* Iran-Iraq Rapprochement...

Iran-Iraq Rapprochement: New Political Alignment in the Middle East

Ali-Asghar Kazemi*
July 2005
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Amid horrible daily bloodsheds in Iraq and while Saddam Hussein is awaiting his doom in prison and the American and allied forces are caught in an unprecedented quagmire, efforts are taking place by a shaky government in Baghdad to break through the prolonged hostilities with Iran.

Almost a quarter of century elapsed since an all-out war was launched in September 1980 by Iraq against Iran, which ended by the Security Council Resolution 598. This war was a typical fratricide between two Moslem countries, which left behind more than a million losses and wounded and billions of material damage for the two sides. Though Iran was not able to pursue its plan of punishing Saddam Hussein and toppling the Baathist regime in favor of the long subjugated Shiite majority in Iraq, American military intervention did the job and materialized this dream. As a consequence, Iran emerged as the final victor of this whole unfortunate event.

Now, after the collapse of Saddam’s brutal regime through U.S. military intervention and numerous accusations of Iran’s malicious attempts at destabilizing Iraq, high officials of the two states are shaking hands and making promises for a better future. What are the chances for this endeavor, who shall bear the costs of this rapprochement and what are the implications for the region?
* * *

On July 8, 2005 (a day after the terrorist attacks on London and in the middle of G8 Summit in Scotland UK), Iraqi Defense Minister Sadoun Al-Dulaimi met with his Iranian counterpart Vice Admiral Ali Shamkhani as a debut of Iraq’s Shiite Prime Minister Al-Jafari visit to Tehran. So far so good, and there is nothing wrong with this bold initiative; since as we well remember the famous dictum: ‘states have no lasting enemies but they have enduring interests.’ Good examples of this maxim are the two World Wars in Europe in the 20th century. The odd thing about this visit was its apparent final outcome that is not only unacceptable in international law but absolutely intolerable for the people of Iran who’s moral and material sufferings during and after an eight-year-long war are beyond recount and imagination.

It was reported that Iraqi Defense Minister had come to Iran ‘to open a new chapter against what inspired between the two neighbors in the past,’ and he apologized for Iraqi war of aggression imposed upon Iran. The Iranian side ostensibly agreed to abandon Iran’s claims for war damages and reparations, and in addition pledged to provide one billion dollars to Iraq for reconstruction. Indeed, this whole affair seems quite bizarre and those officials who dared to venture such dealings are either ignorant of the limits of their authority or are playing a wicked game whose outcome will be very risky.

Since we do not know anything about the eventual quid-pro-quo behind the scene, we can only speculate on a few points that are worthy for consideration.

First of all, we should recognize that from a legal and technical point of view, and according to Security Council Resolution 598, Iraq-Iran war is yet in a ‘temporary suspension of active hostilities’ status and its final termination is subject to an official peace treaty between the two states.

Second, even if all mutual promises are taken as true intentions and in good faith, we cannot be sure whether the two sides have the capacity to carry them in practice. Since the present provisional government in Iraq lacks legitimate mandate and lawful standing to negotiate a peace treaty. Therefore any dealing with the current office-holders in Iraq is devoid of legal basis.

Third, pursuant to item 6 of the Resolution 598, the then U.N. Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, on December 9, 1991 handed over a report to the Security Council declaring Iraq as aggressor and the initiator of the war. Thus, Iraq’s international responsibilities for compensations are engaged and nobody can stop or forgive such ‘acquired rights’ for reparations and compensations to that effect. Only duly mandated and legitimate authorities can negotiate an all-encompassing peace treaty between the two parties.

Fourth, an eventual breakthrough between the two states, might pose a number of thorny issues, including the fate of Mujahideen Khlq Organization (MKO), which is an opposition group banned in Iran and stationed in Iraq. The Islamic regime has always been at odd with this group, and considers them as dangerous terrorists. Iran may eventually give attractive concessions to Iraq for the sake of preventing MKO activities and rendering it ineffective and completely neutralized. It is not quite known how much of the secret dealing with Iraq pertains to this preoccupation.

Fifth, the contemplated ‘military cooperation’ between the two states, discussed during the high officials visit in July 2005, might not please Americans and their allies in the middle East, especially Israel. Therefore, we should expect some negative reactions from states that feel threatened by this scheme, which may even obstruct the plan before it gets underway.

Sixth, the new conservative government in Iran, which is apparently promoting anew revolutionary values, might capitalize on the Shiite majority success in Iraq and by forming a coalition against the U.S. makes their presence in the region unbearable. Unless it gets some implicit assurance that the Americans will no longer pursuit the objective of regime change through military intervention or otherwise.

Finally, this whole scheme may be planned to show Iran’s goodwill with regard to Iraq in order to attenuate tremendous pressure put upon it since the beginning of heightening foreign infiltration and insurgency in that country. It is not quite sure however that the internal situation in Iraq will get better in the foreseeable future. Thus, Iran may not be able to benefit from the opportunity to form a unified Shiite front in the region.

In conclusion, it seems that if Iran-Iraq rapprochement materializes in the near future, it will eventually change the political alignment and balance of power in the Middle East. This process that has started after the elections and the establishment of the provisional government in Iraq, has assured Iran that a democratically elected government will put the power in the hands of the Shiite majority. This is indeed the ultimate aspiration that fulfills the Islamic revolution aims in the region. Whether the people of Iran is willing to pay the price and forego its incontestable rights for war damage compensations in lieu of political alignment with a Shiite government in Iraq is matter that requires further debates.
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* Ali-Asghar Kazemi is professor of international relations, Dean of the Graduate School of Law and Political Science, Islamic Azad University (Science & Research Campus) Tehran- Iran. E-Mail: Kazemiaa@Hotmail.com

* Iran's Presidential Elections...

Iran’s Elections: The Miracle of the Ballot Boxes


Ali-Asghar Kazemi
July 2005
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Iran is one of the few lands of legends and wonders where miracles still happen. Recent presidential elections outcome proved once again this amazing phenomenon. In fact, miracles occur every day in this realm and the Islamic regime owes its endurance to this occurrence. We Orientals usually love myths, unexpected events, legends, and fairy tales. As Ernst Cassirer said in his The Myth of the State, the major help of myths and legends is to make our despair and bitterness of life more bearable. The long history of Iran is full of such controversies and paradoxes which rational minds are incapable to explain.

The vicissitudes of the last century in contemporary Iran’s political scene, including the 1979 revolution and the collapse of the Shah’s regime were nothing but pure miracles. To that, one should add the war with Iraq, which somehow guaranteed the survival of the Islamic regime. The emergence of the reformist front during the last decade also miraculously served to protect it from various international strains and domestic turmoil. The last miracle, which surprised not only the insiders (including the selected candidates for presidency), but also the whole world, was the outcome of the elections in June 2005. The surprise came at a time when contrary to all opinion polls and field surveys, a relatively unknown ‘conservative hardliner’ (Mahmood Ahmadi-Nejad) left behind the powerful pragmatic statesman (Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani) in a run-off race for Iran’s presidency. How this miracle really happened and what are the plausible ramifications for the region and the wider world?

* * *

The end of reformist reign in the Iranian parliament was considered as the beginning of a series of democratic repulse in Iran’s political and social landscape. Indeed, during the progressive control in the executive and legislative branches of the government, Iran was able to prevail over many threats and calamities that could endanger the very existence of the Islamic regime. The West and the world in general hoped that the trend would ultimately lead to flourishing civil society and democratic institutions that would leave behind obsessive and fundamentalist ideas. But, the severe defeat of the reformist elements in parliamentary elections was a serious blow to the progressive ideals that turned naives’ sweet dreams to nightmare. Hence, soon after conquering the 7th Majlis in Iran, the conservatives aimed at the last head-bridge, the executive branch, in order to complete their decisive battle for absolute power control. This project has been successfully achieved on June 24, 2005.

Considering the fact that analyzing political process in Iran is rather thorny issue, one may approach the subject from a dual optimistic and pessimistic perspective.
Optimists, tend to believe that the Islamic regime has proven once again its capacity of efficient governance and has passed another test of legitimacy in the last presidential elections. They argue that the world should accept the outcome as another democratic exercise. Viewing from an optimistic lens they put forward the following arguments:
• Conventional terms used in Western political jargon such as: left, right, liberal, conservative, and so forth, hardly fit Iran’s actual socio-political setting. This is to say that we should not expect to find similar association, traits and characteristics of these expressions when used to describe certain groups or parties in present Iran,
• Iranian leaders are not much happy with these labelings, especially when used by foreign observers and political analysts. In fact, such terminology is often very misleading for outsiders who try to understand political phenomena in a rather traditional society like Iran, with not much experience in party politics and democratic exercise,
• Iranians are very unpredictable people and their voting attitude, social psychology with respect to political process do not necessarily match the standard patterns in western societies,
• Contrary to opposition groups’ propaganda inside and outside Iran for elections boycotts and Western media accusations on human rights violations, nuclear aspirations, etc., the Islamic regime has still a solid popular support that guarantees its legitimacy and survival,
They claim that Iranians are fed up with the reformists’ empty slogans and pompous contentions on political development, freedom and human rights. Their demands are mainly for improvement of material well-being; and their major preoccupations are eradication of such plagues as corruption, poverty, injustice, favoritism, inflation, unemployment, narcotics and other social anomalies and disruptions.
To that end they endorsed a rather unknown, but zealous and energetic figure in line with the leader and devoted to the Islamic regime.
The pessimist critiques, including oppositions groups, contend that this presidential election was faulty right from the beginning and the whole process lacks democratic standards. Their arguments are more or less around the following issues:
• The Guardian Council’s intervention in the initial arbitrary selection of a limited number of candidates from among more than 1000 applicants was an undemocratic action, which put into doubt the whole process,
• There was a strong political will behind the election of Mr. Ahmadi-Nejad as president, despite widespread boycotts throughout the country, thus, ballots statistics have been manipulated in his favor and with a view to show high turn-out as a proof of regime’s public support and legitimacy. This contention is based on some of the claims and accusations of other defeated candidates (Mr. Karroubi in particular),
• The Islamic regime is in a state of gradual self-defeating process and is experiencing its final stage of disintegration. To circumvent this course, it will do every thing in its power, including the manipulation of elections ballots and votes.
• The last two attempts to promote non-clergy figures to high public offices such as the speaker of the parliament and the presidency are merely symbolic actions to rehabilitate the severely damaged clergy reputation,
• The Islamic regime has no legitimacy and is supported by only a small percent of the population. A referendum under the supervision of the United Nations and other international institutions is needed in order to determine the fate of the regime in a democratic manner.
Although it is premature to give a realistic assessment of the future trend of Iran’s political behavior vis-à-vis domestic, regional and international issues, in order to evaluate possible ramifications of the elections outcome, we should focus on the most critical issues that the new government will be facing right away.
First and foremost is the nuclear venture, which has created lots of concern throughout the world. At the present time Iran is in the midst of negotiations with EU3 (France, Germany and UK). The elected president has taken position on that by reaffirming Iran’s right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. He also has assured the world that Iran will do everything to gain the confidence of the international community in a transparent manner.
With respect to the Middle East and the Palestinian question, he reiterated Iran’s previous position. As to relations with the United States, he did not commit himself and repeated the official position of the Islamic regime. On other issues that might interest the Middle East region and the world as a whole, we shall wait and see how the course of events will develop. Meanwhile, it might be worthwhile to note the following remarks with respect to the emerging new-conservatives.
Despite the apparent antipathy and hard-line attitude- not to mention the dubious background- of the president elect, one should understand that the new generation of conservatives in Iran is much more educated and pragmatic than many old-fashioned elements without academic background and adequate understanding of the modern world. New conservatives are clever enough not to swim against the current, which could endanger their very survival. Besides that, the new international environment will not allow the emergence of an irresponsible leader alike those during the cold war.
The new conservatives in Iran no longer believe in backward shift of human society, fanaticism, societal stagnation and dogmatic ideas. They speak elegantly of democracy and rule of law, moderation, accountability of office holders, national interests, efficiency, competence, good organization and management by objective. While they still believe that devotion comes first, but they now consider themselves as experts and specialists in all matters and in all domains. As a result of this transmutation, conservatives now allow themselves to use the same rhetoric and vocabulary as their reformist rivals. Yet, in one thing they are different, that is they merely seek their identity among hard-liners and thus go along with their style but not with their substance. The new president appears to be the prototype of this emerging generation.
In conclusion, it seems fair to suggest that with the attainment of all national powers by the new generation of conservatives, henceforth the Islamic regime has no other choice than to embark in gaining popular support by devoting itself to good governance and effective response to widespread demands for change, justice and fight against corruption and other social evils. In the international scene it will do its utmost effort to gain recognition and respect and might give every conceivable concession in order to remain in power. This is just an optimistic and wishful assessment of the present trends, unless another miracle changes the whole course of events.

* Insurgency in Iraq...

Insurgency in Iraq: Legal, Political and Security Implications for the Region


Ali Asghar Kazemi*
June 2005


Introduction

This short paper attempts to address briefly the problem of continued turmoil and insurgency in the post-Saddam Iraq and its possible repercussions for the region with particular emphasis on Iran.

As a Shiite state neighboring Iraq, with a long history of rivalry, hostilities and war, Iran’s national interests are very much tied to all political, strategic and structural changes in Iraq. The collapse of the Baath regime, through the American military intervention, has created a number of challenges and opportunities for the Islamic regime in Tehran. How Iranians perceive the present volatile situation? How they react to eventual threats? Are they apt to benefit from the potential opportunities? The main argument here is that Iran’s national interests are best served by a stable, democratic and free Iraq with a legitimate strong government willing to cooperate with its neighbors in the promotion of regional calm and security. The outcome of the presidential elections in Iran will have no effect on the political landscape and Iranian policy towards Iraq.

The paper is divided into four sections: After this introduction, the next section gives some clarification on the use of term ‘insurgency’ and its legal implications. In the following sections, the wider implications of instability in Iraq for the region and the apparent shifting American attitude vis-à-vis Iran and other problems of the Middle East will be discussed. The final section is devoted to the prospects for the future of Iran-Iraq relations



Insurgency or Terrorism? A point of Caution!

When we speak of insurgency and insurgent group in a given state, we implicitly recognize a legal status for those who for some legitimate causes fight against an occupying power with the objective of liberating their territory, or with a view to overthrow the incumbent authority or de jure government or some other political aspirations. Insurgent groups in domestic conflicts come under the protection of humanitarian law and the 1977Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Whereas terrorism and terrorist activities are considered as crimes against humanity, and subject to universal jurisdiction; that is to say, a terrorist should be prosecuted and punished wherever is found, disregard of the place he/she committed the act or his/her nationality. It is not quite clear whether there was any intention behind using of the term ‘insurgency’ in this Conference and whether the media and American authorities have a clear understanding about the legal consequence of such term from international humanitarian law perspective.

Since the start of the sporadic resistance through staged and coordinated violence in Iraq, it was referred to as ‘terrorist attacks’ carried essentially by a group of Moslem militants connected to Al-Qaeda. They were also considered as mobs, criminals and rebels who perform their carnage without political objectives. But as soon as we refer to these groups as insurgents, they might be entitled to some privileges similar to that accorded to belligerents during armed conflicts. In such circumstance, American and Iraqi offensives against these insurgents should comply with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols, covering internal conflicts and civil wars. Otherwise, offensive operations such as the ones carried recently in western Iraq near the Syrian borders or in Fallujah would be considered unlawful and a breach of the provisions of the above Protocols.

As a general rule, foreign states are forbidden to give help to the insurgents fighting against the established authorities. There is even a UN General Assembly resolution 2131(XX) which declares that “no state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state, or interfere in civil strife in another state” (Yearbook of the UN, 1965, p.94). This rule has been endorsed and reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice ICJ in the case of Nicaragua vs. USA. (ICJ Reports, 1986).

However, an exception to this rule probably exists, when the established authorities are receiving foreign supports from another state. For instance, after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan at the end of 1979, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and later the United States started providing weapons and training for Moslem insurgents fighting against the Soviet backed government. Apparently, this is called ‘right of counter-intervention.’

The ICJ in the case of Nicaragua v. USA described another case of possible exception to the prohibition against giving help to insurgents. As we might recall, the United States admitted aiding the ‘contras’ insurgents who were fighting against the government of Nicaragua, but argued that it was justified as a form of collective self-defense, because Nicaragua has been supplying weapons to insurgents in El Salvador. The Court rejected the argument of self-defense by U.S., since it was not subject of an armed attack, and thus U.S. plea failed in that case.

The current insurgency in Iraq has indeed regional and international repercussions. This is especially true with respect to neighboring states whose economic, trade, political and social interactions with Iraq are totally disrupted and the border security has become quite vulnerable.

To sum up with the legal and political implications of recognition of insurgency status for terrorist operations in Iraq, it seems fair to suggest that these groups be referred to as simple law-breakers and rebels. Since if states decide to recognize them as ‘insurgents’ this would change the legal premise of coping with them through the use of force. However, I shall continue to refer to the term ‘insurgency’ for simplicity, leaving aside the legal connotation.


The Wider Implications of Insurgency in Iraq

It has now become quite evident that American military planners failed to anticipate or prepare for any serious resistance and insurgency after the downfall of Saddam Hussein and perhaps less so after his miserable capture. Still now the intelligence about the identity of peoples who willingly kill themselves in suicide attacks are very vague and unreliable. Even Iraqi officials have little understanding of the relative strength of Iraqi nationals and foreigners among fighters and the probable connections between the two groups.

Since the beginning of the heightening of violence and bloodshed in Iraq, especially after the elections and the establishment of the new provisional government, Iraqi officials tried to put the blame on ‘extremist groups from abroad that merely objected to the presence of Americans and other foreign troops in this country.’ It was also claimed that these groups are out to set ‘a sense of permanent violence to intimidate people and turn them against the government.’

The Iraqi officials believe that these so-called ‘insurgents’ “ do not have a political plan, neither they have a long term strategy, and are only to fight US forces wherever they can find them. These insurgents have been described as “virus that come from abroad and has started to spread to Iraqi youth. An Iraqi government spokesman explicitly pointed his finger to Jordan, Syria and Saudi-Arabia and even Palestinians nationals to be behind these suicide attacks[1]. Fortunately, contrary to widespread accusations outside Iraq, Iran was not included in this list. This may means either that Iran is eventually following a strategy of non-interference, which best serves its long-term national interests vis-à-vis Iraq, or the Shiite majority government is reluctant, at this juncture, to point the finger at their longtime friend, which provided them sanctuary and assistance during their years of exile in Iran.

From a realistic point of view, Iran has every reason now to support the established government in Iraq and try its best to promote the delicate balance and stability there. I would like to underline the word now because at the beginning of U.S. military intervention in Iraq, Iranian leaders were quite furious and believed that a quick victory in Iraq would bring the Americans in a face-to-face confrontation with the objective of toppling the Islamic regime. But now, after two years of harsh violence and bloodshed, Iran has gained some sort of assurance that the Americans would not venture another gamble whose outcome is quite uncertain.

As a point of clarification, we should remember that since the beginning of U.S. intervention in Iraq, Iran has followed a clever policy that may be termed as a ‘two pillar strategy’ with respect to Iraq. On the one hand, it condemned American military intervention as an unlawful and aggressive act against a Moslem country, on the other it considered the downfall of Saddam Hussein and the Baath regime as a God blessing.

In fact, the downfall of Iran’s archenemy and longtime hostile produced a number of challenges and opportunities for Iran. The most threatening challenge was and still is the presence of American forces all around Iran, which virtually encircle Iran’s strategic position on land and at sea. This dimension of U.S. intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan could have been very alarming if Americans had succeeded to a quick round up in Iraq and did not encounter serious challenge by insurgents.

Thus apparently, it seems that the continued turmoil and insurgency in Iraq has an immediate benefit for Iran, since the United States may not be tempted to use hard power against Iran in the foreseeable future. But, at the same time, if chaotic situation continues, it would be counterproductive for all neighboring states and the region as a whole. This proposition is especially true with respect to Iran, which has a lot of common interests with the newly established Shiite majority in Iraq. Therefore, it is fair to suggest that Iran should rationally do everything in its power to attenuate the ethnic, religious, sectarian and tribal conflicts in Iraq; since, it is itself very vulnerable on these matters.

Iraq’s Experience: American Changing Attitude

Despite recent US harsh assault against insurgents in west Iraq, there are some signs that Americans are contemplating to revise their defense strategy followed after September 11, 2001. The new strategy goes beyond the doctrine of ‘preemptive military strike’ aiming at ‘protecting the sovereignty of nation states’ (Washington Post, March 19). The focus of the revised strategy is to determine what kinds of actions are needed to be taken now to shape an international environment for crises prevention. This includes combating terrorism and preventing the use and proliferation of WMD, as some of the core problems. This new attitude which is being reflected in the revised US defense strategy, would supplement the existing doctrine of reshaping the polarized Moslem states, both Arab and non-Arab, could lead to greater success throughout the Middle East and beyond.

Americans have now realized that the use of force to cope with situations that they dislike or otherwise do not promote their worldwide interests may not necessarily be achieved by hard power. Fortunately, very recently the new U.S. approach to a number of cases, including Iran’s nuclear affair, show that the United States is somehow leaning towards the use of soft power, diplomacy, economic and trade incentives, in order to promote its interests and manage crises which are susceptible to escalate and endanger peace and stability in the world and the Middle East. Recent easing of embargo against Iran and letting Iran to apply for WTO, along with a number of other encouraging actions are vivid indications of the emergence of a new approach to critical problems of the Middle East.

At the present time, Iranian leaders do not seem to worry much about an eventual American intervention; nevertheless they continue to reject foreign presence in Iraq and consider the prevailing chaotic situation and continued insurgency as a consequence of the United States interference in this country.

A democratically elected government in Iraq is in favor of Iran’s interests, since the outcome would always benefit the majority Shiites. Of course, we should recognize that not all Moslem shi’as are necessarily in line with the Islamic regime in Iran. For this reason, Iran has some preoccupation with the power structure in Iraq’s new constitution and form of government. For instance, a unitary versus federal political structure, meaning a direct democratic election (one man one vote), or a sort of regional autonomous government, for certain ethnic population such as Kurds Shiites or Sunnis, may change the whole landscape of the new Iraq.


Looking to the Future

Although the volatile situation in Iraq does not permit a realistic conclusion at this juncture, we may at least wrap up this analysis by speculating on Iran-Iraq future relations and the probable requisites for establishing a just and durable peace between the two states.

While Iran seems eager to open normal relations with the new established government in Iraq, It also has some reservations about the final outcome of power structure in this country. Iran would eventually not endorse an autonomous Kurdish state, contiguous to its western borders, which could instigate Iranian Kurds to ask for similar treatment. Turkey also has always had similar concerns.

On the other hand, an equitable distribution of power among various ethnicities and regions, which leads to long-term stability, would also benefit Iran’s national interests. This in turn will hopefully pave the way to transform Iraq from a perennial rival and hostile to a friendly cooperative neighbor, provided that the following outstanding issues are settled once for all with the new legitimate government:

1- Given the fact that Iran and Iraq have not yet signed a formal peace treaty after the cessation of active hostilities at the end of war, from a legal and technical point of view they are still in cease-fire status, established by the U N resolution 598. Therefore, the most important and urgent action would be to conclude a treaty officially terminating the state of war between the two states,
2- As a complement to the above, the settlement of war damages and reparations should take place according to paragraph 6 of United Nations Resolution 598, which obligates the initiator of war of aggression to make adequate compensations,
3- The official reconfirmation of the 1975 treaty between Iran and Iraq, which has been abrogated by Saddam Hussein at the beginning of its aggressive war against Iran in 1980,
4- The final settlement of all outstanding issues regarding border demarcations on land and in the Shatt-al-Arab.


The outcome of presidential elections will most probably not change the political landscape in Iran. That is to say, no matter who is elected he will surely follow the overall policy so far pursued by the Islamic regime. This include eventually the nuclear policy and the establishment of normal relations with the United States.

With respect to Iraq, with the coming into power of the legitimate government in this country, the overall atmosphere appears quite apt for the two Moslem states to resolve once for all their historic and perennial disputes and engage in mutually cooperative relations. This will hopefully help to promote peace and security of the region and would frustrate all ill wishers, including Moslem militants and fundamentalists to continue their violence in Iraq and elsewhere in the region. Iran would be the prime benefactor of such stability and its interests will best be served in such an environment. As a matter of fact, almost all important Iraqi personalities and leaders have personal good ties with Iran where they have spent several years in exile during the Baathist regime. They all have friendly sentiments towards Iran, share the same culture and above all, speak Persian. There is no doubt that the insurgency will subside sooner or later after Iraq regains its full sovereignty and the legitimate government is established. In such conditions, there would be no longer need of foreign troops being stationed in a free Iraq.


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Notes

*Ali Asghar Kazemi: Professor of International Relations, Dean of the Graduate School of Law and Political Science (GSLPS), Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Campus, Tehran- Iran

Presented to: The Regional Security Conference, UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations, June 16-20, 2005 Athens- Greece





[1] In a separate paper I presented to the previous cession of The Regional Security Conference in December 2003, I have tried to categorize various groups who are making trouble in Iraq. Below is a section of the paper with the following title: Mounting Challenges to the U.S. Military Presence in Iraq and the Rising Costs of Occupation, December, 2003
“It is safe to say that those challenging the U.S. occupation of Iraq come from various backgrounds and do not pursue the same objectives and interests. One possible set of groups is as follows:
1. A faction made up of average, unemployed, and desperate people who feel humiliated by foreign occupation, have no hope for the future, and think that the Americans are not able to restore law and order in Iraq. This group is not necessarily pro-Saddam and does not wish to see the old Ba’ath regime revitalized, but nonetheless has a great desire to regain national identity. These people are most susceptible to manipulation for political protests. They are not prepared to take arms for any large-scale uprising or revolt against Americans. They are easy to handle and would be satisfied by material rewards and attention, if provided to them directly by the Americans or through Iraqis in charge of welfare. These people are not inherently harmful, but other opportunistic groups can use them in mass demonstrations against U.S. presence in Iraq.
2. The remnants of the old Ba’ath regime and the special Republican Guard, who are still devoted to the ousted tyrant. They are hated by the average Iraqi, and have no future or choice other than to fight the occupying forces, since they have nothing to lose. These groups believe that they failed to perform their sacred duty of resisting the invading forces during the U.S. intervention: by saving their heads, they lost their honor and prestige. They want to make up for their betrayal.
3. Muslim fundamentalists from a wide range of backgrounds, who oppose foreign infidels taking over the lands of Islam. These zealous Islamists may range from the remnants of al-Qaeda to other extremists, mainly Sunni and orthodox factions of the Muslim devout. These are not in favor of democratic elections in Iraq, which may lead to Shi’a majority rule in Iraq. Among these Muslim zealous we may find citizens of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Sudan, and other Vahabi Sunnis in the region.
4. Arab (Iraqi) Shi’a militants, who are supposedly supported by Syria and Iran (the Badre Army) through sophisticated connections, apparently unchecked even by authorities in power. As some claim, these groups are responsible for a number of well-planned and sophisticated acts of sabotage in Baghdad and other major cities such as Najaf and Karbala, causing extensive casualties and damage. This latter group has long been the subject of U.S. suspicion and apparently some of its members have been disarmed by the U.S. military. Whether the group is capable of conducting such well-executed and organized attacks is subject to question.
5. More recently, it has been said that hundreds of Islamic militants who had fled Iraq during the war have returned home and are planning major resistance and attacks against U.S. forces. They include members of Ansar-Al-Islam, a militant group allegedly linked to the al-Qaeda terrorist network, which escaped into Iran and have since returned. Many car-bomb blasts in Baghdad are believed to be the work of this group.
6. There are some who believe that the young (and much less learned) cleric Moqtada Sadre, whose father was killed by the Ba’ath regime, has been active recently among Shi’a devout against the Anglo-American invasion and occupation . This group is arbitrarily put into a separate category of Muslim Shi’a challenging the U.S. presence and occupation of Iraq, since their objectives differ from those who oppose the principle of Velayat Faqih. Whether this young activist has any future in Iraq’s political arena is not certain. The tactics and slogans this group are using are very immature and do not lead to credible, serious resistance. Furthermore, people who have gathered around the young Sadre seem not to take his leadership seriously. Therefore, this group may not cause much trouble for Americans in Iraq. Nonetheless, they have to be checked and contained, if the United States wants to clear impediments on the road of the Iraqi transitional power.
7. Though it may sound like fantasy, it is worth mentioning another theory on the invisible hands behind the organized terrorist attacks in Iraq. The idea is based on a conspiracy theory that sees the hands of Israeli intelligence in these sporadic, yet sophisticated, operations. By doing this, they theorize, Israel can further push the Americans to go along with its longtime strategy of neutralizing the threat of Hezbollah and other Muslim militants in Lebanon and Syria and instigate American sentiment against the Islamic regime in Tehran. There seems to be no credibility in this scenario, apparently fabricated by anti-Jewish circles that use every possible angle to prove that Zionism is benefiting from terrorist attacks aimed at destabilizing Iraq.
The speculations further refer to a new Israeli strategic vision that would prepare the ground to rid the Israelis of their Palestinian problem, give them “breathing space,” and revitalize the Zionist dream of a greater Israel. In this view, Israel is capable of reshaping the strategic environment in the Middle East, in cooperation with Turkey and Jordan, through weakening and containing Syria and rolling back its influence in Lebanon. This whole scenario (of course with the help of the United States) would draw a new road map for making the Middle East a safe place for Israel. Some anti-war groups in the United States go along with this argument, though it is highly speculative.”

* The Dilemma of Nation-Building and State Formation in Post-Saddam Iraq

Contents


1- Introduction
2- The process and Concept of Nation-Building and State Formation
3- Unitary versus Federalist Political Structure in Iraq
4- Competing Forces and Conflicting Aims in Iraq’s Political Arena
5- The U.S. Plan for Transfer of Iraq’s Sovereignty:
The Paradox of Democracy
6- The Wider Ramification of Democratic Iraq for the Middle East
7- Conclusions
Post Scriptum


















1- Introduction

Whatever the reasons behind the American military intervention in Iraq and the collapse of the dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein, the truth of the matter now is that with the downfall of the Baathist regime, history of the Middle East has turned an unprecedented bloody page, which will have widespread ramifications for the whole region.
Indeed, the importance of the second phase of the American intervention in Iraq, (i.e. the reconstruction phase) is much more vital than the collapse of the Baath Regime. Because, if the Americans fail to establish a viable democratic government, and if law and order is not restored and the bloodshed is not stopped, then this will create a negative precedent for the American strategy in the Middle East.
Given the fact that a long lived brutal regime has suddenly fallen apart and was ousted from the political scene in Iraq, we should expect that a power vacuum will be created during the transition period, until a new legitimate and viable power structure is established. But, the lack of democratic culture and a civil society in Iraq , will make it most difficult for whoever intends to embark on creating new democratic institutions with a view to establishing law and order in this terror-ridden country.
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* Professor Kazemi holds Ph.D. in International Law and Relations from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford: Massachusetts U.S.A. He is author of many books and articles. He is legal advisor on matters of International Law of the Sea. Currently, he is Dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Science, Islamic Azad University (Science and Research Campus). For more detail please consult Academic Site of Dr. Kazemi: www.akazemi.homestead.com




In other words, at the outset, we face the problem of “ Nation-Building” and “State Formation.” Since, with the collapse of the old regime, all the social, political, economic and military institutions vanished overnight with the people who used to run them under the dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein.
The much intriguing question now is, who actually should be charged with the responsibility of rebuilding this disintegrated war-torn nation and bring together the peoples from various ethnic and religious background as a whole, and induce them a new national identity while establishing an appropriate governmental apparatus, in order to respond to the wishes and democratic aspirations of the peoples.
A unitary versus federal political structure, meaning a direct democratic election (one man one vote), or a sort of regional autonomous government, for certain ethnic population such as Kurds Shiites or Sunnis, for instance, may change the whole picture of new Iraq. These are the main issues now facing the American policy makers and their allies on the one hand, and the Governing Council on the other. Of course, there are other interested players who should be taken into account. The United Nations and its various subsidiary bodies and the role that they should play in the whole affairs, the regional actors neighboring Iraq, and most importantly the various religious and ethnic leaders and groupings inside Iraq, each of which pursuing its own objectives and wishes. The immediate question now before the Americans is what is to be replaced by the old regime and how it shall be established in order to respond simultaneously to the following preoccupations:
1-The overall American strategy to establish a democratic government in Iraq;
2-The true expectations of Iraqi peoples with diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds and objectives;
3- An adequate political structure and governmental institutions in order to maintain internal peace and security and establish friendly relations with other States;
4-A viable democratic regime, which could serve as a model for other countries in the region.
This paper shall endeavor to address briefly the above questions with a view to find a path through the existing bottlenecks and to describe the appropriate means and ends for achieving the objective of nation-building and State formation future Iraq.

2- The Process and Concept of Nation-Building and State Formation
“State” and “nation” are two distinct concepts in political and legal writings; yet, they might be used interchangeably in common journalistic jargon. The term “nation” denotes a community of people bound together by a general sense of belonging owing to common sharing of certain historical memories, traditions, language, religion, culture and common political aspirations1. Though, in some cases, not all of these elements are necessarily present in order to build or create a nation . Therefore, a nation, which is territorial in nature, does not involve territorial sovereignty and, unlike State, is not an organized government.2 The key element here is the existence of a strong sense of belonging together of a group of people in order for a nation to become into being. Furthermore, the individual members of this group shall place a certain loyalty to the group as a whole over any conflicting loyalties. However, it should be noted that although a nation implies common culture, symbols and world views, what makes it different from other social, cultural and ethnic groups , is the territorial and geographical unity of the nation. For this reason, most writers in the field believe that the concept of “nation” is primarily a geographical or spatial one. 3 While, there are others who contend that as the people move forward to acquire maturity in political experience in a civil society, their feeling of belonging together becomes less dependent on language, ethnic or religious ties, and more on adherence to particular values associated with political concepts, democratic ideals and institutions. This however, may happen only when the people learn to devote their ultimate loyalty to the State, which materialize their ideals and wishes in institutions and the legitimate authority.
On the other hand, a State must own to certain characteristics without which a fully sovereign and independent political entity may not materialize. It must, first of all occupy a fixed territory over which it exercises exclusive jurisdiction (to use a legal terminology). And within this territory, stability of organization and administration must prevail; and the entity must be able to fulfill its international duties and obligations. The two other prerequisites of a state are: population on the one side, and a government, which insures internal stability and fulfills international obligations of the State.4 The presence of all three factors would not, however, necessarily guarantee the existence of a State in the legal sense.5 A State that has lost its status as a sovereign entity and a legal person under international law - either through normal disintegration or occupation and absorption by other State, which is the case of Iraq-, may regain that status only when it is again able to carry on its own internal and external affairs.6
Thus, the concept of nation-building may be viewed as the process through which a legitimate authority is established for the purpose of maintaining law and order and achieving political stability within sovereign nation-State, created by the common will people. In other words, nation-building require political integration in the context of nation-State, by bringing together diverse cultural, and social discrete groups into an organic functional system with a unique strong national identity.
The process of nation-building has four dimensions:
a) progressive development among members of political community of a sense of identity with the State and its political philosophy and ideals;
b) Broadening of social communication among the constituent communities, subgroups and subcultures spread out in various regions;
c) Gradual erosion of the old social, economic and psychological commitments and acquisition of new patterns of socialization and behavior attuned with new values ;
d) Improvement of infrastructure facilities, lines of communication and rules for greater flow of goods and services between various regions of the State.7

Nation-building is therefore a process which paves the way for inducing a sense of political identity and creating a sentiment of territorial nationality, which helps to gradual elimination of subordinate parochial attachment to particular values, and establishing a democratic State, emanating from the common will of the people. Once the nation succeeds to maintain its cohesion and integration throughout the territory, the people can then embark on the difficult process of State formation, which is a complementary step in gaining sovereignty for the purpose of execution of legitimate power and authority. We shall examine below the process for the particular case of Iraq.

3- Unitary versus Federalist Political System for Future Iraq
Broadly speaking, States that have the legitimate supreme and permanent authority in a country may be organized either as a unitary body, in which the power is centralized, or as a federal, where authority and power are distributed among several regional entities. Usually, in both cases we have the same branches of government, but their actual work, functions and structure are quite different.
Since its independence from the British mandate under the League of Nations in 1932, until the collapse of the Baath regime by the American military intervention in the year 2003, Iraq has been ruled by undemocratic and dictatorial regimes. This is to mean the people of Iraq have never had the experience of a civic culture- as it is understood by Western standards and democratic values. During this long interval, Iraq has experienced many coups, civil and foreign wars and permanent unrest among various religious and ethnic groups. In the latter part of the recent history of Iraq, it was ruled supposedly by Revolutionary Command Council, but in fact by Saddam Hussein reign of terror. This proves that the people of Iraq never had the chance to express their free will and loyalty to a representative political system or a “nation” as a whole. Thus, they preferred to keep their loyalty to their ethnic or religious particular values and not an all-encompassing entity called “ nation-State”. Therefore, the first and foremost important problem now, is to find ways and means to educate Iraqi people with the rudimentary norms and practice of nationhood and democratic values. This is of course a difficult task that cannot be achieved overnight.

4- Competing Forces and Conflicting Aims in Iraq’s Political Arena

The ethnic composition and population distribution in Iraq have always mired the formation of a unitary system in this country. Arabs constitute about 75% of the population; Kurds are estimated about 20%, and the remaining 5% is composed of various minorities. Historically, Kurds have always been in quarrel with the central government, because of their arduous desire to be independent or otherwise to gain some sort of regional autonomy. The militant Kurdish minority in the north has log been hostile to Iraqi central authority. After years of sporadic guerrilla warfare, they have finally succeeded in acquiring a degree of internal autonomy in 19748. But even this did not satisfy the expectations of Kurdish leaders (PUK, and KDP). Thus, the fighting and resistance continued on large scales even during the final phases of Iran-Iraq war and until the last days of the Ba’ath regime.9
About 95% of the population in Iraq is Moslem. However, a much larger number, and at any account, the majority of them, are Shi’a.10 Historically, the Sunnis, who maintained the power by the inner core of the Ba’ath Party, have always subjugated Shi’a Moslems of Iraq, despite their majority.11 In fact, now that the Shi’a Moslems have found this golden opportunity to express their wishes, they do not seem to be prepared to forego their majority rights to form a democratically elected government in Iraq. This is indeed a source of major preoccupation, not only for the Americans, but also more seriously for the Kurds and Sunnis. Since, as we mentioned above, the Kurdish population had long fought for its autonomy even during Saddam’s reign of terror in Iraq; and very probably they would not concede to a unitary system of government under the majority leadership of the Shiites12. For the Sunnis also, who have always been embedded with political power in Iraq, it would be very hard to compromise on the issue of power distribution.
This is indeed the hard part of the process of nation-building and State formation on the basis of democratic criteria. In fact, this is the paradox of the current situation in Iraq. While the international community arduously tries to promote democratic values throughout the world, in this particular case, the process does not seem to be of any appeal to anybody. Since, most observers fear that a direct democratic election, on the basis of one man one vote, will end up with the emergence of a fundamentalist anti-Western Islamic regime in Iraq. Furthermore, the apprehension of the Kurdish movements to resume hostilities and fight for independence or autonomy against a centralized unitary government puts the future of a stable Iraq into serious doubt.
Those who suggest federalist system of government in Iraq, in fact, have a close eye on the potential troubles that may occur by a majority rule. In practice, federalism requires a consensus by all the factions on democratic principles and tolerance between diversities of regional and local values. For this reason, the necessity of balancing between unity and multiplicity makes a federal system very difficult to operate effectively. Nonetheless, in the particular case of Iraq, one has to make a delicate calculation as to the benefits and vices of each system. Although federalist institutions require a fully democratic system-which is lacking in present Iraq, there seem to exist no other practical solution which could restore order and stability in this war-torn country.
We have to bear in mind that too much freedom for a country that has suddenly fallen on the path of democracy, may well end up to chaos and instability, as we are witnessing now in Iraq. The power vacuum after the collapse of the Ba’ath regime and the lootings of hospitals, museums and government offices under the eyes of occupying forces, are good examples of the limits to freedom and democracy. Too much democracy or too much concentration of power can result to stalemate. However, neither solution may guarantee to handle the problem of daily violence in Iraq.
The alternative is to induce promotion of more opportunities at a level so great as to effect a net increase in the satisfaction of all contending parties in Iraq. However, all these ideals shall depend on the future constitution of Iraq, which is to be drafted by an elected convention no later than March 15, 2005.13

5- The U.S. Plan for Transfer of Iraq’s Sovereignty:
The Paradox of Democracy

The continued violence in Iraq after the capture of Saddam Hussein, who was supposed to conduct resistance against the American occupation, forced the United States to request help from the United Nations14. This was in line with the American created Iraqi Governing Council’s position for a transfer of sovereignty under the supervision of the UN. At the core of the idea of the American plan is that assemblies of notable regional and religious representatives – something alike caucuses- would select a parliament with a number of delegates (of course friendly to Americans.) The parliament then would elect the provisional government to which State power would be handed over by June 30, 2004. The Shiites however, did not go along with the plan, and protested against it on the demand of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, a prominent religious leader of Iranian origin.15 Ayatollah Sistani has demanded that a direct election should be carried in Iraq and supervised by the United Nations. The Bush administration had no other choice than to call upon the UN Secretary General to intervene in the affair before the violence and bloody attacks on American and allied forces get out of control and affect president Bush’s campaign in this election year.
The present US appointed Iraqi Governing Council has 24 members and its main task is to draft before February 28 a “ fundamental law” or a “Provisional Constitution” to govern a transitional period running from July 1 until the end of 2005. This period starts with the handover of political power from the US led coalition to an Iraqi transitional government. This body shall cease to function with the establishment of an elected government on the basis of a new constitution, which shall be drafted by an elected convention by March 15, 2005.16
The most important feature of the constitution would be about the rational and practical distribution of power among various regions and groups. As a basic document, the constitution shall have the last word. It is the essential embodiment of State legitimacy. In the special case of Iraq, which has little democratic experience, the future constitution shall spell out all rules, which directly or indirectly affect the distribution or exercise of the sovereign power. This may include all rules, which define relations among regional governments, as well as their representative members in the central government, and the pattern in which sovereign power of the State is executed.
We should bear in mind that no single institutional or constitutional model, no matter how much democratic, from a theoretical or practical point of view, can be logically imprinted from outside and applied to the case of Iraq. This is to mean that a sui-generis type of constitutional document shall be tailored for Iraq, taking into consideration many indigenous factors, including ethnic and religious diversities, social, cultural, political, economic and strategic concern. This constitution must not only specify the division of legitimate authority between branches of government, but also it shall indicate relationship between the people and the State, between their freedom, or autonomy and the overall conditions of local and central governments on their behalf.17
Of course, it is not possible here to explain the detail of the operating principles that should be included in a plausible Iraqi constitution. But, some of the essential lines can be briefly alluded to. One major point that should be rigorously taken into account is the strict separation of State and religion. This means the principle of secular State, where the legitimate power emanates from the people. Otherwise, in a country like Iraq, we should expect upheaval and turmoil in future. This is actually the main reason behind the argument that only a federalist democratic system can reasonably respond to the expectation of a stable Iraq in the years to come. As we mentioned earlier, a direct mass democracy in Iraq will end up to the situation where the Shiite majority may embark on creating some sort of religious State, which is the worst alternative that can be visualized.
The idea of secularism is not interpreted the same way in the West and among the traditional Moslem countries of the Middle East. In some places, secularism is considered as the residue of Western influence and imperialism; thus a return to religious ideas is perceived synonymous to anti-imperialistic movement. In other cases, religion is gaining momentum as an ideological drive for salvation, independence, freedom, social justice and other ideals normally attributed to Western democracy.18 This is exactly the trend that we witnessed during the rule of Taliban in Afghanistan and their peers (Al-Qaeda), and is still spreading throughout the world.19
It is true that religion - in this particular case Islam, has always attracted hopeless people and has given hope and fear to competing and opponent political factions in traditional societies. But, we are not quite sure how much it is capable in helping to alleviate the burden of the new challenge and respond to the demands of modern world of the 21st century. The vision of a unified Moslem world (Ummah) to which the new revolutionary generation of religious leaders in Iraq and elsewhere in the Islamic world adheres, is a system presumably independent from the existing world order, plagued by the September 11 events. Their strategic objectives are inherently incompatible with the established norms and structure of the existing international system and in total disaccord with democratic principles. Few of them may give lip service to the demands of the average Moslem believers for the sake of acquiring political power, but once they get it, they will not be accountable to anybody.
For these reasons, the United Nations, the Americans and their allies must be very careful of the paradox of mass democracy and the vices of eventual direct elections in war-torn Iraq. This is the case where democracy decays either because of the stupidity of leaders or because of the cupidity of the masses.20 Indeed, nobody wishes to see in future the Iraqi people regret the times when Saddam Hussein, the so-called butcher of Baghdad, was in power. There are of course a handful of ill wishers in the region, who feel quite happy with the present chaotic situation in Iraq. They are those who fear the wider implications of a stable and democratic State in their contiguity.


6-The Wider Ramification of Democratic Iraq for the Middle East

There seems to be little doubt that achieving a stable and democratic Iraq is a sublime objective that the international community as a whole should logically pursue. But unfortunately, a number of authoritarian States in the region are not very fond of such event. The reason for that apathy is more or less comprehensible. We may well remember that after September 11, which led to the collapse of Talibans in Afghanistan and then the Ba’ath regime in Iraq, many dictatorial regimes in the Middle East anxiously asked who is the next on the list? In those days the massage to undemocratic rogue States was rather clear: “you are with us or with the terrorists!” Countries that disagreed with U.S, intervention or one way or another cooperated with terrorists, became alarmed and voiced protests about the U.S. president harsh warning.
Some others believed that the only solution to cope with terrorism is to attack at its roots, which are the fertile ground that helps the creation of such phenomenon. It was argued that dictatorial regimes in the region should go through a forced democratization process as a preventive measure to terrorism. Here we do not intend to pass judgment on the rationale of either of these arguments. In a separate paper I explained the legality of American military interventions in the region.21
Thus, those who had some dubious connection with the terrorists became very nervous and for a while kept quiet waiting the development of the matter. But soon after the stalemate in Iraq’s affairs, they regain their nerves and joyfully claimed that the United States was trapped in another Vietnam.
With the mounting daily challenge against the U.S. and allied forces in Iraq, the situation indeed became unbearable22. In fact, one of the reasons for the American requesting a more serious involvement of the United Nations in Iraq was to alleviate the burden of the U.S. unilateralism that had even deranged its close allies in the NATO. Unfortunately, this world organization was not prepared to further pay the price of Iraq’s insecurity, after the decisive blast on UN Headquarters in Baghdad, which claimed the life of many innocent people, including UN representative in Iraq.23
Although the authors behind these seemingly organized violence are not quite known, but with a bit of imagination, one could see the hands of those who get most advantage from these misdeeds. It is certain that the Iraqi people, even those who used to claim resistance against the occupying forces before Saddam’s capture, no longer have any incentive and benefit in these bloodsheds and atrocities. Since, as we are witnessing these days, the main objective of troublemakers is to inhibit the smooth transfer of sovereignty to Iraqi people, who are the main target and victim of violence.
Countries, who are anxious to be on the list of American neo-conservative hawks for the next round of U.S. offensive, are the ones who are wishful to see the United States entangled in Iraq’s muddy ground. Because they think, as long as this superpower’s forces are busy in Iraq, they can breathe freely and be safe from an eventual assault. Therefore, common sense logic dictates that they would do all they have in their capacity to keep the Americans busy in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world.
Therefore, one of the most urgent tasks of American strategists would be the quick round up of the situation in Iraq, not for the purpose of opening another front in the Middle East, but in order to have free hands for handling other crises in this turbulent and unstable region. In fact, there are a number of trouble spots in the Middle East that need to be managed quickly; otherwise, they will emerge suddenly as a volcano that may threaten the regional and world order as a whole.
On the agenda of outstanding critical issues in the Middle East, which have direct impact on the current situation of Iraq, are problems of democracy, human rights, terrorism of all kinds, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the plague of despotic regimes. The question of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict is one of those that is susceptible to overshadow the management of other crises in the region, thus needs special attention and has to be settled once for all. The much-debated problem of nuclear proliferation may also be included in the priority list.24 Other marginal issues, such as water, famine, diseases, narcotics substances, organized crimes, money laundering, human and natural environment, ethnic and religious divergence, can too lead to instability and conflicts in the region. This means that terrorism is a multifaceted phenomenon, deep rooted in a variety of causes and factors that have to be recognized and dealt with appropriately. The dilemma of nation-building and State formation in Iraq, after the sudden downfall of the brutal regime of Iraq to the Hobbesian condition of “state of nature,” is an important impediments, in the process of transfer of sovereignty to this war torn country.

7- Conclusions
The road to peace, democracy and stability in Iraq has many turnings beyond which it is difficult to see. Last February 2004, foreign ministers of neighboring States of Iraq, including that of Iraq itself, gathered for an urgent meeting in Kuwait in order to stress their position on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of this country.25 They also reaffirmed the importance of enhancing the role of UN so that it can assume its central responsibilities throughout the transition process in Iraq. This is indeed a good gesture provided it is backed with good intention. Since as we well know, most of the troubles inside Iraq are planed and executed by outsiders (Al-Qaeda or other fundamentalist groups). Some neighboring States pretend that they are not capable of controlling their borders to prevent illegal infiltrators and terrorist groups from sneaking into Iraq. But, how much truth lays in their alleged reason is subject to query.
The United States, as the predominant occupying State, should manage its strategy in a manner to achieve the following objectives in Iraq:
1) Transfer of sovereignty on the scheduled point in time, i.e. June 30, 2004. Because, any temptation to postpone this date would have negative impact on the whole process. It is worth mentioning that some ill wishers prefer that the US stay there for a longer period and to be pushed out of Iraq by forceful means. To them, this will cause US to loose credibility, which will deter it from eventual future interventions in the region;
2) Establish a secular system of State in which political power remains aloof of spiritual authority;
3) Draw up a constitution, which reflects the legitimate demands and wishes of all ethnic and religious interests groups in Iraq;
4) Form a federal system of government, by taking into account the historical, regional and ethnic diversities and population distribution as well as potential political tendency and background of each region;
5) Avoid dealing secretly with or giving any unfair advantage to any faction who is more vocal than the other. We have to bear in mind that things may not remain on the sly and soon will be revealed and may damage the whole situation. This is especially true with the majority Shi’a Moslems who have long been subjugated by their Sunni peers;
6) Insure that countries neighboring Iraq effectively control and block all illegal infiltration into Iraq, and deter eventual deliberate penetration, through bilateral arrangements or UN sanctions;
7) Give primary role to the UN for the preparation of the draft of the new constitution and the supervision on its implementation;
8) Rely more and more on indigenous forces for the maintenance of internal law and order during the transition period. UN forces backed by allied military and intelligence capabilities should secure borders for the prevention of illegal infiltration. In other words, foreign forces should be kept away from public eyes in major cities and towns;
9) Insure that major oil facilities are protected against terrorist attacks and sabotage, conducted by inside mischievous or outside intruders;

To achieve the above objectives, the United States shall draw a long-term plan with the cooperation of all parties involved, including UN, allied, and neighboring States of Iraq.
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the course of action for democratic change in traditional countries with a long history of authoritarian culture, repressive regimes and tyrannical leaders is not an easy process. The United States, the UN and whoever in charge of this vital task, should bear in mind the fact that the democratization process is very difficult and time-consuming. Those who lack patience may soon get disappointed and discouraged. This is something that should be avoided like pest. Any over-zeal to open the society too quick too soon, as the radicals may claim, might end up to disaster. Those opportunists who instigate emotional masses to take to the streets of major cities in Iraq, to demand a variety of things that usually emanate from a free democratic society, should not necessarily be listened to. Because first, they may not be familiar with democratic process and second, they may not have good intention and third, others who might not seek the true interests of Iraqi people may manipulate them.
One thing that Iraq does not need at this critical juncture of history is that political and democratic process be left to the hands of sloppy masses in the streets. The U.S. and its allies should not be intimidated by such mass protests. This means that they ought to do what is rational and legitimate and which best serve the long-term interests of Iraqi people, the Middle East and the international community as a whole.

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Post Scriptum:
After the completion of the first draft of this paper in mid February 2004, a number of important developments took place in Iraq tumultuous political scene. The first was the simultaneous fatal explosions on March 2nd 2004 (which coincide with the Shiite most venerated day of Ashura, the anniversary of Imam Hussein’s martyrdom), in various cities of Iraq, including Karbala, Kazemein and Baghdad. The number of casualties was too high (about 181 killed and many hundreds injured), almost all of them were Shiites from Iraq and Iran.
The second event was the termination of the official deadline for the promulgation of the provisional Constitutional Draft, which would govern the provisional Iraqi State during the transitional period, i.e. until December 2005. Apparently, the Shiite members of the Iraq’s Governing Council still have some differences with the others about some provisions of the Provisional Constitution. It seems that there is a dispute over two elements of the draft document - named the Transitional Administrative Law -, which, until now, had not seemed to be at issue:
a-Shia members of the IGC are ostensibly calling for a collective presidency that includes three Shias, one Kurd and one Sunni Muslim. The draft stipulates a president and two deputies.
b-It is believed Shias also want to change the mechanisms by which a permanent constitution could be ratified, removing safeguards that would give minority groups a veto.
c-Clauses in the draft reportedly say two-thirds of voters in any three provinces can veto the permanent charter in a referendum.
d-The Kurds' self-rule region includes three provinces - and reports suggest the Shias may have now gone back on a pledge to give Kurds constitutional guarantees.26
Nonetheless, the main lines of vital interests included in the Draft are the followings, which are expected to remain unchanged:
1-The draft charter will recognize Islam as one source of legislation rather than the only source. However, it is also said no legislation should be passed that was deemed to contravene Islam. This seems to be an attempt to "strikes a balance between the role of Islam and the bill of individual rights and democratic principles".27
2-The Draft gives autonomy to the Kurdish minority for now .The issue of the Iraqi Kurds' future was essentially deferred. They are to remain autonomous, but a permanent constitution will at a later date determine the exact nature of their self-government.
3-Women can now hope for 25% of seats in a new national assembly, although this is a goal, not a specific quota.
4-The document also stipulates that Iraq will have a president, two deputies, a prime minister and a cabinet. (As mentioned above, the Shias seems to differ on this point.)
5-The bill of rights includes protections for free speech and religious expression.
After several delays due to the consultations of the Shiite members of the Governing Council with the Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the Draft of the Provisional Constitution for the interim government of Iraq was officially signed on 8 March 2004.

* * * *

1 – See e.g. R. D. Dikshit, Political Geography, A Contemporary Perspective, Tata McGraw- Hill Publishing Company Limited, New Delhi, 1982,pp.160-161

2 – John Stuart Mill(1861) has once given one of the best definition of nation. He defined it as “ A portion of mankind united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any other – which makes them cooperate with each other more willingly than other people; desire to be under the same government and the desire that it should be governed by themselves exclusively” ibid. p.161

3 – Reinhold Niebuhr enumerated the following elements as the forces of cohesion for a community to become a nation: common language and a sense of ethnic kinship, geographic unity and continuity, a common historical experience and frame of political thought, a common area of economic mutuality, and sometimes, the fear of a common enemy. According to Niebhur, any of these forces may be defective, but they can not be all defective if the unity of a nation is to be preserved . A common religion was usually regarded as an equally important prerequisite until religiously pluralistic nations refuted the theory. cf. idem

4 – The main characteristics of a State are the ones exposed briefly above. However, the interested reader may refer to any book on international relations or international law in order to find complementary explanations about the term.

5 – There are some entities that have territory, population, and even a government, but are not considered as State in legal term and have no international personality. Such as, for instance, Puerto Rico, which under the United State sovereign control. Some writers believe that the element of recognition of a State by other States and the international community as a whole is also a sine-qua-non for the formation of a sovereign entity.

6 – This is the case of Germany after the Second World War and its occupation by allied forces, which later became a fully sovereign State.

7- Cf. e.g. Dikshit. Op.cit. P.163

8- In 1975 after the conclusion of a reconciliation treaty with Iran, Iraq abandoned its claim over the Shatt al Arab, and Iran also ended its support of Kurdish rebellion. Thereafter, the Kurdish resistance and war against Baghdad also gradually attenuated.

9 -The barbaric attack of Iraqi forces on the people of Halabja with chemical weapons in 1986 is an n example of such atrocities against Kurds.
10- Statistics on the number of Shi’a differs from 65-75 % depending on the sources. Under Saddam’s rule the Kurds, much smaller than the Shia and Sunnis, for a decade, occupied the northern region of Iraq, and had a status close to independence. Although amongst the Sunni, Shia and Kurd triangle, the Kurds had backed an American long term occupation, which allows the Americans to move safely through Iraqi Kurdistan into Iraq, however, just recently the US proposed a plan for the Kurds to have little control in this northern region, but the Kurds rejected US proposal. The Kurds insists on retaining the power they gained under Saddam’s rule. Last year, while the attack on Iraq by America continued, the Kurds had captured the oil province, Kirkuk that is located in the northern region. The question is, will the Americans now betray the Kurds who have supported them all along? Let's follow what happens next. See: A:\Cariwave - Iraq's situation.h
11 – The Ba’ath Party was essentially an ultra-nationalist, left wing, Pan-Arab group, a rival faction of that which still controls Syria.

12 – Mass protests by Shiites in several major cities of Iraq to support the demand of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani for direct elections even before the schedule set out by the Americans for transfer of power to Iraqi people, appear to be a vivid indication that they intend to seize the opportunity for a Shiite majority rule. The religious leader even refused to meet with Paul Bremer, the US administrator in Iraq in order to discuss the matter. This indicates that the plan proposed by Washington relating to regional caucus system, otherwise meant a federal political structure, is not acceptable to the Shiite majority. However, Ayatollah Sistani did not rule out the possibility that the issue of popular vote before the American deadline for transfer of power (30 June 2004) must be studied by the United Nations.

13- One of the Shiite leader Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim, who is a member of the Iraqi Governing Council, and who heads the largest Shiite organization, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), recently expressed the view that during the dictatorial regime of Saddam both Kurds and Shiites suffered from injustice, and naturally the Sunnis who were part of Saddam’s circles now fear their retaliation, and think that in a Shiite majority government they might be subjugated of disfavored. He reassured that such thing shall not happen and all the parties will receive adequate treatment in the distribution of power and official posts in future.
14 – It has to be remembered that the United Nations office in Baghdad ceased to function and closed down after a fatal bomb attack which claimed the life of many, including UN representative in Iraq.
15 See supra, note 12. It is noteworthy to remind that the Shiite population in Iraq have the bitter memories of being twice summoned to rebellion and mass protests- by the Nixon and first Bush administrations, where in both cases they were not supported and left to the mercy of Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime. They were murdered by hundreds and put in mass graves, found all over Iraq after the collapse of Saddam.

16 See Iran Daily, February 5, 2004, p.9. According to US plan, the constitutionalprocess and timeline will ultimately be included in the Fundamental Law, but need to be agreed in advance, as detailed below:. · A permanent constitution for Iraq will be prepared by a constitutional convention directly elected by the Iraqi people.· Elections for the convention will be held no later than March 15, 2005.· A draft of the constitution will be circulated for public comment and debate.· A final draft of the constitution will be presented to the public, and a popular referendum will be held to ratify the constitution.· Elections for a new Iraqi government will be held by Dec. 31, 2005, at which point the Fundamental Law will expire and a new government will take power. See: A:\[casi] Agreement on formation of Iraq's new government.htm
The United States and Britain have said Iraq must first have a constitution and hold elections before they relinquish sovereignty. France, Germany and Russia are seeking a quick transfer of power to a provisional Iraqi government and want the United Nations to get the major role in overseeing the country's political transition to a democracy. The new U.S. draft does not set a deadline for the hand over of power, which France had said it wanted by the end of the year. But it does ask the United Nations to help the Iraqi people during the political transition and provide its "unique expertise" when the Governing Council holds a constitutional conference and in its preparations for elections. The United States, which holds the council's rotating presidency for October, circulated the draft informally. According to the draft, co-sponsored by Britain and Spain, the Governing Council must submit to the Security Council by Dec. 15 "a timetable and a program for the drafting of a new constitution for Iraq and for the holding of democratic elections under the constitution." See: A:\U_S_ Draft Sets Iraq Election Timetable.htm

17 The "Fundamental Law," or the Provisional Constitution to be drafted by the Governing Council in close consultation with the Coalition Provisional Authority. Will be approved by both the GC and CPA, and will formally set forth the scope and structure of the sovereign Iraqi transitional administration. Elements of the "Fundamental Law":* Bill of rights, to include freedom of speech, legislature, religion; statement of equal rights of all Iraqis, regardless of gender, sect, and ethnicity; and guarantees of due process. * Federal arrangement for Iraq, to include governorates and the separation and specification of powers to be exercised by central and local entities. * Statement of the independence of the judiciary, and a mechanism for judicial review.
* Statement of civilian political control over Iraqi armed and security forces. See: A:\[casi] Agreement on formation of Iraq's new government.htm
18 – For detail see: Ali-Asghar Kazemi, Religion and Politics: In Search of Compatibility and Compromise (Monograph, Tehran: 1985), p.122

19 In fact, the September 11, 2001 events, which finally brought the United States and its allies to Afghanistan and Iraq, are the product of such fundamentalist beliefs that secularism and Western style democracy are nothing but a major conspiracy to devoid the Moslems of their religious principles.

20 There are two schools of thought in this context: One, the skeptics who maintain that human frailties make mass participation in politics both impractical and undesirable. To these, ordinary people simply lack the requisite knowledge, skills, and motivations to act responsibly. The opposing view ( optimists) puts the blame on political leaders. In both cases the paradox of democracy is present. See “ Democracy and Public Opinion: Two Views,” www.udel.edu/htr/American/Texts/public.html

21 – See my paper on “The Legality of U.S. Armed Interventions and Prospects for Peace and Democracy in the Middle-East” Presented to: The Regional Security Conference UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations and The Foreign Ministry of Greece , 2-5 August 2003

22 – See my paper “Mounting Challenges to U.S. Military Presence in Iraq and the Rising Costs of Occupation,” presented to the Middle East Regional Security Conference, December 2003, Athens –Greece.

23 – Similar dubious explosions took place more recently in Kurdish region, which also killed many Kurds, including a number of prominent Kurdish leaders and officials.
24 – On the question of nuclear proliferation see my paper: “ Shifting U.S. Threat Perception after September 11 and the Fear of Iran’s Nuclear Threat,” Presented the Regional Security Conference, Athens-Greece, December 2003

25 – Ministers from Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Egypt and Bahrain agreed in this meeting to “ re-emphasize the territorial integrity of Iraq together with respecting the sovereignty, independence and unity of Iraq , in addition to complying with the principles of non-interference in its internal affairs.” See: Iran Daily, February 16, 2004. p.1
26 –See: A:\BBC NEWS World Middle East Iraqis put constitution on hold.htm – 5 March 2004

27 – Cf. A:\BBC NEWS Middle East Iraq's draft constitution hailed.htm - March 1,2004

* Bush Reelection and the Middle East:Iran in Focus

[First Draft]

Bush Reelection and the Middle East:
Iran in Focus!

Ali-Asghar Kazemi*
November 2004
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Keywords: Middle East, U.S. elections, Iran’s nuclear project, Iraq situation, Democratization process, Terrorism, Conservative agenda, EU talks with Iran…


Introduction


The much-debated November 2, 2004 presidential elections in the United States has finally come to an end with an unprecedented victory for the republican candidate, George W. Bush. Bush reelection for a second term as United States president was interpreted and received variously both inside and outside the U.S. Although many Americans expected this triumph for the conservative president, but the perplexing polls shed a lot of confusion on the results until the last minutes. The reason for this perplexity was that many Americans were not quite sure as to whether they should vote for a warrior president who consistently maintained that USA was in a state of war against terrorism at home and abroad.

While Bush reelection into office for a second term came not as a surprise and many people around the world welcomed the event, some others, including heads of states and politicians, got severely disappointed. Now the question at this juncture is what would be the implication of Bush’s reelection for the world at large and the Middle East in particular? This paper shall try to examine the question especially from the vantage point of Iran which, at the midst of its nuclear ambition, seems to be caught between the “devil and the deep sea.” However, it will be argued that the fate of peace and order in the Middle East appears to be very much tied up to the policy that the United States will pursue with respect to Iran.
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* Professor Ali-Asghar Kazemi holds a Ph.D. in International Law and Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Mass. He is the author of many books and articles, and a legal advisor on matters concerning the international law of the sea. Currently, he is dean of the Graduate School of Law and Political Science, Islamic Azad University (Science and Research Campus) Tehran-Iran. For more information please consult: http://www.akazemi.homestead.com/



Mixed Reactions to Bush Reelection in the Middle East

US entanglement in Iraq and to some extent in Afghanistan, and the ominous news of daily casualties of US soldiers, had scared many people inside and outside the US, to the extent that about 75% of foreigners around the world wished that John Kerry would be elected as US president. In the Middle East it was received with mixed reaction. Some traditional undemocratic rulers feared the “democratization” plan as a de-stabilizing force threatening their very survival. While some peace hungry people expressed joy for reinstating the peace process in Arab-Israeli relations and re-establishing law and order in Iraq.

In the Middle East the situation was much more confusing, since the US presidential elections coincided with Yasser Arafat’s aggravating health condition, which resulted to the emergency evacuation of the Palestinian leader to France for treatment. The day the results of the elections were announced, Arafat was declared clinically dead, and therefore he would never know the outcome of this election, so important and critical for the Palestinian cause.[i]

In Iran there was a split between the leaders and the people. While Iranian officials abstained to formally take either side, because of harsh position of the two candidates during the election campaign on Iran’s nuclear issue, in the back of their mind they preferred democrats to replace the much dangerous “war president.” On the other hand, a large majority of Iranian people rejoiced Bush reelection on various grounds. Average people and those who had fought during the Iran-Iraq war or lost members of their families and beloved, looked at Bush as a “knight in shining armor” who miraculously fulfilled the Iranian dream of defeating Saddam Hussein and his cruel regime. The intellectuals and opposition groups saw a promising outlook in their vision of a democratic Iran in the years ahead.[ii]
On the other hand, Israel[iii] and the US-backed interim leaders of Iraq were confident a second term for Bush would signal more of the same policies. Before the election result was announced, Iraqi interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi expressed hope that "Whoever is the winner will be our friend. The United States has liberated us from a dictator and a very long period of war and agony.”[iv]
Elsewhere in the world, many politicians, officials and heads of states did not hide their sentiment against Bush’s reelection. In Europe, while many countries, which opposed United States military intervention in Iraq, tried to walk on the borderline in their remarks, awaiting for the results. Indeed, if Bush reelection means that the conservative agenda will continue its previous course with more rigor and resolve, this would be bad new for EU and the rest of perplexing world.

Below we shall examine some of the most critical issues that the new Bush administration will be facing in the years ahead and with particular reference to the Middle East and Iran.


Pending Critical Issues on the Middle East Agenda

President Bush’s reelection for a second term into office with an unprecedented majority, legitimately gives him the mandate to pursue his plans and to achieve the strategy he has followed in the past years throughout the world, including the crises-ridden Middle East. Since the second US military intervention in Iraq, which brought down Saddam Hussein and his cruel regime, the new conservatives in Washington became subject of a number of accusations both from inside and outside the United States.

Much has been said about the issue of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and lack of clear evidence for their existence and relations between Iraq and Al-Qaeda, on which basis apparently Iraq was target of US military intervention. Many US allies in Europe, such as France and Germany, objected to American unilateralism and abstained to endorse US strategy in the Middle East, especially in Iraq. It goes without saying that these countries did not wish to see Bush reelected. But now they have no other choice than to go along with the Americans who by their votes endorsed their president for another four years. Indeed, the years ahead could be very critical for the fate of the Middle East and as a consequence, the world as a whole.

It is safe to say that now, more than anytime in the past, the people of the greater Middle East look towards Washington for their hopes and wishes. They are aware that now the US president has a much better position inside (vis a vis the Congress) and outside, with respect to American allies, who once were hesitant in dealing with the United States ventures around the world. But, this does not necessarily means that the tasks before the US president, with a fresh mandate, are easy to achieve. Furthermore, the neo-conservative hawks in the US administration should be warned against the temptation that they can solve all the outstanding issues in the world by military might and hard power. This is especially true with regard to new genre of terrorism religious radicalism around the world.

A number of urgent problems would have to be included in the agenda of the US president that can be classified as follows disregard of their priorities:

· The lingering issues of Arab-Israeli situation, including the Palestinian problem in the wake of Yasser Arafat disappearance from the Middle East political scene,
· The Iraqi situation and the necessity for a quick round up of the ongoing entanglement,
· The issue of nuclear proliferation and the condition created by Iran’s nuclear ambition,
· The problem of Islamic radicalism and the growing threats of international terrorism,
· The issue of democratization of the greater Middle East as a solution to contain terrorism,
· Other situations susceptible to emerge as crises endangering US interests in the region.

It goes without saying that peace and order in the Middle East are severely geared to the timely and appropriate management of those critical issues, which could otherwise be a heavy burden on the way of American policy and strategy in the years ahead. Indeed, George W. Bush would have difficult times in his second term in office to properly carry out his stated plans to unravel these critical issues. However, if he chooses to go it alone and to continue to persist on unilateralist actions, as he did in the past, the chances for a quick way out of the impending problems would be very meager.

Perhaps one of the main handicaps of Bush and his neo-cons advisers around him is his reductionism approach to political realm. That is to say, that he tends sees everything in a dual manner: black and white, good and evil, etc. Whether we like it or not, this approach is susceptible to increase animosity against Americans around the world, not only in the Middle East but also among Europeans, who are demonstrating more and more dissatisfaction against U.S. policy in the region.

Considering the fact that this short paper lacks enough space to address all of the above issues, it would only focus on the recurring problem of nuclear proliferation and the U.S. policy toward Iran. Of course, it could be argued that Iran’s nuclear ambition is somehow geared to other critical problems such as Islamic radicalism and democratization in the region. One can go even further to contend that Iran’s position with respect to the Palestinian problem and the unfortunate condition in Iraq has direct bearing upon U.S. policy towards Iran. Since, from the beginning of the American intervention in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, after the 9/11, Iran has shown that it can play a crucial role in the region with respect to the success or failure of American policy in the whole Middle East.


Iran’s Nuclear Venture in the wake of Bush Reelection

While U.S. elections were underway, Iranian and EU3 (French, British and German), diplomats were in the process of negotiating on the nuclear issue[v]. The talks had started in the midst of the hot debates between the two candidates for U.S. president. Interestingly, both contenders voiced their position with much concern about Iranian attempt to become a nuclear actor. Whereas Iranian hardliners did not hide their preference for the Democrat’s candidate, the average people and intellectuals favored Bush to be reelected into office.

The second round of EU negotiations with Iran came as a result of a split between Europe and the United States as to how they should tackle with Iran’s nuclear ambition. Then emerged the “stick and carrot” policy, with the EU accepting the task of continuing to encourage Iran with a package of incentives to abandon its nuclear project, including the immediate termination of nuclear enrichment for an undetermined period in the future. Before the results of U.S. elections were released, Iranian negotiators showed intransigent attitude towards their European counterparts. Meanwhile the conservative hardliners in the Islamic Parliament in Tehran ventured to pass a resolution requiring the government to resume the nuclear enrichment process, with a view to influence Iran-EU negotiations underway.

Claiming that Iran would not allow itself to forego its legitimate rights to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, Iranian diplomats took a hard position vis-à-vis Europe and occasionally threaten to leave the negotiation table. However, when the outcome of the elections became known and Bush prevailed, this had immediate impact upon the atmosphere and Iranians clearly softened their attitude. Meanwhile Iran had attempted to attract Russian and Chinese attention to the problem and succeeded to obtain some kind of verbal assurance from them with respect to the eventual hand over of the case to the United Nations Security Council[vi]. Iran is conscious of the fact that these two countries, as permanent members of the SC, can use their veto right to block an eventual resolution against it in this important organ. But, it is not quite sure whether Russia and China would do so for the mere fact of pleasing Iran against the discontent Western powers.

European Union leaders while showing the “carrots” dangled the prospect of important trade pact to Iran, provided that this country suspends its nuclear program[vii]. However, the United States, which implicitly assumed the role of “bad guy” with the “stick,” does not seem to be happy with the formula and calls for a permanent halt to Iran’s uranium enrichment project. It is being speculated that if until the next meeting of the UN nuclear watchdog on November 25, 2004 the negotiation does not succeed to convince Iran on a full and sustained suspension of all enrichment and reprocessing activities, then the chances of the case being submitted to the SC are very high.

Considering the fact that Iranians thus far seem very uncompromising on the matter of “perpetual cessation” or “indefinite suspension” of their nuclear program, and might only temporarily suspend this activity on a “voluntary basis,” as a measure of confidence building, the following points could be speculated:

· Iranians are not so much worried about their case being submitted to the Security Council, because they seem to have some other kinds of assurance,

· They may be counting upon the support of Russia and China, as two important permanent members of this UN body, to block any eventual resolution,

· By prolonging the negotiation process, Iranians may be buying time to reach to a stage in their nuclear program, which put them in an un-returnable path and then, they will withdraw from the NPT altogether in order to proceed their way to nuclear option!

· Iranians may be on the verge of reaching to a nuclear deterrence position, which permits them to negotiate on an equal footing with their nuclear rivals in the West,

· Iranians may be merely caught between “the devil and the deep sea,” not knowing what to do with the current situation, fearing that any move might further endanger the overall survival of the Islamic regime.

We cannot be quite sure which of the above speculations may be true. But, from the face value of Iran’s rather bold diplomatic undertakings, it is safe to suggest that the Islamic regime is actually using all the leverages at hand, both economic, political and even military[viii], to come clean out of this muddle. The recent deal on liquefied gas with China, which amounts to an overall value of $200 billion, is one such undertaking which would tie Iran’s political fate to China’s growing needs for energy over the next 25 years. Russians on the other hand, are very happy about the current nuclear plant in Bushehr and the prospective other nuclear plant deals with Iran and seem not to be ready to forego this lucrative business just for the sake of giving a hand to American plan to contain Iran’s ambition to use nuclear technology, which in their view, is not harmful.

Iran may even try to lure Europeans in giving out concessions on oil and other business of mutual interests, which could deflect American pressure. On the other hand, Europeans well know that any attempt to pass a UN Security Council resolution under chapter 7 of the Charter, with the effect of preventing Iran’s oil export, would have a disastrous impact upon the market price, already unbearable by them. Thus, they might not be ready to go along with eventual economic sanctions against Iran.

Furthermore, an eventual preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities or oil installations on land or offshore, either directly by the United States or through Israel, will not be supported by EU or the international community as a whole. On the other side, one should recognize that if Iran perceives a real threat in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere in its land territory, it has the capacity to make the whole region insecure. Indeed, these impediments make it very difficult for the U.S. president and his entourage to carry out a strategy in the Middle East, which would threaten Iran’s survival or undermine its regional interests. Since, as we said before, Iran has already shown in other occasions that it is capable to frustrate any such plans throughout the region. Therefore, the fate of peace and order in the Middle East seems to be very much tied up to the policy that the United States will pursue with respect to Iran. This will bring us to a tentative conclusion that follows.


Looking to the Future

Considering recent development in the Middle East, the future of this region seems not to be very promising at this juncture. However, with the passing away of Yasser Arafat, some observers who regarded him as the main bottleneck in the peace process are now very optimistic on the matter. All would depend on the course of action that Arafat’s successors will choose to fulfill the long-awaited cause of Palestine. Current fluid situation does not permit to pass a realistic judgment on other impending issues issues. We have to wait and see how the future course of events may progress.

As to role that the new Bush administration may assume with respect to other outstanding issues on the Middle East agenda, we may come to the following concluding remarks, based on the information that we now have at hand:


· -Given that, according to official statements, no substantive change may take place in U.S. policy toward the Middle East, it does not appear that we should expect any immediate breakthrough in many respects, including the Palestinian problem,
· -The absence of Yasser Arafat from the political scene of the Middle East may open new horizon for a durable peace solution, but it is not quite sure whether Bush’s road map can be revitalized in the foreseeable future,
· -Recognizing that President Bush and his neo-conservative entourage have a definite propensity to solve problems of terrorism and related issue by using hard power and force, the prospects for eradicating this unusual phenomenon do not seem bright,
· -Notwithstanding the result of the upcoming elections in Iraq, that might take place next January 2005, the fluid situation in this country might not bring an end to Iraq’s chaos in near future,
· -Considering the fact that many traditional states in the Middle East are fearful of the Bush’s vision of “democratization” of the region, it does not seem that this controversial course of action will succeed to any considerable degree in the near future,
· -Iran might continue to remain evasive on the nuclear issue and the United States may not be able to put rein on this country’s ambition to acquire the nuclear technology with dual purposes of hostile and pacific ends,
· -It is not quite sure whether the United States can convince EU and two important permanent member of the UN Security Council (Russia and China) to submit Iran’s nuclear case to this organ for eventual sanctions,
· -Perhaps the only way out of this embarrassing situation for the United States is to open direct dialogue with Iran in order to put an end to all problems of mutual interests, including the nuclear issue.

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Notes


[i] Most countries in the region opted for caution after the White House claimed victory for the incumbent and challenger John Kerry conceded defeat. The Palestinian Authority's envoy to France admitted that veteran leader Yasser Arafat, who is being treated in Paris for a serious but undiagnosed illness, was "worried". Arafat "hopes the second mandate will be different" if Bush is confirmed the winner of Tuesday's election, Laila Shahid said. Echoing a generally negative Palestinian stand towards Bush, deputy parliament speaker Hasan Khraishah said "neither Bush nor Kerry spoke about the Palestinian question during their campaign.” ”Bush has only served to isolate the Palestinian leadership and block the peace process," he said. Cf., “Middle East concern over Bush Victory”, Aljazeera.Net, November 3, 2004.
[ii] On November 2, 2004 in Iran, thousands of demonstrators chanting "Death to America" marked the 25th anniversary of the US hostage crisis at the former American embassy in Tehran. One hard-line member of the parliament observed that America was headed for "international and economic ruin unless Bush is more careful in his second term” Iran student news agency ISNA
[iii] Before the election results, Israel was confident it would preserve its special relationship with Washington whoever will be elected to the White House. Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom said he did not expect Israel to come under any heightened US pressure over the dormant peace process. "So far we have cooperated with all American administrations and we will continue to do so. I don't think pressure will be necessary, Israel wants to advance on the road to peace," he said. Aljazeera.Net, ibid, Nov. 3, 2004.
[iv] Aljazeera.Net ibid.
[v] Iran had previously agreed in the final Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU Foreign Ministers of 21 October 2003 in Tehran, in order to promote mutual confidence with a view to removing barriers for cooperation in the nuclear field, “… to suspend voluntarily all Uranium enrichment and processing activities as defined by the IAEA.” See my paper on the subject presented to the UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations, “Iran’s Nuclear Venture: Legal Obligation and Political Temptation,” May 2004.
[vi] Chinese foreign minister visiting Tehran on November 6, 2004, stressed the necessity of long-run cooperation between the two countries and referring to Iran’s nuclear project said “ we support the continuation of Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA and also negotiation with the three European countries.” He expressed hope that the ongoing negotiation could lead to positive outcome and added that peaceful use of nuclear energy is a legitimate right of all countries. He further said that through more flexibility and cooperation, Iran can avoid the case being sent to the UN Security Council. Cf. Iran Daily, November 8, 2004, p.1
[vii] For example, the United Kingdom offered Iran to build a light nuclear reactor provided it discontinued it nuclear activities. British representatives presented the proposal during the November negotiation with Iranian diplomats in Paris, France. Based on this proposal, Iran should stop all of its ambiguous nuclear activities, including the enrichment process, which is essentially aimed at preventing Iran from making an “Islamic bomb.” Cf. : Iran Daily, November 8, 2004 . P.1

[viii] During the negotiation of Iranian and EU diplomats on nuclear issue, Iran’s conservative media have expounded various statements from high-ranking officials, including the leader and other military authorities warning against any pressure or blackmail unto Iran. At the same time it was announced by Iran’s Defense Minister that Iran is now in the process of mass production of its long-range missiles (Shahab 3). The commander of the Iranian ground forces also announced that the biggest military exercise in Iran’s history would soon be carried in Iran’s western frontiers bordering Iraq.