They are not prepared to take arms for any considerable up rise or revolt against Americans. They are easy to handle and would be satisfied and calm by material rewards and attention, if provided to them directly by the Americans or through Iraqis in charge of welfare. These people are not inherently harmful, but other opportunistic groups can use them in mass demonstrations against U.S. presence in Iraq.

2- The remnants of the old Baath regime and the special Republican Guard, who are still devoted to the ousted tyrant, but hated by the average Iraqis, having no future and no other choice than to fight the occupying forces, since, they have nothing to loose. These groups believe that they have failed to perform their sacred duty of resisting the invading forces during the U.S. intervention, and by saving their heads, they lost their honor and prestige. They want just to make up for their betrayal and perfidy to the leader and the people during the harsh invasion. Most observers believe that either Saddam personally or his most devoted general, Ezzat Ibrahim, are involved in organizing these groups in recent major military resistance to American forces.

3-Moslem fundamentalists coming from a wide range of background, who essentially oppose foreign infidels taking over the lands of Islam. These zealous Islamists may range from the remnants of Al-Qaeda to other extremists, mainly of Sunni and orthodox factions of Moslem devout. These are not in favor of democratic elections in Iraq, which may end-up to Shia majority rule in Iraq. Among these Moslem zealous we may find citizens of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Sudan and other Vahabi Sunnis in the region.

4-Another group of Moslem devout of Arab (Iraqi) Shia militants, who are claimed to be supported by Syria and Iran (The Badre Army), through sophisticated connections, apparently unchecked even by authorities in power. As some circles claim, these groups are responsible for a number of well-planned and sophisticated sabotages in Baghdad and other major cities such as Najaf and Karbala, causing extensive casualties and damages.[3]

This latter group has long been the subject of American suspicion and apparently some of its members have been disarmed by the American military. Whether the group is capable of conducting such well-planned organized attacks is subject to query.

5-More recently, it has been said that hundreds of Islamic militants who had fled Iraq during the war, have returned home and are planning major resistance and attacks against U.S. forces. They include Ansar-Al-Islam, a militant group allegedly linked to the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, which escaped into Iran, and have since returned. Many car bomb blasts in Baghdad are believed to be the work of this Group.

6-There are some who believe that the young and much less learned cleric, Moqtada Sadre, whose father was killed by the Baath regime, has been active recently among Shia devout against Anglo-American invasion and occupation. This group is arbitrarily put into a separate category of Moslem Shia challenging the U.S. presence and occupation of Iraq, since the objectives they follow differ from those who oppose the principle Velayate-Faqih.[4] Whether this young activist has any future in Iraq’s political arena, it is not quite obvious. Because, the tactics and slogans they are using are very immature and do not lead to credible serious resistance. Furthermore, people who have gathered around the young Sadre seem not to be taking his leadership seriously. Therefore, this group may not cause much preoccupation for Americans in Iraq. Nonetheless they have to be checked and contained, if they want to clear the impediments on the road of the Iraqi transitional power.

7-There is sill another speculation (Though it may sound like fantasy, but is worth mentioning), on the invisible hands behind the organized terrorist attacks in Iraq. The idea is based on a conspiracy theory that sees the hands of Israeli intelligence in these sporadic, yet sophisticated operations. There seems to be no credibility in this scenario, apparently fabricated by anti-Jewish circles that use every possible imagination to prove that Zionism is benefiting from terrorist attacks aimed at destabilizing Iraq. Since, by doing this, Israel can further push the Americans to go along with its longtime strategy of neutralizing the threat of Hezbollah and other Moslem militants in Lebanon and Syria and to instigate American sentiment against the Islamic regime in Tehran.

The speculations further refer to the new Israeli strategic vision that would prepare the ground to get rid the Israeli of their Palestinian problem, and give them a “ breathing space “ and revitalize the Zionist dream of a greater Israel. This view believes that Israel is capable of shaping the strategic environment in the Middle East, in cooperation with Turkey and Jordan, through weakening and containing Syria, and rolling back this country’s influence in Lebanon. This whole scenario, of course with the help of the United States, will draw a new road map for making the Middle East a safe place for Israel. Some anti-war group in the United States go along with this argument, though it may look a bit imaginary.

The above classification is far from being conclusive, and any one with a bit of imagination, can easily add to this list or argue against any one of them.




3- The Wider Implications of Iraq’s Instability: Who gets what and how?

The experience of the United States in Iraq suggests that American coercive measures to counter problems of terrorism and related issues in the world are of the nature that cannot get widespread support. Thus, we see that American intervention in Iraq, which is considered as the product of U.S. desire to consolidate its superpower status, is challenged not only from inside but even by a number of European States. Each of these has its own reason and philosophy to object to the trend.

The continued occupation of Iraq may bring more instability to this region; however, a sudden American withdrawal may be more detrimental to the overall international and regional order. To understand this paradox, one should realize what is happening within the grand strategy of U.S. policy makers, aimed at the overall world order. Some people believe that any serious challenge to American intervention and occupation of Iraq, especially from European powers, would eventually be doomed to failure and perhaps more counterproductive at this stage. Similarly, rearguard effort to prove that American action was legally or morally wrong, is now unconstructive and could only create mutual discontent and irritation. Even those who suggest that the United States should be contained from further interventions elsewhere in the world, through the instrument and by the leverage of the United Nations, believe that this may only weaken more than ever this world body.

What happens if the United States were finally forced to pull out from Iraq by a coalition of all those active and potential challengers of American occupation inside the country on the one hand, and the rising criticism of anti-war movement within and outside the United states, on the other? What about the former U.S. allies in Europe who initially opposed the American intervention and later consented, rather through expediency and for the pursuit of their benefits, in the reconstruction phase?

France, for instance, believes that America will not be effective or legitimate in effort to rebuild Iraq without its help. In fact, France did not contribute financially to Iraq’s reconstruction in recent Madrid session, despite the fact that she endorsed the United Nations’ Security Council Resolution on Iraq along with the unanimous votes of all members.

Eventually, France like many countries in the Middle-East, who first objected U.S. intervention in Iraq, would like to see the United States to sink in a quagmire, because they believe that a weakened and disappointed America will abstain from going after countries like Iran and Syria, who appear to be on the agenda for the next round of reprimand. France and other states within the European Community, think that after U.S. setback in the Middle-east, they would be in a position to assume their rightful place as an American rival and
even contender, in shaping the new world order[5].
Perhaps, no other country like Iran is more affected by the events occurring in Iraq. Changes for the best or worst are equally and vitally important to Iran. Indeed, a democratic Iraq, established through western values and orientation, is an ominous threat to Iranian socio-political fabrics. Because, it may raise people’s expectations for more liberal policies, thus distancing the society from traditional Islam. On the other hand, a democratic free election in Iraq, with no imposition of any limitation from foreign powers, either through constitutional provisions or otherwise, may bring Shia majority into power.

Such change may not necessarily please right wing conservative in Tehran, especially if the new regime in Iraq distances itself from the much critical principle of Velayte Faqih, which is the main pillar of the Islamic Republic in Iran. Furthermore, the emergence of a rival theological center in Najaf may undermine that of the city of Qom, which is considered the core of Shia clerical authority. Given the fact that the Islamic Constitution does not recognize political and legal delimitation within the realm of Islamic Ummat, the clerical power-shift from Qom to Najaf, may bring about a political shift of Shia authority from Tehran to Baghdad. This would be a nightmare to clergy leaders who do not like to happen. This makes the whole paradox, that is, while the emergence of a democratic Iraq could rationally benefit the region, it may lead to the destabilization of some neighboring state such as Iran. Iranian authorities have
been watching very closely the development in Iraq. They seem to be quite conscious of the critical situation, and they believe that the Americans eagerly need their assistance, not only for the reconstruction but also for the maintenance of border security and the overall stability of Iraq.

5-American Options in Iraq and the Wider Problem of Terrorism

This whole dark picture of Iraq, tend s to prove that Americans can not successfully control this liberated nation from the tyranny of Baath regime, without the internal and external assistance of interested parties. Otherwise, sooner or later, we may be witnessing widespread challenges against the American occupation that might trigger an unfortunate civil war. Such situation would be a serious impediment to the establishment of a stable and viable government with the necessary authority to run the country without outside influence.

Meanwhile, in order for the United States to pave the way for Iraqi to regain their sovereignty as a free independent nation, they have to tackle with a number of outstanding issues that are aimed at the very credibility of U.S. as a super- power, endeavoring to reshape the world order after the events of September 11, 2003:

1-Ben Laden has recently spelled out the reasons he encouraged his devouts to attack American interests in Iraq. To him, a tiny portion of strategic planners known as neo-conservative imposed the war in Iraq. Many in the world are of the same opinion and believe that American claim that Iraq is the central front against terrorism, is another way of manipulation of the truth. Since Saddam had nothing to do with the September 11 attacks, nor with Al-Qaeda.

2-There are those who believe that terror and terrorism are before anything a tactic and not an entity or institution, against which one cannot declare war. In this view, terror is an instrument used by the weaker to intimidate the stronger or to discourage him to pursue his objectives.

3-Criminal and terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, are fundamental fanatics who represent no one within the Islamic community but themselves. Therefore, they should be treated like criminal gang. In other words, to equate the problem of terrorism with Islam, not only irritates Moslem believers but also may further undermine the American cause to cope terrorism.

4-Organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas or Islamic Jihad, which are using terror tactic (otherwise named freedom fighters), are only product of half a century of humiliation and political mismanagement in the Middle East. They are fighting for specific cause. They may be wrong in their tactics, or we might not like their approach, but this does not change the situation, as long as a satisfactory solution for all parties is not found. Americans are not involved directly in this affair, but their superpower status and their support of Israel, necessitates their involvement.
5-Furthermore, it is argued that people resisting American occupation in Iraq, merely exercise their legal rights provided for in the 1949 Fourth Geneva Conventions[6]. This is to suggest that if the indigenous population revolt successfully U.S. forces and evict them, occupation ceases. The legal aspect of the matter is an interesting case that could be the subject of a separate study.

On the contrary, some believe that war imposed on Iraq and the consequent crisis, aggravated the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by giving green light to Israel to reoccupy and brutalize the Palestinians under the guise of “ fighting terrorism.”-Iran has been accused on various occasions to destabilize the reconstruction efforts in Iraq, and is suspected to be involved in a number of events there. Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator in Baghdad, recently claimed that neighboring countries of Iraq, Iran and Syria, continue to meddle in various ways in the internal affairs of this country. But so far no clear-cut evidence has been provided for these claims.

Whether American forces in Iraq are considered liberators or occupiers or both, is a paradox. And whether the establishment of a democratic government in Iraq should mean the total expulsion of the occupying forces, is a vital question to which no precise answer exists. But, it is not certain that the U.S. could escape from facing the above-mentioned issues. Whether the United Nations or any other forms of international coalition can replace the Americans during the transitional period, until a stable government is established in Iraq, this remain s to be seen. The U.N. itself is in the midst of serious legal, administrative and financial crisis. We cannot expect much from this world body, since it is only what the world community, as a whole wants to be. Thus, the United States may not want to rely much on this world body, as long as it is not fully responsive to its world strategy.

5-Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

In conclusion, it is advisable that the U.S. determines its course of action in Iraq, as well as the Middle East as a whole, by judgment of long-range consequences rather than immediate objectives. Acting on the basis of a limited perspectives and short run calculations may be detrimental to its status of
“ Superpower.” Failing to look ahead and scrutinize the ends, may only stir up the crisis situation in the Middle East. We have to understand that the nature and structure of the emerging world order will not tolerate a “Pax Americana. ” Peace-keeping, is not analogous to war-making and occupation. It is a task that has to be performed by a collectivity, legitimately entrusted the function for the benefit of the world.

Unilateral and competitive action of peace-keeping is likely to increase the risks of instability and insecurity. A multilateral approach through the United Nations offers a mutually acceptable and more manageable means of limiting those risks. Today the foundations of power have been moving away from the emphasis on military force and conquest.[7] If the United States wants to remain strong and preserve its superpower status, it has to pay attention to its “soft power” based on democratic values and technological leadership, rather than “hard power” based on military forces and coercive capabilities.[8]

The United States in order to cope with the emergence of an unbearable crisis situation in Iraq and the wider Middle East, it shall embark on a three- level policy concurrently pursued at home and abroad. The following recommendations in this respect may be worthwhile of consideration:

1-At the Domestic level:

a- Given the sensitivity to potential casualties abroad, especially now in Iraq, the United States has to acquire the necessary persuasive force to convince the American public for its continued occupation of Iraq, despite the mounting challenges against U.S. forces.
b- In order for President Bush to stop loosing popularity in this coming election year, he has the critical task to persuade the American families of the rationale of U.S. soldiers being killed on a daily basis in Iraq.
c- The gradual spreading of anti-war sentiment in America shall be contained in order to avoid the Vietnamization of Iraq.
d- To contain the rising sentiment of anti-Moslem spreading inside the U.S. by avoiding to associate terrorism with Islam and American Moslem followers or those coming from various parts of the Middle East and North Africa. To allocate more resources for Iraq’s reconstruction through the Congress, and closely supervise their uses.
2-At the International Level:

a- The United States has to further rectify its policy of unilateralism, through a process of widening partnership, taking into account the interests of other contending world and regional powers.
b- Give a more essential role to the United Nations, through widening participation of other States for the reconstruction of Iraq[9].
c- Get the Arab States more involved in the training and formation of security and internal order forces in Iraq. This could also include the formation of political and diplomatic cadres.
d- Open direct talks with countries neighboring Iraq, especially Iran, Syria and Turkey for the purpose of maintenance of extended borders, thus avoiding infiltration of irresponsible groups to enter Iraq with the objective of destabilizing its internal order.
e- Encourage international investors to participate in and contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq.[10]

3-At the local level:

a- To pursue the policy of confidence building through well planned program.
b- Gradually diminish U.S. forces showing inside cities, which is a source of national humiliation and negative reaction.
c- Gradually leave the task of law and order to Iraqi police.
d- Let the people of Iraq prepare the appropriate draft for Constitution, without, just the same, trying to impose or dictate openly to the transitional government.
e- Gradually replace American forces by that of Arab States who are more familiar to Arab language and affinities of Moslem community.


Notes

[1] Professor Kazemi holds Ph.D. in International Law and Relations from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts U.S.A. He is the author of many books and articles. He is legal advisor on matters of International Law of the Sea. Currently, he is Dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Science, Islamic Azad University (Science and Research Campus). For more detail please consult Academic Site of Dr. Kazemi: www.akazemi.homestead.com


[2] The first serious attack was aimed at Hotel Al-Rashid, the site of U.S. Head-Quarters, and where the so-called architect of American Military intervention in Iraq (Paul Wolfovits, Under Secretary of Department of Defense) was residing during his visit to Baghdad in October 2003. The most recent attack was the shooting of American transport helicopter, carrying some 30 or more soldiers, and killing at least 16 of them on November 1, 2003.

[3]The fatal car bomb in Najaf, killing Ayatollah Bagher Hakim and a great number of Moslem innocents gathered in the Friday religious sermon near the tomb of Imam Ali, and other terrorist attacks aimed at the United Nations organs and some foreign embassies in Baghdad, are supposed to be the work of these groups.

[4] It is interesting to note that in some circles of theological debates in the Seminaries of Najaf, the idea of Velayate Faqih (Theological rule) is never accepted. This is a major source of discontent in Tehran political and ideological milieu.


[5]John Chapman, Director of the London based International Institute for Strategic Studies IISS, once said: “ What European are saying about Iraq is that this is our backyard, we are not going to let you meddle in it, but we are not going to tend it ourselves

5- Fourth Geneva Convention Art.65, also provided in the United States Law of Land Warfare, p.435 (b).


[7] - See e.g., Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,” Limits of American Power,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol.117, No. 4, Winter 2002-2003, pp.545- 559, at 549

[8] - See ibid, p. 552 establish representative local and national governments. The UN's local Iraqi staff members are working on these programmes in parts of the country.

[9] -At the time of revision of the first draft of this paper, a number of developments, both negative and positive have occurred in the Iraq’s crisis. On the negative side, further harsh attacks to American and allied forces have taken place, namely the killing of a number of Italians forces stationed in Iraq. Other terrorist attacks have taken place in Saudi Arabia and Turkey, claiming the life of a great number and injuring hundreds of innocent peoples. On the positive side, the gradual involment of the United Nations and international support for restoration of condition of stability and security in Iraq, in pursuit of the objectives spelled out in UN Resolution 1511, of 16 October 2003. One other development that can be considered as very positive and potentially constructive, is the official visit of the some members of Iraq’s Governing Council, including its temporary head (Mr. Jalal Talebani), to Tehran, as well as Turkey, which is a step forward in the recognition of that body, so far rejected by most Arab States.
[9] Resolution 1511 calls on the UN to strengthen its vital role in Iraq by taking such measures as providing humanitarian relief, promoting economic reconstruction and advancing efforts to